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Abstract
Three Essays on Inequality in the United States
by
Gowun Park
Adviser: Professor Wim Vijverberg
This dissertation is about inequality of income in the United States. The first essay ex-
amines how inequality in total personal income relates to the inequality in each income
component, such as wage income, interest income, transfer income, and so forth. The second
essay analyzes the percentile shares of wages to find the factors that contribute to U.S. wage
inequality. Furthermore, wage inequality is decomposed into the parts that are explained
and unexplained by these contributing factors. The third essay distinguishes the proportion
of the overall inequality that is due to pre-determined conditions of an individual.
Chapter 1: The Source of Income Inequality in the United States
The measurement of income inequality has been a focus of considerable study. However,
the determinants of income inequality are still unclear. This study explores which income
sources are primarily responsible for the observed U.S. income inequality using a decom-
position method. Moreover, by estimating the marginal effect of a specific source income,
I analyze its impact on overall income inequality. By doing so, this study identifies which
source income has been alleviating overall inequality the most – or has been increasing it
the most – before and after the financial crisis.
Among eight different sources, wage income has the largest as share in total income,
yet it is most equally distributed income source. However, the increase in the Gini of wage
v
income after the financial crisis suggests that the intensifying unequal distribution of this
source income contributed to rising inequality.
The role of government transfers is important in reducing inequality, especially after the
financial crisis. The equalizing effects of a ten percent increase in these transfers is a 0.84
percent reduction in the Gini of total income after the financial crisis. Among different
government transfers, Social Security is the greatest equalizer. Besides the government
transfers, retirement income reduces total inequality.
Interest and self-employment income show unequalizing effects on total inequality. The
importance of interest income rose during the financial crisis and increased again more re-
cently. The shares of self-employment income decreased since the financial crisis, and thus
its contribution to overall inequality became smaller.
Chapter 2: Unpacking Wage Inequality in the United States
Wage earnings are the single most important income source in the U.S. They account
for over 70 percent of total personal income. Therefore, wage may be the key determinant
of income inequality. Since the 1980s, slower economic growth, higher unemployment and
reduced wage shares have been observed in the U.S. Along with these economic trends, the
U.S. income inequality has been rising and many believe that these dispersions are due to
the widening of the U.S. wage structure since 1980 (Karoly and Burtless 1995). Severe wage
stagnation caused by the deep recession from the most recent financial crisis (2007-2009)
makes an analysis of wage inequality a challenging task. This study attempts to untangle
the trend of the U.S. wage inequality before and after the financial crisis and identify the
source of the differences in wage distributions.
The Gini coefficient is the most popular inequality measure but is not sufficiently prac-
tical for our purposes. While it does provide a global level of inequality, it does not reveal
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the detailed process underlying the changes of this measures. Furthermore, this inequality
measure has an inherent disadvantage: it varies whenever the distribution of wage income
changes without regard to the location of the changes, such as whether they happen at the
top or at the bottom of the distribution (Litchfield 1999). Therefore, this essay analyzes the
percentile shares of wages, as in the well-known work of Piketty (2014). By means of this
measure, this study investigates potential contributors to U.S. wage inequality during 2000-
2014, including gender, race, ethnicity, age, concentration of the top earners, occupation,
economic sector, location, difference in the level of educational attainment, and other condi-
tions such as employment status and a worker’s English language proficiency. Utilizing two
leading decomposition methods, I differentiate between components that can be explained
by individuals’ core characteristics and components that cannot be explained by these po-
tential contributors and thus, account for wage structural differences within our society. In
addition, by further dividing the decomposition results, this study examines which factors
are most likely to contribute to the difference in the wage distribution.
During 2000-2014, while wage income is more unevenly distributed among men, there
exist the glass ceiling for women in the form of a significant wage gap at the top decile.
Among five racial groups, within-group wage inequality among Asians is highest, while it
is lowest among the Other Races category. At every quintile, White workers are paid more
than non-White workers, and their relative gains tend to increase at higher quintile of the
distribution. This result suggests the existence of sticky floors for non-Whites that prevents
them from achieving an equivalent wage due to the higher returns to characteristics in favor
to Whites, in particular for men. The estimated wage gaps between non-Hispanic White
and others – either Hispanics or non-White non-Hispanics – is evidence of the presence of
the U.S. labor market polarization.
The college wage premium increases non-monotonically and the recent increase in wage
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inequality is not only due to the higher returns to higher education but also due to larger
within-group wage dispersion among more educated workers. Pre-determined conditions to
workers such as working status or English language proficiency widen wage gaps, particularly
at the top-end, up to 33.59 dollars per hour.
From a regional point of view, most of the wage dispersion in the U.S. is attributed
to the within-state wage inequality. The between-state inequality accounts only for less
than 20 percent during the sample period. The wage shares held by top one or top ten
percent highest earners are stable even during the financial crisis. They preserve about ten
percent and thirty two percent of total annual wages, respectively. The within-age cohort
wage inequalities tend to increase with age except for the teens as their potential experience
increases.
The between-occupation inequality is smaller than the within-occupation inequality.
There exists large relative gain of top one percent in managerial occupation relative to
those in other occupations, which is 149.37 dollars per hour. Workers are in the financial
sector are paid up to 116.97 dollars per hour more, depending on their relative ranks in the
wage distribution.
The U.S. wage dispersion increases after the financial crisis and it is mostly due to the
widening difference in the upper tail. In terms of composition or wage structure effects,
wage structure effects account more for wage inequality. The composition effects linked to
the industry has shown as increasing overall inequality. The most important contributor to
overall inequality is different at the top and at the bottom of the wage distribution. Wage
structure effects linked to education are contributed to increasing wage inequality in the
upper tail, but these are attributed to reducing wage inequality in the lower tail of the wage
distribution.
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Chapter 3: Inequality and Unequal Opportunity in the United States
Although many studies focus on inequality of outcomes (e.g., household income or personal
income or educational attainment), the outcome inequality does not adequately reflect the
inequality in society since this inequality is also the result of different levels of efforts. Thus,
inequality itself can be neither all good nor all bad (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011). The primary
concern for inequality of opportunity (IOP, see Roemer, 2000) emphasizes the aspects of
pre-determined factors that are beyond an individual’s control such as family background
or individual core characteristics. Measuring IOP starts by sorting the determinants of
outcomes into two exclusive classes: the factors that are beyond individual responsibility
(circumstances) and factors are under the control of the individual (efforts). Utilizing an
ex-ante approach, this study measures how much of the observed U.S. income inequality is
attributable to IOP. In addition, the relative importance of each circumstance is examined
using the Shapley decomposition.
During 2000-2014, about 35 percent of U.S. inequality should not be considered due to
the differences in the individual efforts but rather as due to circumstances. This share of
inequality that is considered as due to circumstances increases after the financial crisis. These
results may imply that the effort characteristics, which are under the individual’s control,
became less important in the U.S. labor market due to the shrinkage of the middle quality
jobs after the financial crisis. Among five racial groups, IOP among Blacks is the highest
while that of Asians is the lowest. After the financial crisis, the IOP increased for Blacks and
Other Races but decreased for Whites, Asians, and Mixed-Race members of society. IOP of
non-Hispanics is higher than that of Hispanics.
As for the decomposition results, while own circumstance contributes more to total IOP
in the group of Whites and Mixed-Race individuals, family background was more responsible
for total IOP among of Blacks, Asians and members of the Other Races group. For non-
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Hispanics, the larger contribution of the own circumstance was especially evident after the
financial crisis. Meanwhile, for Hispanics, family background became increasingly more
important after the financial crisis.
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The measurement of income inequality has been a focus of considerable study. As is well
known, the Gini index is one of the most popular inequality measures used in the studies
of income. However, the determinants of income inequality are still very much subject to
debate. To the best of my knowledge, surprisingly little is known about income inequality in
terms of the factor components of income or from a regional perspective such as at the level
of the U.S. states. Corresponding to the increased interest in inequality over the years and
to find its cause, there were attempts to disaggregate the inequality by population subgroups
(Bourguignon 1979, Cowell 1980, Blackorby et al. 1980) or by the different components of
total income (Fei et al. 1978, Pyatt et al. 1980). Shorrocks (1982) suggests a fundamental
approach how to assess the contributions of any given income component to the inequality
of total income. Later, Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) extend Shorrocks’ derivations1 and
represent a decomposition of the Gini coefficient as the product of three terms: the share
of each source income in total income, the income source’s own Gini, and a measure of the
source’s correlation with rankings in total income.
Which income source is the primary determinant for recently rising income inequality?
Was the government transfers policy effective to reduce overall inequality after the financial
crisis compared to before? The central research question of interest in this study is which
of the different income sources are primarily responsible for the observed level of income
inequality. Of equal interest is the question how overall inequality would be changed if one
of the income sources was increased by one percent.
This essay answers these important questions using the decomposition method proposed
by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). The overall U.S. inequality is decomposed into three compo-
nents that are based on eight different incomes from sources in the survey data that covered
1Shorrocks (1982) calls this derivation “natural decompositions” of the Gini.
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2005-2014. Furthermore, this income source decomposition of inequality is used to estimate
the source’s marginal effects that show the impact of a particular income source on overall
income inequality and to analyze which source has been alleviating or unequalizing total
inequality over time. Lastly, the role of government transfers on overall inequality is consid-
ered based on the income source decomposition, particularly in regard to the effectiveness
of redistribution during the recession after the financial crisis.
The empirical study presented makes at least four further contributions. First, this
study reveals the level difference in income inequality between factor components of income.
Second, this study compares how much of overall inequality is due to a particular income
source over time such as before and after the financial crisis. Third, this study examines
the trajectory of income inequality from each income source instead of usual aggregate level
inequality. Fourth, this study measures the contribution of government transfers on overall
income inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a formal defini-
tion of inequality measure that follows the literature. Section 1.3 outlines the methodology
that this essay uses in the analysis of the decomposition of income inequality. Section 1.4
describes the data and key variables to be employed in this study and presents the main
features of the data. Section 1.5 reports the findings of the study, and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Measuring Inequality
This section provides the properties of an adequate inequality measure and formally
defines the Gini coefficient of income inequality that follows the literature, which forms the
foundation of the decomposition method throughout this paper.
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1.2.1 Five Basic Properties of an Inequality Index
How can we pin down a fair measure of inequality among the many ways it may be
quantified? Researchers have come up with five criteria that a desirable inequality measure
should possess (Cowell 1985, 2000; Ray 1998).
Anonymity The inequality measure is required to be independent of any individual charac-
teristics except their income. This implies that permutations of incomes among individuals
should not change the overall degree of inequality as they are ranked from poorest to richest.2
Principle of Population This requires that not the population size but the composition of
different income classes in the population matters.
Independence of Income Scale The inequality measure should not change with uniform pro-
portional changes in individual income.
The Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle The measured inequality should increase when there
is a regressive transfer from a relatively poor to a relatively rich.
Decomposability The overall inequality should be consistently related to its components, such
as subgroups of the population or factor components.3
Among existing inequality measures, Theil’s entropy index, Theil’s second measure of
inequality, the coefficient of variation, and the Gini coefficient satisfy these five basic proper-
ties. However, Theil’s entropy index and Theil’s inequality measure cannot be disaggregated
by income sources and do not provide an obvious intuitive explanation (McKay 2002). The
Gini coefficient is the most intuitive inequality measure that is easily construed as the de-
composition of effects from each income source (Taylor et al. 2005). Wodon and Yitzhaki
(2002) provide an excellent review for the main advantage of the Gini index over other in-
2It also referred to as Symmetry in some literature.
3The Gini coefficient is only decomposable by subgroups (e.g., ethnic groups) if the population subgroups
do not overlap in the vector of incomes. However, this is not the main interest of this study. See Section
1.5.1 of inequality within- and between-state for more detailed information.
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equality measures. They argue that the Gini has a statistical measure of variability since
the Gini can handle negative income, a property that some other inequality measures do
not possess. Moreover, the statistical properties of the Gini are better known than those of
other inequality measures. Unlike some other inequality measures, the Gini has solid the-
oretical foundations as a normative index of the theory of relative deprivation (Runciman
1966; Yitzhaki 1979) and as an inequality measure from axioms on social justice (Ebert and
Moyes 2000).
1.2.2 The Definition of Gini Coefficient of Income Inequality
The Gini coefficient (or index) is the most commonly used inequality measure. The Gini
varies between zero and one in most cases. Graphically, it is represented by the area between
the Lorenz curve and the line of equality, divided by the total area under the line of equality.4
If income is equally distributed, then the Lorenz curve and the line of equality are merged,
and thus the Gini coefficient equals zero (perfect equality).5 If one person has all the income
and all others have none, then the area between Lorenz curve and the line of equality equal
to the area under the line of equality, so the Gini takes a value of 1 (perfect inequality).








|yi − yj| (1.1)
where n is the number of individuals in the population, yi and yj are the income of individual
i and j, i, j ∈ (1, 2 . . . , n), and y is the arithmetic mean income such that y = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 yi.
4The Lorenz curve represents the cumulative income share on the vertical axis against the distribution
of the population on the horizontal axis. The line of equality is a straight line of 45-degree.
5The Gini may take a negative value or a value greater than one if there are negative (mean) incomes.
Zero incomes do not cause problem for the Gini (Scott and Litchfield 1994).
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1.3 Empirical Methods
This section outlines the decomposition technique that is employed in this study, and
proceeds in two subsections. The first subsection formally defines the decomposition that
incorporates the Gini coefficient of income inequality, which is following the work of Shorrocks
(1982) and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). The next subsection introduces the marginal effect
of a factor component as a partial derivative of the Gini of total income.
1.3.1 Framework of Decomposing the Gini by Income Source
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) show that the Gini coefficient for total income inequality,





where Sk is the source k’s share of total income, Gk is the relative Gini that corresponds
to the distribution of income from kth source, yk, and Rk is called the “Gini correlation”
between the source income and total income.6 The derivation of equation (1.2) is provided
in Appendix A1.
An important advantage of this decomposition is that it provides an intuitive interpre-
tation for the relation among these elements regarding each source’s contribution to total
income inequality: the magnitude of each income source to total income (Sk); the inequality
regarding the distribution of income source (Gk); the correlation between income from each
source and total income (Rk) (Stark et al. 1986). For instance, if the source k’s share, Sk,
is large, then the magnitude of its contribution to total income inequality must be large
in absolute terms. But a large income share of the source does not necessarily mean that
6The Gini correlation, Rk, is the ratio between cov[yk, F (y)] and cov[yk, Fk(yk)], when F (y) and Fk(yk)
are the cumulative distribution of total income and income from source k, respectively.
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it has an unequalizing impact on total income. If the income source is perfectly equally
distributed, then the source Gini, Gk, equals zero and the source k does not contribute to
change overall inequality. When the source k’s share, Sk, and the source Gini, Gk, are large,
which implies the source has a large impact and is unequally distributed, and therefore, it
may change the total inequality. The direction of this changes – whether it is equalizing or
unequalizing effects – depends on who earned the income, and thus where the individual is
located in the income distribution. If the income source is unequally distributed but favors
the bottom of the income distribution, it may reduce total inequality. The Gini correlation is
a term captures this source’s correlation with rankings in total income. The Gini correlation
of income from kth source, Rk, can take values between −1 and 1 (i.e., −1 ≤ Rk ≤ 1), and
it equals zero if the income from source k and total income are independent. For instance,
Rk will equal 1(−1) if income from the kth source is an increasing (decreasing) function
of total income, and Rk will be zero if the income from the kth source is a constant. For
instance, government transfers such as welfare benefits are negatively correlated with total
income level, and thus the higher inequality of this source has an equalizing effect on total
inequality.
In sum, whether the increase in income from one source raises total inequality depends
on three factors: (1) the importance of the income source in total personal income, (2) how
equally that income source is distributed relative to overall income, and (3) the allocation
of this increase in source income among members of the population.7
1.3.2 The Marginal Effects of Source Income
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) show the way to examine how an incremental change in a
particular income source influences overall inequality. Consider the marginal proportionate
impact of a change in income from source k, such that income from source k is multiplied
7See Coudouel et al. (2002) for more details.
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by (1 + ek), for a small value of ek. Using the decomposition by income sources, the effect
on total inequality associated with a uniform percentage changes in the income from source
k, while holding income from all other sources constant, can be represented as a partial
derivative of the Gini of total income with respect to ek:
∂G0
∂ek
= Sk(GkRk −G0) (1.3)
where G0 is the Gini coefficient of total inequality before the marginal income change and Gk
is the Gini coefficient for income from source k. The derivation of equation (3) is provided
in Appendix A2.













Therefore, the relative effect of a marginal percentage change in source k on inequality equals
the relative contribution of source k to total income inequality minus the share of source k
in total income. The effect of small changes in income from source k on total inequality is:
(a) if Rk is negative or zero, total inequality is decreasing as the income from source k is





> 1, total inequality is increasing with changes in the income from source
k.8
8The distributional influence of the source income depends on the sign of GkRk − G0, when Rk > 0.
Moreover, note that Rk ≤ 1.
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1.4 Data and Overview
1.4.1 Data and Personal Income Sources
In this essay, I employ microdata from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS), which consists of the American Community Surveys (ACS), covering the period
from 2005 to 2014. The ACS is an ongoing survey that is conducted by the U.S. Census
Bureau and continues every year based on randomly selected sample from every state, and
the District of Columbia.9 The unit of analysis represents an individual who has incomes or
wage earnings (aged 16 or older).10 The sample size of the dataset is 24,398,084 observations
over the period from 2005 to 2014 across the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The
exact sample sizes for each year are reported in Table B.1 in the Appendix.
The key variable of interest is total personal income, which is defined as respondent’s
total pre-tax personal income or losses from all sources for the past twelve months. The
amount is the aggregated income from eight different sources in the questionnaire: (1) total
personal pre-tax wage and salary income, which includes cash bonuses, tips, and other money
income received from an employer but does not include payments-in-kind or reimbursements
for business expenses, (2) pre-income-tax self-employment income from a business, profes-
sional practice, or farm, (3) pre-tax income from Social Security pensions, survivors benefits,
permanent disability insurance, or U.S. government Railroad Retirement insurance payment,
(4) pre-tax income from various public assistance programs or welfare except assistance from
private charities, (5) pre-tax income from an estate or trust, interest dividends, royalties,
and rent received, (6) pre-tax retirement, survivor, and disability pension income, other than
Social Security, (7) pre-tax income from Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and (8) addi-
9American Community Survey (ACS) is a weighted sample of population. From 2000 to 2004, ACS
provides 0.13 percent to 0.43 percent samples from every state, and from 2005 onward, the ACS contains
one percent samples.
10The respondents of income data in IPUMS are aged 15 or older except wage income, where respondents
are age 16 or older.
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tional income from sources such as Veterans’ payments, unemployment compensation, child
support, and alimony. All incomes are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2010 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index. The sample mean of personal total income varies from
32,286 dollars to 36,747 dollars across years. The sample means of key income variables are
reported in Table B.1 in the Appendix.
The respondent’s race is coded as a five-category variable such as: (1) White, (2) Black,
(3) Asian or Pacific Islander, (4) Other race and American Indian or Alaska Native, and (5)
Two or more mixed races. Other race is the residual category containing any races not listed
on the survey. All multiple-race responses are captured as two or more races. The number
of observations by race and its mean personal income by sample year are reported in Table
B.2 in the Appendix.
Since the Census Bureau does not treat Hispanic or Latino as a race group, ethnicity is
considered as a separate variable. The sample is divided into Hispanic and Non-Hispanic
groups. Table B.3 and Table B.4 in the Appendix provide the number of observations and
the mean personal income for Hispanic and Non-Hispanic, respectively.
The state and region variables indicate the state and region where the housing unit was
located. The state variable uses the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) coding
scheme. Census regions are groupings of U.S. states and the District of Columbia by four
subdivisions – Northeast, Midwest, South, and West – for the presentation of census data.
Census divisions are grouping of U.S. states and the District of Columbia by nine-subdivision
of the four census regions.11
11Each of the four census regions subdivided into two or more census divisions. Note that Puerto Rico
and the Island Areas are not considered as part of any Census Region or the Census Division. See Table B.5
in the Appendix for more detailed information.
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1.4.2 An Overview of Income Inequality Changes
This section provides the main features of the income data from the preliminary descrip-
tive analysis.
Figure 1.1 shows the U.S. Gini coefficient of total personal income and the Gini of each
income component in total personal income during 2005-2014. The line of Gini showed a
positive slope between 2005 and 2007, then relatively flat during following three years. It
rapidly increased between 2010 and 2011, then was generally stable (2011-2012), rose again
(2012-2013), and finally decreased (2013-2014). Usually, when income inequality increased
(2005-2007 and 2010-2011), the source income Gini of wages rose.
The difference between rising inequality before (2005-2007) and after (2010-2011) the
financial crisis is the contributor of income inequality. During 2005-2007, the Gini of four
income sources – wages, retirement, welfare and other income – increased. However, after the
financial crisis, the primary driving factor of income inequality is wages. During 2010-2011,
all source Ginis decreased except the Gini for wage and other income. When the Gini of
wage either decreased or very mildly increased, while at the same time other source Ginis
decreased, the U.S. inequality was stable. When all source Ginis, include the Gini for wage,
decreased, the total Gini decreased such as in 2013-2014. During this time, the source Gini
for other income and welfare income rose, but these increases are compensated by the decline
in the Gini for social security income. In sum, the U.S. income inequality has grown before
the financial crisis and steeply increased right after the financial crisis mostly due to the
growth in wage inequality. It remained relatively stable during 2007-2009 and 2011-2012.
Then it sharply increased (2012-2013) but decreased recently (2013-2014), and thus fell back
to its 2011-2012 level.
Note that the values of the source Ginis are higher than the overall Gini because some






















































































































































































































































from that particular source income to be highly unequal.12
Figure 1.2 shows the level of income inequality as Gini coefficient by state including the
District of Columbia (DC) and its time trend over time (2005-2014). Moreover, in order
to show the heterogeneity in the evolution of inequality, the figure lighlights the trends
of six states, two each from the 2005 groups of high-, middle-, and low-income-inequality
states: within rach group, the two states show very differnt long run time trends. For
instance, among top-level of inequality states in 2005, the Gini of California and the District
of Columbia are somewhat similar in the beginning. But while the inequality in California
shows a steep increase, the Gini in DC stays at the same level. Among those states in
the middle range of inequality in 2005, inequality in New Mexico and West Virginia has
been rising but display a very different speed of growth. The inequality in New Mexico
has increased rapidly, but the Gini in West Virginia displays a gentle slope. Wyoming and
Wisconsin, two from among the low-level inequality states, show opposite trend over time.
Although the level of inequality in Wyoming was higher than Wisconsin in 2005, it has been
decreasing over time while inequality in Wisconsin has been increasing. Thus, eventually, in
2014, the inequality in Wisconsin turns out higher than Wyoming.
The mean values of total personal income and source incomes by states and the District of
Columbia (DC) during the entire sample period (2005-2014) are reported in Table B.6 in the
Appendix. The sample mean of total personal income is $53,336.29 (DC) as highest value
and $25,684.46 (Mississippi) as lowest. Connecticut has the second largest sample mean
of total personal income ($47,867.89) and New Jersey is the third highest mean income
state ($45,149.24). These three states also have the highest mean wages: $41,167.16 (DC),
$35,498.37 (Connecticut) and $34,790.23 (New Jersey). The lowest mean wages are found
in West Virginia ($17,534.86), Mississippi ($17,838.80), and Arkansas ($17,992.46).



































































































































































Figure 1.3 shows the composition of personal income from eight different income from
sources, which is based on the state average, during 2005-2014. Wages are the most impor-
tant income source, accounting for between 63.21 percent (Montana) and 77.18 percent (DC)
of total income. The next largest source income is self-employment income, which accounts
for 14.14 percent (North Dakota). Social security shows its greatest contribution in West
Virginia (12.82%), while that of retirement is highest in New Mexico (8.9%). The propor-
tion of interest income is lowest in Mississippi (3.81%) but that of supplemental security is
highest (1.22%). Interest income accounts for 8.76 percent as highest (Florida). The largest
proportion of other income is 3.38 percent (Alaska).
The mean of self-employment income is highest in North Dakota ($4,740.58). Connecti-
cut has the highest mean of interest income ($3,351.91), with DC closely behind ($3,115.50).
West Virginia shows low value for self-employment ($1,064.83) and interest income ($1,072.03),
but their mean of social security income is highest ($3,367.85). West Virginia ranked about
in the middle for the average of retirement income ($2,165.45), and the highest mean of
retirement income is in DC ($3,427.26). As for welfare and other income, Alaska shows the
highest mean for both incomes, which is $158.36 and $1,228.86, respectively. The top of
mean supplement security income is in Mississippi ($313.04). More detailed ranking of state
by mean of total incomes and each source are provided in Table B.7 in the Appendix.
1.5 Empirical Results
In this section, having outlined the relevant methodologies and the basic trends in income
inequality, I now present the results in three stages. First, I discuss the analysis of the income
inequality at the state level by drawing a comparison between before (2000-2006) and after
the financial crisis (2010-2014). Second, the estimated results of decomposition by income
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sources are reported in the following section. Lastly, with these estimates, I analyze the
contribution of income source to overall inequality. Especially, I examine the marginal effects
such as a percentage change in Gini coefficient from a ten percent changes in the income
from each source and evaluate the role of government transfers diminishing total inequality.
1.5.1 Inequality Within and Between State
While the U.S. inequality, which is measured by Gini coefficient, has been increasing
during 2005-2014, its trend at each state shows much difference of it. How much of the U.S.
inequality can be attributed to within- or between-state inequality? In empirical studies,
researchers often place a dummy variable to capture the location factor. However, these
regression type studies cannot provide an accurate quantitative difference in inequality be-
tween regions when the individual residential location from the survey data is used for the
proxy. The decomposition of inequality for the subgroup in the spatial context is described
as quantifying two components of total inequality: a weighted average of regional inequality
(within-group component) and the inequality due to difference in average outcome across
regions (between-group component) (Shorrocks and Wan 2005). Particular inequality mea-
sures, such as all member of the Generalized Entropy (GE) class, are additively decomposable
by subgroup into within and between terms. The Gini coefficient, however, cannot suitably
be expressed as the sum of within- and between-inequality terms due to the overlap between
the groupwise (regional) income distributions (Shorrocks 1984).
The aim of this section is to propose a simple device in order to estimate an approximation
of within- and between-state contributions to the Gini coefficient. According to Shorrocks
and Wan (2005), the between-group inequality under a spatial subgroup is “the level of
inequality that would be observed if the income of each person is replaced by the mean
income of his or her respective region.” Therefore, we can estimate the approximation of
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between-state inequality by assuming there is no difference of income within that location.
Let us suppose everybody in one state receives the same income, equal to the mean
income of the state yj, with j = 1, . . . 51. Under this condition, within-state inequality
should be removed since there are no income differences between individuals who live within
the same state. Therefore, the dispersion with this assumption identifies the between-state
income inequality.
Turning to the within-state inequality, let y be the national mean income and yj be state
level of mean value, which is defined for each state, j = 1, . . . 51. Then we can find a deflated
income for person i in state j, ydij, using the mean ratio between the national mean income





The average of the deflated personal income, after multiplying individual income by the
mean ratio, equals the national mean income for all state, ydij = y. Thus, by using the
mean ratio, this adjustment removes the between-state difference, and thus, the inequality
is purely associated with the inequality within the state.
Table 1.1: Inequality Within and Between State (2005-2014)
(1)Gini (2)Between Gini (3)Within (2)/(1)(in%)
Gini
All years 0.5787 0.0723 0.5743 12.50
2005 0.5609 0.0751 0.5561 13.38
2006 0.5682 0.0733 0.5638 12.90
2007 0.5725 0.0734 0.5680 12.82
2008 0.5726 0.0734 0.5680 12.82
2009 0.5741 0.0742 0.5695 12.92
2010 0.5762 0.0734 0.5717 12.74
2011 0.5880 0.0738 0.5836 12.56
2012 0.5879 0.0717 0.5837 12.19
2013 0.5921 0.0728 0.5878 12.29
2014 0.5890 0.0734 0.5846 12.46
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The estimated results from the above methods are reported in Table 1.1.13 The first
column of the table is total income inequality that is measured by the observed individual
incomes. The values in the second column are the Gini coefficient when personal incomes
set to equal to the state mean value, and thus it represents the inequality between states.
In other words, it would be the level of income inequality if there was no difference in
personal income within each state. The third column of Table 1.1 reports the values when
the personal income are deflated by the mean income ratio, and thus account for within-state
income inequality. In the last column of Table 1.1, the ratio of between-state Gini and the
actual value of Gini indicates the proportion of the between-state inequality among total
income inequality that is measured by Gini coefficient.
In general, the between-state disparities are much smaller than the within-state differ-
ences. For the entire period, the between-state variation accounts for 12.5 percent of overall
inequality. During 2005-2014, the between-state inequality accounts for only less than 13.5
percent of overall inequality. The within-state inequality accounts for the most of U.S. in-
come inequality, which is more than 80 percent of the total inequality. The percentage ratios
of between-state inequality to the overall inequality are greater than 12.5 percent until 2011,
then decrease sharply but rise again afterwards. The within-state inequality grew since 2005
and showed the highest value in 2013. Overall, the values of total Gini and the within-state
Gini are similar, which implies the most of the inequality should be attributed to the within-
state variation. The overall and the within-state inequality show its peak in 2013 as of 0.592
and 0.588, respectively. The overall Gini changes when the within-state Gini changes, and
the changes in within state influence directly to the U.S. income inequality. However, the
impact of increase in the between-state variation is weak and thus is less likely to cause a
13As a robustness check, within-and between-state Squared Coefficient of Variation for each year is esti-
mated and reported in Table B.8 in the Appendix. This inequality measure is a family of the Entropy indices
and thus, it satisfies the property that overall inequality can be decomposable by subgroup into within and
between inequality.
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significant increase in total inequality. For instance, the increase in total inequality in 2010 is
mostly due to the rising within-state inequality, while the between-state inequality is falling
in the same period.
1.5.2 Decomposition by Income Sources
Using the relevant methods that were outlined in Section 1.3.1, now I present the decom-
position results. The Gini coefficient for total income inequality is decomposed into three
components: the share of each source income in total income, the distribution of source
income, and the Gini correlation between the source and total income.
1.5.2.1 The share in Total Income (Sk)
Table 1.2 summarizes the contribution of each income source to total personal income
and income inequality in the U.S. during 2005-2014. Panel A in Table 1.2 presents the share
of each income source (Sk) in total income.
Wages are the primary income source during those time periods, which account for more
than 70 percent of total personal income. The share of wages was more than 73 percent in
2005 but decreased to around 72.5 percent during the financial crisis (2007-2009). It declined
again after the crisis (2010-2014) and became less than 71 percent in 2011.
The second largest income source was self-employment income in 2005. The shares of
self-employment and social security income were similar at the beginning of sample period,
which was 6.51 percent and 6.48 percent, respectively. However, these two incomes showed a
significant discrepancy at the end of the sample period. The share of self-employment income
decreased since the financial crisis, while the share of social security income increased. Self-
employment income share dropped considerably during the crisis (5.42 percent) and kept
falling until 2013 (4.95 percent). Although, it increased in 2014 (4.98 percent) still has not
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Table 1.2: Decomposition of Income Inequality (2005-2014)
A. Percentage Share in Total Income
Before During After
Source 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Wage 73.14 72.87 72.41 72.64 72.57 72.01 70.96 71.21 71.78 71.43
Self-Employment 6.51 6.49 6.25 5.78 5.42 5.15 5.16 5.13 4.95 4.98
Interest 5.54 5.71 6.38 6.59 5.75 5.27 5.27 5.31 5.72 5.77
Retirement 5.87 5.82 5.91 5.95 6.20 6.40 6.76 6.79 6.58 6.70
Other 1.93 1.90 1.89 1.87 2.21 2.45 2.37 2.18 1.86 1.75
Social Security 6.48 6.63 6.59 6.67 7.29 7.88 8.52 8.45 8.26 8.50
Supplemental 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.40 0.44 0.69 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.75
Welfare 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.11
B. Gini Coefficient for Income Source
Before During After
Source 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Wage 0.6773 0.6839 0.6867 0.6863 0.6951 0.7041 0.7189 0.7171 0.7161 0.7159
Self-Employment 0.9962 0.9953 0.9953 0.9967 1.0001 1.0014 0.9987 0.9973 0.9963 0.9951
Interest 0.9789 0.9777 0.9754 0.9789 0.9916 0.9890 0.9889 0.9880 0.9878 0.9864
Retirement 0.9412 0.9425 0.9427 0.9433 0.9428 0.9437 0.9437 0.9427 0.9439 0.9425
Other 0.9711 0.9720 0.9730 0.9709 0.9640 0.9635 0.9670 0.9702 0.9728 0.9751
Social Security 0.8473 0.8473 0.8466 0.8461 0.8421 0.8396 0.8325 0.8327 0.8345 0.8309
Supplemental 0.9847 0.9840 0.9837 0.9860 0.9856 0.9787 0.9758 0.9761 0.9772 0.9764
Welfare 0.9948 0.9950 0.9954 0.9950 0.9942 0.9936 0.9932 0.9932 0.9933 0.9936
C. Gini Correlation with Total Income Rankings
Before During After
Source 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Wage 0.8828 0.8847 0.8838 0.8850 0.8885 0.8898 0.8906 0.8904 0.8933 0.8897
Self-Employment 0.6938 0.6988 0.6965 0.6865 0.6729 0.6677 0.6848 0.6839 0.6906 0.6866
Interest 0.7670 0.7768 0.7913 0.7902 0.7804 0.7874 0.8043 0.8050 0.8059 0.8056
Retirement 0.5069 0.5197 0.5321 0.5377 0.5507 0.5688 0.5928 0.5872 0.5863 0.5837
Other 0.3900 0.4006 0.4088 0.3808 0.3449 0.3414 0.3843 0.4068 0.4021 0.4276
Social Security 0.0583 0.0769 0.0852 0.0894 0.1087 0.1337 0.1641 0.1636 0.1641 0.1662
Supplemental -0.2924 -0.2783 -0.2715 -0.2816 -0.2631 -0.2178 -0.1967 -0.2016 -0.2058 -0.2163
Welfare -0.2046 -0.1263 -0.1095 -0.1360 -0.1316 -0.1216 -0.1171 -0.1364 -0.1731 -0.2061
Note: Source Ginis are high because they include individuals with zero and negative real incomes from different income sources.
See Appendix A4 for more details.
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been restored back to the before financial crisis level. Meanwhile, the share of social security
income increased in most years. It showed its largest share in 2011 as 8.52 percent of total
income, which is about 2 percent higher than the 2005 level.
The share of retirement income also increased steadily. Retirement income share was
5.8 percent before the financial crisis. It became over 6 percent during the crisis and kept
growing after the crisis up to around 6.79 percent in 2012.
Before the financial crisis, the share of interest income was about 5.5 percent and kept
increasing until the middle of the financial crisis. In 2008, it became more than 6.5 percent,
then started to drop until 2011 (5.27 percent). Its share rose again since 2012 and increased
to 5.77 percent in 2014.
Other income includes unemployment compensation, child support, and alimony. Before
the crisis, it was about 2 percent of total personal income, and it accounted less than 2
percent during the crisis (2007-2008). From 2009 to 2012, it rose to 2.4 percent, which is not
surprising since unemployment rates rose sharply during the financial crisis. It decreased in
2013 and 2014 and dropped below its pre-crisis level (1.7 percent). Supplemental Security
income accounted 0.5 percent before the crisis and remained the similar level during the
crisis. Right after the crisis, it increased up to 0.8 percent then dropped to 0.75 percent of
total income. Welfare (Public Assistance) income was the least important source regarding
the share, accounting for 0.10 percent before the crisis. During the crisis, it rose to 0.13
percent, and it was highest in 2011 (0.17 percent), then slowly dropped back to its level
before the crisis (0.11 percent) in 2014.
When we consider the percentage share of aggregate government transfers, it accounts for
8.95 percent before the financial crisis. It became over 10 percent at the end of the financial
crisis, and kept rising during the recession. It accounts for more than 11 percent after the
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crisis and its peak was 11.86 percent (in 2011).
When we consider the percentage share of aggregate government transfers, it accounted
for 8.95 percent before the financial crisis. It became over 10 percent at the end of the
financial crisis and kept rising during the recession. It accounted for more than 11 percent
after the crisis, and its peak was 11.86 percent (in 2011).
In sum, the principal income source during 2005-2014 is wages, which accounts for more
than 70 percent of total income. Although self-employment was more essential income source
before the financial crisis, incomes from social security, retirement or interest became more
important after the financial crisis. The variation in the share of other income is remarkable
during the financial crisis, which is partially reflecting the rise in unemployment compensa-
tion. The shares of supplemental security and welfare incomes are essentially steady during
2005-2014.
1.5.2.2 Gini Coefficient for Income Source (Gk)
Turning to the distribution of each source income, Gini coefficient for income sources
(Gk) are estimated and reported in Panel B in Table 1.2. The income source Gini let us
know how equally (if Gk is close to zero) or unequally (if Gk is close to one) the income from
source is distributed. Therefore, if the income source Gini is close to zero, which implies the
income from that source is equally distributed, then the income of source would not harm
overall inequality even when its share of total income is significant.
During 2005-2014, the most unequally distributed income source among individuals was
self-employment income shown as the highest income source Gini except 2007, which was the
beginning of the financial crisis. The income source Gini of welfare income was the highest
in 2007. Note that the income source Gini coefficients are high and in some cases, are equal
to or greater than 1, due to the presence of source incomes equal to zero or a negative real
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value for some individuals in the sample. In a household survey, it may be attributable to a
person suffering a net loss in income over the interviewed period, and thus the distribution
of income includes negative values (Wodon and Yitzhaki 2002). Therefore, this ‘higher than
1 Gini’ does not necessarily imply a perfect income inequality in such cases (Taylor et al.
2005). Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) also report a case of the source Gini greater than 1.
They decompose income data from Current Population Survey and find that the income
source Gini of self-employment income and property income are larger than 1. Wodon and
Yitzhaki (2002) point out that the Gini coefficient has an advantage in handling negative
income over alternative inequality measures. See Appendix A4 for the definition of source
income Gini in the presence of observations with zero earnings from a particular source. As
a robustness check, the source income Gini coefficient for non-zero observations is estimated
and reported in Table B.9 in the Appendix.14
The second and third highest source Gini are the values for welfare and supplemental
security incomes: these values are similar during 2005-2008. Interestingly, since 2009, which
was at the end of the financial crisis, the source Gini of interest income took the third highest
place instead of supplementary security income, even though interest rates have been very
low in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
The Gini of interest income was higher than other income or retirement income. Interest
income was most unequally distributed in 2009. The Gini of retirement income increased
during the recession (2010-2011), but it restored back to before the crisis level in 2014. The
Gini of other income declined during and after the financial crisis, especially in 2009-2010.
Other income includes unemployment compensation, and thus, the decreased Gini is believed
14After removing observations with zero-valued income from a given source, the source income Gini lies
between 0.29 and 0.85 for all sources. The interest income shows the highest value in the Gini of the income
source, while the source Gini for Social security income represents the lowest value.
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to be associated with this.
The most equally distributed income source during 2005-2014 was wages. However, its
Gini apparently has increased during 2005-2014, especially after the financial crisis (2010-
2014). The income source Gini for retirement income and social security income were stable
over the time. The income source Gini of other income reduced somewhat during 2009-2011
but has been increasing ever since.
The estimated results from the data suggest that the government transfer incomes, self-
employment or interest incomes were unequally distributed. These were partially due to
the presence of zero or negative real earnings from these sources in the sample. The Gini
coefficient of wages was relatively lower than any other incomes but increased after the
financial crisis, which indicated the intensified unequal distribution of the income from source.
The depth discussion for the magnitude of income source on total inequality follows in
Section 1.5.3.
1.5.2.3 The Gini Correlation with Total Income Ranking (Rk)
For the further understanding of the relationship between the distributional changes and
the source income, Gini correlations with total income rankings are summarized in Panel C
in Table 1.2. The Gini correlation indicates how the source income is correlated with the
distribution of total income. The Gini correlation along with other decomposition results,
distinguishes between inequality-increasing and inequality-decreasing income source. For
instance, the high-source income Gini (Gk) itself is not implying that the income from source
is an unequalizing factor in the context of total income inequality. In fact, when the income
source has a weak correlation with total income rankings, it possibly works as an equalizer
on overall inequality.
Among eight income sources, wages show the strongest Gini correlation with total income
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rankings during 2005-2014. Due to this, wages have the inequality-increasing effects on
overall inequality. Similarly, the Gini correlation of interest income is second largest and thus,
implies it flows disproportionately toward whom at the top end of the income distribution.
The Gini correlations for wages and interest income have increased in most of the time and
indeed, shows the highest Gini correlations in 2013, which are 0.893 and 0.806, respectively.
In contrast, the Gini correlations between all government transfer incomes – social secu-
rity, supplemental security, welfare, and other income – and total income are very low. In
fact, the Gini correlation for supplemental security and welfare incomes are weakly negative.
These weak Gini correlations indicate the government transfers favor the poor more than
any other source incomes. As a result, transfers have the equalizing impacts on the total
income distribution in the U.S. even when Gini coefficients for those income sources are very
high.
The Gini correlation for self-employment income and retirement income are little less
than the Gini correlation for wage and interest income but still are a significant number (over
0.5). The changes in Gini correlation of self-employment and retirement income are different
in direction over time. The Gini correlation of self-employment income is relatively high
in 2005, but shows lower correlation after the financial crisis, whereas the Gini correlation
of retirement income has increased. The latter corresponds with the aging of the U.S.
population. The Gini correlation of supplemental security income increases most quickly
during 2005-2014. Its value of the Gini correlation is relatively small in 2005 (0.058), however,
it has grown almost three times overtime (0.166).
1.5.3 Contribution of Income Source to Overall Income Inequality
Decomposition of income inequality not only identifies how much of overall inequality is
due to a particular income source but also that source serves to increase or decrease total
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inequality. As mentioned earlier, the inequality-increasing or inequality-decreasing effects of
an income source should be carefully determined since it not only depends on the distribution
of source income but also depends on the location in the income distribution of the individual
who earns it.
To deepen our understanding of the causes of income inequality, in this section, I discuss
the contribution of each income source on overall inequality. Furthermore, the impact of a
marginal change in each income source on total inequality is calculated based on the results
in the previous section. Lastly, the role of government transfers and its diminishing effects
on overall inequality are examined.
1.5.3.1 The Contribution of Income Source to Overall Income Inequality
Panel A in Table 1.3 summarizes the relative size of the contribution of each income source
to overall income inequality (SkGkRk). Among eight difference income sources, wages made
the largest contribution to overall income inequality during 2005-2014. Its contribution was
more substantial after the financial crisis compared that of before or during the crisis. The
second largest contribution was from self-employment income (0.045), which was followed
by the contribution of interest income (0.042) in 2005. However, since the financial crisis,
the contribution of self-employment reduced, and that of interest increased, and thus the
contribution of interest income became higher than that of self-employment in 2014, which
were 0.34 and 0.046, respectively. For the retirement income, the contribution to overall
inequality was much smaller (0.028) than that of self-employment or interest income before
the financial crisis. But its contribution increased and became larger than that of self-
employment income in 2014 (0.037). The contribution of other income was higher right after
the crisis but fell back to its pre-crisis level in 2014. Although the contribution of social
security income is relatively small, it increased more than any other source incomes. In fact,
its contribution in 2014 was 3.65 times more compared to the level in 2005. Supplemental
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security and welfare income contributed to reducing overall inequality during 2005-2014, but
did so only slightly.
Panel B in Table 1.3 reports these contributions to overall income inequality as a percent-
age. The largest contribution is from wages, which is 78.29 percent in 2010. The smallest
contribution is social security income in 2005 as of 0.57 percent.
Why does retirement income make a smaller contribution to overall income inequality
than interest income? We can answer this question using the results in Table 1.2. First,
retirement income has a larger share of total income than interest income except in 2007 and
2008 (Panel A in Table 1.2). But the Gini coefficients for those two income sources indicate
that interest income is distributed more unequally than the retirement income during 2005-
2014 (Panel B in Table 1.2). Furthermore, the correlation of retirment income with total
income is lower than that of interest income (Panel C in Table 1.2).
1.5.3.2 Marginal Effects of Source Income
As mentioned earlier, the magnitude of the contribution of each source income to overall
inequality is unlikely to be same. It is due to not only its share of total income or own
distribution but also due to how to the source income correlated with the total income
rankings. How much would overall inequality be changed by a marginal change in a particular
income source? Panel C in Table 1.3 reports the marginal effects of each income source that
represents the percentage change in overall income inequality from a ten percent change in
each income source.
Among eight income sources, a ten percent change in wages, self-employment, and interest
income yield a positive change in total inequality. When the Gini correlation between income
from source and total income rankings is relatively high, such as wages or interest income,
the income from the source has an unequalizing effect on total income (Panel C in Table 1.2).
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Table 1.3: Contribution of Income Source to Overall Inequality (2005-2014)
A. Contribution of Income Source of Overall Income Inequality
Before During After
Source 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Wage 0.4373 0.4409 0.4395 0.4412 0.4482 0.4511 0.4543 0.4547 0.4592 0.4550
Self-Employment 0.0450 0.0451 0.0433 0.0395 0.0365 0.0344 0.0353 0.0350 0.0341 0.0340
Interest 0.0416 0.0434 0.0492 0.0510 0.0445 0.0410 0.0419 0.0422 0.0455 0.0459
Retirement 0.0280 0.0285 0.0296 0.0302 0.0322 0.0344 0.0378 0.0376 0.0364 0.0369
Other 0.0073 0.0074 0.0075 0.0069 0.0073 0.0081 0.0088 0.0086 0.0073 0.0073
Social Security 0.0032 0.0043 0.0048 0.0050 0.0067 0.0088 0.0116 0.0115 0.0113 0.0117
Supplemental -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0016
Welfare -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
B. Percentage Contribution to Overall Income Inequality
Before During After
Source 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Wage 77.97 77.60 76.76 77.06 78.07 78.29 77.26 77.34 77.56 77.25
Self-Employment 8.02 7.95 7.56 6.90 6.36 5.97 6.00 5.96 5.76 5.78
Interest 7.41 7.63 8.60 8.90 7.75 7.13 7.12 7.18 7.69 7.79
Retirement 4.99 5.01 5.18 5.27 5.61 5.96 6.43 6.40 6.15 6.26
Other 1.30 1.30 1.31 1.21 1.28 1.40 1.50 1.46 1.23 1.24
Social Security 0.57 0.76 0.83 0.88 1.16 1.53 1.98 1.96 1.91 1.99
Supplemental -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.19 -0.20 -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 -0.27
Welfare -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
C. Proportional Change in Gini from 10 Percent Change in Income Source
Before During After
Source 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Wage 0.483 0.472 0.435 0.442 0.551 0.628 0.630 0.613 0.578 0.582
Self-Employment 0.151 0.145 0.132 0.113 0.093 0.083 0.084 0.082 0.080 0.080
Interest 0.188 0.192 0.222 0.231 0.200 0.185 0.186 0.187 0.197 0.202
Retirement -0.088 -0.080 -0.073 -0.068 -0.059 -0.044 -0.033 -0.040 -0.043 -0.044
Other -0.063 -0.060 -0.058 -0.066 -0.093 -0.105 -0.087 -0.072 -0.063 -0.051
Social Security -0.591 -0.587 -0.576 -0.579 -0.613 -0.634 -0.654 -0.649 -0.635 -0.651
Supplemental -0.066 -0.069 -0.069 -0.059 -0.063 -0.094 -0.106 -0.104 -0.098 -0.102
Welfare -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.016 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.016 -0.015
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If the source income has a larger share of total income and is more unevenly distributed,
then its contribution to overall inequality will be more significant. The most substantial
increase as a percent change in Gini can be caused by a ten percent change in wages. Before
the crisis, it was 0.47-0.48 percent, and it was as low as 0.43 percent during the crisis. Right
after the crisis, the marginal effect of wages went to up to 0.63 percent in 2011, but it has
been decreasing and was 0.58 in 2014.
The proportional change in Gini from a ten percent change in interest income was less
than 0.2 percent before the crisis but went up to 0.23 percent during the crisis. The marginal
change in inequality as a result of a change in interest income reduced to 0.18 percent during
2010-2012 but started to increase again from 2013, and it was over 0.2 percent in 2014. On
the contrary, the percent change in Gini by a 10 percent change in self-employment has kept
decreasing from 0.15 percent in 2005 to 0.08 percent in 2014. Especially, there was a large
shift in the marginal effect during the crisis: it dropped from 0.11 in 2008 to 0.09 percent in
2009. Retirement income has a negative marginal effect on total inequality. Its magnitude
was much stronger in 2005, which was 0.08 percent reducing in Gini from a 10 percent change
in retirement income but was only cutting 0.03 in 2011.
Due to the weak Gini correlation between retirement income and total income rankings,
the percentage contribution of retirement income on overall inequality (Panel B in Table 1.3)
is smaller than its percentage share of total income in each year (Panel A in Table 1.2). As
a result, retirement income has a slight equalizing impact on the entire income distribution.
A ten percent increase in retirement income, other things being equal, reduces the total Gini
coefficient by up to 0.088 percent during 2005-2008. However, the share in overall income
inequality of retirement income has raised after the crisis and thus, its magnitude to equalize
the total inequality has reduced: the Gini coefficient of total income decreased by around
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0.04 percent as a ten percent increase in retirement income, while other incomes equal.
Note that the share in total income inequality of wage, self-employment, or interest
income is higher than its share in total income (Sk) and thus, increase in these incomes raise
the Gini coefficient of total income, while other incomes equal. For instance, while interest
income accounts only for 6.5 percent of total income in 2008, it contributes to 8.9 percent of
overall inequality.
1.5.3.3 Marginal Effects of Transfers Income
What would be the marginal effects from the government transfers on overall income in-
equality? Are these transfers effectively reduced total inequality by redistributing during the
great recession after the financial crisis? The marginal effect of government transfers such as
social security, supplemental security, welfare (public assistance), and other income – which
includes Veterans’ payments, unemployment compensation, child support, and alimony – are
considered and reported in Panel C in Table 1.3.
During 2005-2014, government transfers are unequally distributed as the income source
Gini (Gk) is 0.83 or higher (Panel B in Table 1.2), yet favor the poor more than any other
income sources as the Gini correlation (Rk) is 0.42 or lower (Panel C in Table 1.2). There-
fore, these incomes have the equalizing effects on total income inequality. The source that
equalizes the most is social security income. It reduces overall inequality up to 0.65 percent
from a ten percent increase in that source income (in 2011 and 2014). These equalizing
effects increase after the financial crisis relative to its pre-crisis level (0.59 percent).
Although the incomes from supplemental security and public assistance (welfare) are
smallest regarding its share in total personal income (Panel A in Table 2), both source
incomes reduce the Gini of total income inequality in each year during 2010-2014. In 2011,
the diminishing effects of these source incomes on overall inequality are 0.11 percent and 0.02
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percent from a ten percent change, respectively. Like social security income, these effects
become larger after the financial crisis compared to the before the crisis. A ten percent
increase in supplemental security income, other things being equal, reduces the total Gini
coefficient around 0.06 percent before the financial crisis and it is higher after the crisis by
0.1 percent. Similarly, the welfare income also has an equalizing impact on overall inequality:
it reduces the total inequality up to 0.02 percent when the welfare income increased by ten
percent while holding other things equal.
The marginal effect of other income was slightly smaller than that of supplemental se-
curity income before the financial crisis. But it increased and became higher than the effect
of supplemental security in 2009 and 2010. In 2010, other income was equalizing about 0.1
percent the total income inequality from a ten percent increasing. The equalizing effects
of other income fell back to the pre-crisis level in 2013, while the effects of supplemental
security income still remained high.
To sum up, a ten percent increase in all government transfers generates about a 0.74
percent reduction in the Gini coefficient of total income before and during the crisis. The
marginal effect of an increase in government transfers on total inequality rose after the crisis.
All government transfer incomes are equalizing up to 0.87 percent (in 2011) of total inequality
as a result of a 10 percent increase in these transfers and 0.84 percent on average per year
after the financial crisis.
1.6 Conclusions
This study used decomposition analysis to examine the impact of eight sources of income
on U.S. income inequality. Five main findings emerge.
First, at the U.S. state level, most of the income inequality is attributed to the within-
state inequality. The changes in within-state variation directly impact overall inequality, but
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the effects of changes in between-state disparities are weak.
Second, the findings highlight the importance of wage income. Wages were the primary
income source during 2005-2014 and accounted for over 70 percent of total income. Among
eight different sources, wage income has the largest as share in total income, yet it is most
equally distributed income source. However, the increase in the Gini of wage income after
the financial crisis suggests that the intensifying unequal distribution of this source income
contributed to rising inequality.
Third, the role of government transfers was important in reducing inequality, especially
after the financial crisis. The income source Gini of government transfers was high, which
suggested the unequal distribution of these source income. However, the weak Gini correla-
tion for government transfers indicated these incomes favor the poor more than any other
sources. The equalizing effects of a ten percent increase in transfers before and after the
financial crisis were 0.73 and 0.84 percent reduction in the Gini of total income, respectively.
During 2005-2014, on average, overall inequality would have been reduced by 0.79 percent
with a 10 percent increase in transfer incomes. Among different government transfers, Social
Security is the greatest equalizer. It reduced the Gini coefficient of total income inequality
by 0.65 percent as a result of a ten percent increase in income from social security, other
incomes being equal. The growing percentage shares of other income during the financial
crisis was believed to be associated with the rise in unemployment compensation. The shares
of supplemental security and welfare incomes were quite steady during 2005-2014. Supple-
mental security and welfare income also have showed equalizing effects on overall inequality:
a ten percent rise in these incomes diminish the Gini of total inequality by over 0.11 percent.
Fourth, the importance of interest income rose during the financial crisis and increased
again recently, and it showed unequalizing effects as a result of a ten percent increase.
Although the percentage shares of interest were smaller than the self-employment, its un-
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equalizing effects on overall inequality were greater than that of self-employment income.
These can be explained by higher Gini correlation of interest income in comparison with
that of self-employment income. Indeed, the Gini correlation of interest increased during the
recession, which implied that this income flowed disproportionately toward individuals who
were at the top end of income distribution.
Fifth, a ten percent rise in retirement income diminished total inequality, but self-
employment was contributed to increase the overall Gini from a ten percent increase. Besides
the government transfers, retirement income reduced total inequality by 0.088 (in 2005) as a
result of a ten percent increase. The equalizing effect of retirement income declined after the
financial crisis compared to the pre-crisis level. The shares self-employment income in total
income have decreased since the financial crisis, and thus, its magnitude of contribution to
overall inequality became smaller. Nonetheless, a ten percent increase in self-employment
income increased the Gini coefficient of total income inequality.
Chapter 2





Since the 1980s, slower economic growth, higher unemployment and reduced wage share
can be observed in most OECD countries including the U.S. (Glyn 2005). Along with these
economic trends, U.S. income inequality has been rising when is measured by the Gini
coefficient based on primary income and disposable income (OECD 2008a). Many believe
that these dispersions in income are due to the widening of the U.S. wage structure since 1980
(Karoly and Burtless 1995). A large body of literature supports this idea by showing the
wage differentials by human capital, by occupation or by experience group (Juhn, Murphy
and Pierce 1993; Katz and Murphy 1992; Murphy and Welch 1992).
While the relation between income inequality and economic growth is the focus of most
debate, the relation between the personal wage and inequality is still unclear. It is especially
difficult to ascertain the relationship between wages and inequality after the most recent
financial crisis and following deep economic recession because of the severe, persistent wage
stagnation. The most compelling studies utilize income distribution and macroeconomic
variables such as unemployment and wage shares (Glyn 2009), trade liberalization (Baccaro
2008), government role (Brandolini and Smeeding 2009) and their tax policies (Alvaredo and
Piketty 2008) to explore the wage/inequality relationship.
Yet several prominent economists believe that inequality was a root cause of the financial
crisis (The Economist 2011). Atkinson and Morelli (2010) consider the asset bubble to be an
indirect effect of inequality. Rajan (2010) assets inequality to be a macroeconomic risk. Just
before the recent financial crisis, the U.S. financial system was deregulated which enabled
new borrowing for households with low incomes and, caused a temporary increase in their
consumption (Horn et al. 2009).
The further explanation of Wisman (2013) of the financial crisis is closely related to wages
and inequality. The prolonged wage stagnation prevents low and middle-income households
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to maintain the same level of families’ welfare or their social status. Thus, it results in
rapid depletion of household savings and increasing household indebtedness. Furthermore,
households’ constrained consumption reduced profitable investment opportunities and stim-
ulated speculation in financial markets, which allowed the rich takes a larger share of income.
Increased income at the top of the distribution promotes greater spending not only for them-
selves but also someone in the middle-income family by raising the costs of basic services
such as spending on their children’s education (Frank 2000). In essence, while wages are
stagnated and inequality is rising, home ownership of the low and middle-income class has
increased consumption through expansion of credit rather than growth of their incomes have
contributed to the asset bubble and the financial crisis.
Nonetheless, the 2008 collapse of the financial system was not the first financial crisis in
U.S. history. We had a stock market crash in 1929 and the ensuing the Great Depression.
Although the financial crisis in 2008 was due to mainly a burst of the asset bubble in the
housing market, remarkably, the income distribution became unequal rapidly prior to both
times (Rajan 2010). In the period between the Great Depression until the 1980s when
inequality started to rise again, inequality in the U.S. declined (Wisman 2013).
May we anticipate a similar reversal following the effects of the recent financial crisis?
How did the financial crisis impact inequality in the United States? To find the answer, we
should consider wage inequality because the involuntary job displacement caused by these
incidents may deeply harm workers not only resulting in loss of their earnings (Jacobson et
al. 1993) but also reducing their life expectancy (Sullivan and von Wachter 2009).
Although the conventional inequality study is focused on income inequality based on
annual household income, this measure may be misled the understanding of true inequality
in several aspects. First of all, income inequality of household income can be affected by
assortative mating. Greenwood et al. (2014) report the Gini coefficient of U.S. household
CHAPTER 2. 38
income inequality would be about 0.43 smaller if married couples were matched randomly
in Census Bureau data. Thus, the inequality measure from household income alone would
overstate the true level of inequality.
Second, although capital income, such as the interest earnings or dividends, may be
mostly unequally distributed income source, it is not a primary source of income for most
people in the U.S. Karoly and Burtless (1995) state: “Trends in earnings inequality clearly
have a major influence on overall inequality; most income received by American households
is derived from labor earning (p.380).” Table D.1 shows the shares of eight different income
sources as a percent of mean total income during 2000-2014. Whereas all other income
sources account less than 10 percent of total income, wages account for over 70 percent of
total personal income in all sample years. Wages are the most important income source
for most households in the U.S. and thus, it may be the key determinant of recent growing
income inequality. Thus, the analysis of inequality that is focused on wages instead of income
may reveal the true level of inequality confronting most of the people.
Third, the inequality indicated by annual data may overstate the level of inequality
because the income or wage dispersion is also altered by the individual labor supply decision.
The total hours that workers willing to work vary with change in real earnings due to
income effects. For instance, college graduates tend to work more hours and spend less time
unemployed than high school graduates (Autor 2011). Thus, the level of inequality would
be higher when it is measured from annual data than the real inequality level. To correctly
isolate the inequality from the aspect of individual labor supply decision, the annual earnings
should be standardized as an hourly measure of earnings, which may provide a more accurate
indication of inequality.
This study attempts to untangle the wage inequality in the U.S. before and after the
financial crisis and identify the source of the differences in wage distributions. Analyzing the
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percentile shares of an outcome variable, which is applied to the well-known works of Piketty
(2014), this study investigates potential contributors to U.S. wage inequality during 2000-
2014, including gender, race, ethnicity, difference in the level of educational attainment,
a concentration of the top earners and other conditions such as employment status and
worker’s English language proficiency. Furthermore, with leading decomposition methods, I
try to distinguish the component that can be explained by individuals’ core demographics
and the part that cannot be explained by observed characteristics and thus it results from
wage structural difference at specific quantiles of wage distribution. In addition, this study
tries to determine which factor can be most attributed to the wage differentials by further
dividing the explained and the unexplained components.
The empirical study presented here makes at least four further contributions. First,
this study measures U.S. inequality more accurately than previously possible by adopting
hourly wages from micro-level data, which includes the consideration of individual core
characteristics. Second, this study considers wage differentials at the different points of the
wage distribution, instead of using usual aggregate measures. For instance, while a number of
studies have focused on the polarization of the structure of labor market, variations along the
distribution are little understood. Specifically, we do not know which part of the distribution
of the high- or low-wage jobs is mostly attributed to the polarization. Similarly, many
previous studies concern substantial growth of a college premium1 as the main reason for
rising wage inequality since the 1980s in the U.S. However, this positive college premium does
not necessarily mean that everyone who has a four-year college degree would be paid the same
amount more than those who do not have the degree. Using distributional analysis, this study
investigates how much the wage gap would be at different locations on wage distribution.
The distributional analysis can provide particularly which part of the distribution – upper
1The ratio of earnings between those who has a college degree and those who do not have a college
education.
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tail or lower tail – is most attributed to the widening wage dispersion. Third, this study
reveals the trajectory of the wage dispersion within subgroups based on their relative ranks in
the wage distribution. It has been generally agreed upon that the return to skills measured
by the wages of college-educated workers relative to high school educated workers have
been increased over the past several decades. However, this wage dispersion only reflects
the between groups wage differential but does not mirror much of within-group inequality.
Fourth, this study explores the changes in U.S. wage inequality after the financial crisis and
examines the trend of U.S. wage inequality. By comparing the wage distribution before and
after the financial crisis, this study attempts to identify the factor that contributes most to
growing wage inequality for different time periods in U.S. labor market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief literature
review of the trend of the U.S. wage inequality in the empirical study and situates the
contribution of this study. Section 2.3 describes the data and key variables to be employed
in this study and presents the main features of the data. Section 2.4 outlines the methodology
that this essay uses in the analysis of wage inequality. Section 2.5 reports the findings of the
study and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
The prominent belief of the evolution of the U.S. wage inequality is summarized as a
U-shape: falling in the inequality 1935 to the mid-1950s, stable until the 1970s and followed
by rapid growth since the beginning of the 1980s (Van Reenen 2011). In the 1990s, it was
increasing but at a much more moderate pace.
One of the popular approaches to explain the increasing wage inequality in the U.S.
focuses on the earnings gap between high school graduate and college graduate. The hourly
earnings ratio of college graduates relative to high school graduates was about 1.5 times in
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1963, but this ratio became 1.95 by 2009, which was mostly due to a steep increase in the
1980s (Autor 2011). Early studies propose an explanation using a supply-demand in the labor
market: a relatively rapid growth of demand for the skilled worker due to change in the skill-
biased technology caused the wage for the college educated to increase (Katz and Murphy
1992; Bound and Johnson 1992). Most of the empirical studies in this branch measure the
wage gap between college and high school graduates as a difference in conditional mean from
a simple regression model. Later studies propose an institutional change in the labor market
as the cause of the growth of wage inequality during the 1980s such as de-unionization (Card
1996, Freeman 1991) or change in the minimum wage (Lee 1999; Teulings 2002).
Besides the mean decomposition methods, a large literature uses a between- and within-
group decomposition of the variance as a wage inequality measure. Their empirical results
emphasize the importance of the within-group (residual) inequality to account for the sub-
stantially increased wage inequality during the 1980s.2 For instance, Juhn et al. (1993) and
Katz and Autor (2000) find that the residual inequality accounts for 56 percent to 60 percent
of the increase in inequality. However, since the changes in characteristics can also affect
the residual wage dispersion,3 the changes in the composition of the workforce may increase
the variance of residuals (Melly 2005). Lemieux (2002) decomposes changes in the wage
distribution into changes in regression coefficients, the distributions, and residuals using a
re-weighting method.4 He asserts that the proposed procedure can explicitly address the
changes in the distribution of covariates (bs) and the issue of changes in the coefficients (xs).
He finds that the increase in the U.S. wage inequality can be accounted for by the difference
in measured skills (experience in the labor market and education) but that it cannot be ap-
2Residual wage inequality is the dispersion in wage within demographic and skill groups. it is also called
within-group wage inequality.
3Mincer (1974) shows that individual education or experience increase the residual wage dispersion using
his human capital earnings model.
4Lemieux (2002) proposed a re-weighting method that combines two ideas from previous studies: replacing
yiA by its counterfactual, ȳCiA from Juhn et al. (1993) and the re-weighting procedure from DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux (1996).
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plied well to the bottom end of the wage distribution. He concludes that increase in the price
of unmeasured skills was not the major determinants of the growth of wage inequality since
1973.5 Melly (2005) estimates the conditional wage distribution in the United States between
1973 and 1989 using a decomposition based on quantile regression.6 While the changes in
characteristics account about half of the total growth in wage inequality, the residuals ex-
plain only for about 20 percent of the increased inequality in the 1980s. Lemieux (2002)
and Melly (2005) come to a similar conclusion: a substantial proportion of the increase in
inequality can be explained by the changes in the distribution of individual characteristics,
especially the increases in the return to skills but the price of unmeasured skills account only
for a small share of the growth of inequality in the U.S.
As seen in the contradictory results above, the decomposition of changes in distribution
is needed in the studies of indices of inequality because of the possible dependence between
individual characteristics and residuals. According to Autor et al. (2008), although the
wage inequality kept increasing, their pace of growth is slower in the 1990s and early 2000s
compared with the 1980s. The interesting point they made is that while the upper tail of
the male wage distribution (the 90/50 wage gap) shows a persistent increase, the lower tail
inequality has shown a reverse from the ongoing rise since the 1980s. Frequently, the wage
differentials at different parts of wage distribution give a dissimilar answer. For instance, the
wage gap between male and female in the upper tail of the wage distribution is not same as
in the lower tail (Arulampalam et al. 2007). In fact, many studies report gender or racial
wage differentials tend to widen at higher wage quantile and this pattern seems persistent.
These studies suggest the existence of glass ceilings or sticky floors for female and minorities
5Lemieux (2002) finds that “much of the increase in residual wage inequality is due to changes in the
composition of the workforce.” (2002:648)
6Similar procedures that are based on quantile regression are suggested by Machado and Mata (2005)
and Gosling et al. (2000).
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in the labor market (Chi and Li 2008; Kee 2006; Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2003).
Turning to the key force widening wage dispersion in U.S. labor market, the findings from
previous studies point out the polarization of the structure of job opportunities (Autor et
al. 2006; Autor et al. 2008; Goos at al. 2009; Goos and Manning 2007). They explain this
phenomenon as the job opportunities of High-skilled, high-wage occupation (i.e., professional,
technical, and managerial occupations) and low-skill, low-wage occupations (i.e., food service,
personal care, or protective service occupations) expanding but the middle-skill, the middle-
wage job is shrinking. Therefore, the employments and wages are growing in the high-
education required jobs or in the low-education required jobs, which is deleterious mostly to
their wages who did not have a 4-year college education.
The evolution of the U.S. wage dispersion must be looked very different based on the
partition of the sample and thus, explaining the rising wage inequality by single aspect
would be inadequate. Therefore, in this chapter, I would like to investigate the potential
contributors to U.S. wage inequality during 2000-2014 in various angles: including gender,
concentration of the top earners, difference in the level of educational attainment and other
conditions such as employment status and worker’s English language proficiency.
2.3 Data and overview
2.3.1 Data and key variables
In this essay, I employ data at the micro-level from the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS) from the American Community Survey (ACS), covering the period from
2000 to 2014. The ACS is an ongoing survey that is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau
based on randomly selected sample from every state, and the District of Columbia.7 The
7American Community Survey (ACS) is a weighted sample of population. From 2000 to 2004, ACS
provides 0.13 percent to 0.43 percent samples from every state, and from 2005 onward, the ACS contains
one percent samples.
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unit of analysis represents an employee who is of working age (16 to 65 years old). The
sample size of the dataset is 15,714,207 observations over the period from 2000 to 2014. The
sample size for the period before the financial crisis (2000-2006) is approximately 5,000,000
observations and for the period after the crisis (2010-2014) is roughly 6,650,000 observations.
The key variable of interest is total personal earned income, which reports income earned
from wages for the previous year. The hourly measure of wage used in this study is calculated
from the total personal earned income divided by the total working hours during the previous
year (usual week worked last year multiplied by usual hours worked per week). Unlike most
previous studies that used the average weekly earnings on all jobs as their hourly measure
of wage, the construction of hourly wage from the total working hours and personal wages
past 12-month provides a great advantage for better presentation of wages disparities (Melly
2005). Wages are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2010 dollars using the Consumer
Price Index. The sample mean of personal hourly wages varies from 17.46 dollars to 32.60
dollars across states. Before the financial crisis, those lie between 17.46 dollars and 32.51
dollars per hour across states and between 17.01 dollars and 32.89 dollars per hour after the
crisis. The exact sample sizes and mean hourly wage for each state are reported in Table
D.2.
The wage inequality using hourly wage, instead of using the annual wages, can prevent
the overstated wage inequality due to the individual choice of working hours. The total
hours that workers wish to work at a given real wage tends to increase or decrease with real
wages rises due to income effect. In any case, the change in real wage affects the labor supply
by employees. How would the labor supply be altered across the wage groups? The result
in Table D.3 shows the average annual labor supply of male and female workers (or before
and after the financial crisis) compared to the entire sample by decile. The average working
hour of workers in the bottom 30 percentile of the wage distribution is only about 1,129 to
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1,656 hours per year, whereas in the upper 30 percentile of the wage distribution it is about
1,864 to 1,980 hours per year. The average hour difference between most and least worked
is roughly 851 hours annually. At every decile, the labor supply by the male worker is more
than it is by the female worker. The working hour differential by gender lies between 170
hours and 365 hours annually. The workers in the 70-80 decile are the most worked group
and the worker in the bottom 10 percentile are supplying the least hours by both male and
female workers. The results of the last two columns of Table D.3 indicate that the workers in
the bottom decile and in the top 30 percentile are supplying more of labor after the financial
crisis, but the workers in other deciles are working up to 23 hours less annually. Especially,
the difference in labor supply of top 10 percentile is about 77 hours higher after the financial
crisis.
Hence, if the wage inequality is measured by the annual wage earnings, it may be overes-
timated due to the different labor supply decision of individual worker. Likewise, the wage
dispersion between male and female workers from annual wages would be looked wider than
real wage inequality due to less working hour by female workers compared to the male work-
ers. Similarly, the wage dispersion after the financial crisis that is estimated from annual
earnings might be misdirected since the labor supply of workers after the financial crisis are
different in the different location of the wage distribution. To correctly isolate the wage dis-
persion from the aspect of individual labor supply, the personal earnings are converted into
an hourly measure of wage in this study. Standardizing the annual earnings using hourly
wage may provide a more accurate measure of wage inequality.
One drawback of using this dataset is that wages in ACS are top-coded: the higher wages
than the 99.5th percentile in each state are replaced by the state mean values for given Census
year.8 Thus, it may not fully represent the person’s labor earnings at the very top-end of the
8During 2000-2002, the higher wages than $200,000 are coded as the state mean values for the given
Census year.
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wage distribution. If top-coded at a relatively low value, in turn, it causes underestimation
of the wage dispersion in the upper tail of the distribution but still can provide the lower
bound of wage dispersion (DiNardo et al. 1996).
The occupations and the industries are categories based on the 1990 Census Bureau oc-
cupational classification scheme. In ACS data, these are comparable over time and available
for individual age 16 or older who had worked within the previous five years. The occupation
categories in ACS are a modified version of the 1990 Census Bureau occupational classifica-
tion scheme to maximize the variable’s consistency over time. The classification consists of
389 different occupational categories at the 3-digit level. These values at the 3-digit level of
occupational classification are partitioned into seven broad occupational categories implicit
in the 1990 scheme: managerial; professional specialty; technical and administrative; ser-
vice; farming, production, and repair; operators and laborers; sales. the sample of workers
are grouped into six based on the Census Bureau industrial classification scheme. In cen-
sus usage, the industries report the type of industry in which the individual performed an
occupation. Thus, these do not refer to manufacturing and production but refer to work
setting and economic sector, as opposed to the worker’s specific technical function. The six
broad categories of economics sectors are such as: primary; manufacturing; educational and
health services; other services except education and health; finance; trade. The detailed
classifications of occupations and industries are provided in Table D.4 and Table D.5.
All races are coded into five-category: (1) White, (2) Black, (3) Asian or Pacific Islander,
(4) Other race and American Indian or Alaska Native, (5) Two or More mixed-race. Other
race is the residual category containing any races not listed on the survey. All multiple-
race responses are captured as two or more races. Since the Census Bureau does not treat
Hispanic or Latino as a race group, ethnicity is considered as a separate variable. The
number of observations by racial groups is reported in Table D.6. The location factors are
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considered based on the Census Region and Division (Table D.7) as well as the U.S.
2.3.2 An overview of changes in Wage
This section provides the main features of the wage data from the preliminary descriptive
analysis.
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Figure 2.1 shows the overall change in hourly real wage in the U.S. during 2000-2014.
Each line in the figure represents the age group in the sample (e.g., teens, 20s, 30s etc.).
Overall time the highest paid age group is workers in their 60s. In fact, the hourly wage of
the worker 50s and 60s move similarly until 2005 then from 2006 the wage of 60s exceeds
the wage of 50s. The highest hourly wage paid is $30.51 in 2007 for the workers of 60s. The
lowest wage is $8.91 in 2006 for the teens. The hourly wage paid varies across the age group:
for instance, the wage range for the 60s is $27.64 to $30.51 but it is between $8.91 to $9.75
for the teens as reported in Table D.8. The lowest wage paid by age group of the 30s, the
40s, and the 50s is in 2011 $22.18, $25.49, and $26.33, respectively. While the wage line for
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teens is relatively flat overall time, the wage line of the 20s, the 30s, the 40s and the 50s
have slightly negative slope during the same time period.
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Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 are showing the mean hourly wage by age group of male and
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female worker separately. At a glance, we can notice that the shape of lines for male workers
in Figure 2.2 is similar that of all workers in Figure 2.1 but for the female worker as in Figure
2.3 is looked much different from the figure for all genders. The magnitude of hourly wage
range for men and women is also different: the top and bottom hourly wage paid for male
workers is higher than for the female workers. During 2000-2014, the men’s wage stands
between $9.94 as lowest and $37.39 as highest (Table D.9), while the women’s wage lays
between $8.58 and $24.51 (Table D.10). The gap between top and bottom paid age group is
larger for male workers ($28.15) than for female workers ($15.93). Therefore, male workers
are paid more than female workers across all age groups but the wage gap among male
workers is larger than among female workers. While most male workers, except the male
age group of the 60s, are paid more before the financial crisis (2000-2006), female workers
are paid more during (2007-2009) or after the crisis (2010-2014), with exception of 20s. The
male age from 20 to 65 paid the lowest hourly wage during 2011-2012 but the year of lowest
paid for female workers changes across age groups.
The wage for the male age group of the 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s has negative slope during
2000-2014. The line of age in 60s fluctuate around 2007, which is the beginning of the crisis,
and the hour wage decreases about $3 per hour after the crisis compares to the hour wage in
2000. The wage of workers in 30s dropped more than $3 after the financial crisis compares
to the highest value before the crisis ($27.16). The largest gap between highest and lowest
hour age paid is in the 20s, which is almost $4. The most dramatic dropping in hour wage
shows in workers age of 50s: the gap between the top and bottom paid amount is $4.46 and
the hour wage has dropped after the crisis about $3.50 for this age group. The wage of teens
is very stable over time. In fact, the change is less than $1 and is lower than $10 during the
entire period.
Among female workers, the highest paid age group was the workers in their 50s until
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2007, but after 2007, the group of 60s is paid the highest amount. The slope of wage line for
all age groups of female workers, except the 20s and the 60s, are relatively flat over time: the
wage line for the groups of age 60s shows upward trend while the wage line of workers age
in the 20s decrease over time. However, the amount of hour wage change for female workers
is lot less than its for male workers: the largest gap between top and bottom paid amount
for female workers is only $2.88 (age group 60s) but the gap in the most of the female age
group are less than $2, which is significantly different from the male wage gap. When we
compare the amount paid before and after the crisis, the largest decrease in hour wage for
female workers is around $2 and for in their 20s. Unlike the big change of hour wage in
men’s age 50s, the women’s hourly wage for 50s mildly move over time and the level before
and after the financial crisis is similar, which is around $23.
In sum, the most of the trend in wage changes during 2000-2014 explains the wage changes
of male workers. In both male and female workers, the lowest paid group is teens and the
highest paid group is workers in their 60s. The wage line of both male and female workers
in age groups in the 20s shows negative slope over time while the slopes of the teens’ wages
for both genders are relatively flat. The female workers paid less in all age groups and the
gap in amount is up to $11.06 when to compare the average value of the hour wage of female
workers to one of the male workers for each age group.
Figure 2.4 represents the mean hourly wage based on the Census Region. The exact
mean value for each census region and census division reports in Table D.11 and Table
D.12. Census regions are groupings of U.S. states and the District of Columbia by four-
subdivision – Northeast, Midwest, South, and West – for the presentation of census data.
Census divisions are grouping of U.S. states and the District of Columbia by nine-subdivision
of the four census regions.9 Northeast is ranked as the top hour-wage region over 2000-2014.
9Each of the four census regions subdivided into two or more census divisions. Note that Puerto Rico
and the Island Areas are not considered as part of census regions or census division. See Table D.7 for more
detailed information.
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The highest wage is $26.74 before the crisis (in 2004) and the lowest mean wage is $24.55
after the crisis (in 2012).
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The bottom mean hour-wage region is Midwest and its highest and lowest mean wage
not much different to each other: $21.93 (in 2004) and $20.02 (in 2012). The second highest
mean hour-wage region is West. Interestingly, the wage line for Northeast and West move
similarly until 2011 but these are started to move different direction since 2012. South is
lower than Midwest in the beginning of the sample period (2000-2001). The gap between
Midwest and South has become widening since 2006. The mean value of hour wage in South
lays between $20.87 (in 2011) and $22.32 (in 2007).
Table D.12 shows the mean hourly wage in each Census division by year during 2000-
2014. The top mean value is $27.25 in New England Division while the bottom mean value
is $18.76 in East South Central Division. Note that the maximum hour wage in East South
Central Division is also less than $20 during the sample period. The mean hour wage in
Middle Atlantic also similar with the level of New England, which is $27.09. On the one
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hand, these two division are in Northeast region, but on the other hand, two divisions in
West region - Mountain and Pacific Division - has a large gap that is almost $4 on their
average value over time. While the top mean of Pacific is $26.63, the highest mean wage of
Mountain Division is only $22.68. The divisions in Midwest are also similar to each other
and its range is around $21 over time. During 2000-2014, East South Central and West
South Central Division show low mean hour wage. All divisions, except New England, have
dropped its mean wage after the financial crisis. The mean wage of New England Division
in after the crisis is similar to the before the crisis-mean wage. The average value of mean
wage for the entire time period across all division ranges between $19.43 to $26.11.
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 depicts the mean hourly wages by the state before and after
the most recent financial crisis. The wages are mapped by ten wage ranges based on the
mean values during sample periods. The actual sample sizes and the exact mean values by
state before and after the crisis are reported in the second and the third column in Table
D.2.
The U.S. average hourly wage was higher before the financial crisis ($22.19) than after
the crisis ($21.53). Before the crisis, the highest wage was $32.51 (DC) and the lowest wage
was $17.46 (Montana) and two states (DC and Connecticut) paid an hourly wage over $30.
After the financial crisis, the hourly wage only in DC was over $30 ($32.89).
The mean hourly wage increased after the financial crisis only in 11 states: DC, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and
West Virginia. In sum, after the financial crisis, the highest hourly wage became even higher
($32.89 in DC) and the lowest wage paid became even lower ($17.01 in South Dakota).
This result shows the wage dispersion has been widening after the financial crisis. The
U.S. average hourly wage was higher before the financial crisis ($22.19) than after the crisis
($21.53).
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Figure 2.5: Mean of personal hourly wage by state
before the financial crisis (2000-2006)
Figure 2.6: Mean of personal hourly wage by state
after the financial crisis (2010-2014)
Before the crisis, the highest wage was $32.51 (DC) and the lowest wage was $17.46
(Montana) and two states (DC and Connecticut) paid an hourly wage over $30. After
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the financial crisis, the hourly wage only in DC was over $30 ($32.89). The mean hourly
wage increased after the financial crisis only in 11 states: DC, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. In sum,
after the financial crisis, the highest hourly wage became even higher ($32.89 in DC) and
the lowest wage paid became even lower ($17.01 in South Dakota). This results shows the
wage dispersion has been widening after the financial crisis.
2.4 Empirical methodology
2.4.1 Wage inequality and percentile shares of wage
Although the most popular inequality measure such as the Gini coefficient can provide
a global level of inequality, it does not reveal the detailed process underneath the change of
these inequality measures. Furthermore, a disadvantage of the inequality measure as the Gini
coefficients is that they vary when the distribution changes, without regard to the location of
changes such as whether it happens at the top or at the bottom of the distribution (Litchfield
1999). Thus, it is worthwhile to analyze the distributional inequality with the intention of
understanding what has instigated the changes in overall inequality. For instance, the well-
known study of Piketty (2014) uses the percentile shares of an outcome variable (income)
that goes to the top income groups of the distribution. In this section, as well as the global
inequality measure, we are going to consider the wage inequality from various angles using
the quantile shares of total wage that is the proportion of total outcome that accounts for the
difference between subgroups of population based on their relative ranks in the distributions.
2.4.1.1 The definition of percentile shares
This section introduces a formal definition of the percentile share that incorporates the
inequality measure such as Lorenz curve ordinates, which is following the previous works of
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Blinder and Kovacevic (1995), Cox (1999), and Hyndman and Fan (1996).
Let Y represent the variable of interest such as wage, then its cumulative distribution
function can be expressed as:
F (y) = Pr{Y ≤ y} (2.1)
The quantile function Q(P ) is given as the inverse of this distribution function such that:
Q(P ) = F−1(P ) = inf{y|F (y) ≥ P} (2.2)
where P ∈ [0, 1].
The ordinates of the Lorenz curve quantify the cumulative Y against the population shares








dF (y) = P and
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ydF (y) = µY .








where I(·) is an indicator function.
When P1 and P2 represents the relative rank in the outcome such as P1 ≤ P2, the quantile
share of outcome S(P1, P2) is defined as percentage of total wage that belongs to the specific
portion of population share, which is allocated into the certain interval between quantile
(QP1 , QP2 ]. Thus, eventually this quantile share is equal to the difference of Lorenz curve
ordinates as following:
S2 = S(P1, P2) = L(P2)− L(P1) (2.5)
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when S(Pk−1, Pk) denotes by Sk and when Pk−1 and Pk are certain cutoff points with relative
rank such that Pk−1 < Pk, P0 = 0 and PK = 1 for ∀k = 0, . . . K.
To simplify the notation let the indicator function IYi≤QP means I{Yi ≤ QP} ,then the
quantile shares in accordance with the finite population can be express as:
S2 = S(P1, P2) =
∑N
i=1 Yi(IYi≤QP2 − IYi≤QP1 )∑N
i=1 Yi
(2.6)
Similarly, the percentile share density can be defined by normalizing the percentile shares





The density, Dk, would be equal to one when each individual in that specific population
shares has their Yi equal to the average Y in the population.10 Therefore, total percentile








The average value, SAk , that is belong to certain population between quantiles QPk and





when (Pk − Pk−1)×N is the number of members between QPk and QPk−1 .
10An exhaustive set of percentile share densities of an outcome across all domains of P s integrates to one.
In that sense, if the individual wage in the subpopulation has, on average, n times of the population average
wage then the density, Dk, would be equal to n.
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2.4.2 Decomposition methods
This section outlines two leading decomposition techniques that is employed in this study,
and proceeds in three subsections. The first subsection generally explains the identification
strategy and formally defined the parameters of interest. In the following subsections, two
approaches are introduced: the reweighting method that is suggested by DiNardo, Fortin
and Lemieux (1996, DFL hereafter) and the unconditional quantile regression decomposition
that is proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009, FFL hereafter).
2.4.2.1 Identification strategy
The most extensively used decomposition methodology in labor economics is the mean
decomposition method introduced by Oaxaca (1974) and Blinder (1973). The goal of the
classical Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition is to decompose differences in the mean wages
across mutually exclusive groups. When the membership of the group is linked to some
exogenous characteristics of the individual, the decomposition determines an “explained”
part of the wage differential (composition effect) and an “unexplained” part of the wage
differential (wage structure effect). In other words, the former is the part that is explained
by the difference in group characteristics and the latter is the part that is related to a
difference in the way that characteristics impact the outcome variable across groups. The
unexplained part in the OB decomposition for the wage may be interpreted as being caused
by discrimination since it is the part due to exogenously given characteristics of the workers
that define the group membership (Fortin et al. 2011). Therefore, using the Oaxaca-Blinder
(OB) method, the overall mean wage gap between two groups can be divided into a wage
structure effect and a composition effect. In their original paper, the two groups are defined
either by gender or by races, but the groups may be defined in other ways such as by time
period (i.e., before and after the financial crisis). While a composition effect represents the
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difference in wages that is linked to the difference in covariates of the individual between
different time periods, a structure effect is linked to the difference in the return between
before and after the financial crisis.
The two groups are labelled as A and B, g = A,B and individuals indexed by i =
1, . . . , N . Assume that the wage structure is a linear and additively separable function in
the worker’s observable (X) and unobservable characteristics (ε) and E[εgi|X] = 0
Ygi = Xiβg + εgi for g = A,B (2.10)
Thus, the conditional expectation of wage Ygi given a vector of covariates X to be linear:
E[Ygi|X] = Xiβg for g = A,B. (2.11)
Let DB = 1 be an indicator of group B membership. Then the overall mean wage
difference, ∆µO, may be expressed by taking expectations over X and ε, using the law of
iterated expectations such as:
∆µO = E[YB|DB = 1]− E[YB|DB = 0]
= EX [E(YB|X,DB = 1)|DB = 1]− EX [E(YA|X,DB = 0)|DB = 0]
= (EX [X|DB = 1]βB + EX(E[εB|DB = 1]))
− (E[X|DB = 0]βA + EX(E[εA|DB = 0]))
= EX [X|DB = 1]βB − EX [X|DB = 0]βA
(2.12)
Since E[εB|DB = 1] = E[εA|DB = 0] = 0 by assumption.
Using the counterfactual wage, EX [X|DB = 1]βA, that the worker in group B would have
earned under the wage structure of group A, the overall mean wage difference, ∆µO may be
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divided into a wage structure effect, ∆µS, and a composition effect, ∆
µ
X :
∆µO = EX [X|DB = 1]βB − EX [X|DB = 1]βA + EX [X|DB = 1]βA
− EX [X|DB = 0]βA
= EX [X|DB = 1](βB − βA) + (EX [X|DB = 1]− EX [X|DB = 0])βA




The decomposition may be estimated by replacing the expected value of covariates with
the sample averages for each group, g = A,B, such that X̄g :
∆̂µO = X̄Bβ̂B − X̄Bβ̂A + X̄Bβ̂A − X̄Aβ̂A
= X̄B(β̂B − β̂A) + (X̄B − X̄A)β̂A




The wage structure effect is also called the unexplained part of wage differentials (Fortin et
al. 2011).
This wage decomposing methodology can be extended beyond mean based estimation,
and the composition and wage structure effects also can be defined for the distributional
statistic.
Consider a random sample N with individual indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . The sample
pooled into two group A and B, g = A,B, such that N = NA + NB. The wage (Ygi) is
function of observed (Xi) and unobserved components (εi):
Ygi = Sg(Xi, εi) for g = A,B (2.15)
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where Sg(.) is unknown wage structure function.
When F = F (y) is the CDF of outcome variable (wage) and ρ(F ) is the distributional
statistic of interest, the overall difference in the wage distribution between group A and B
is:
∆ρo = ρ(FB)− ρ(FA) = ρB − ρA (2.16)
For instance, when the distributional statistic (ρ) is the mean (µ), the overall wage difference
is given as total difference in mean wage between groups, as in well-known Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition.
This overall wage gap can be decomposed into two parts using the counterfactual dis-
tribution FCA reflecting the wage distribution that would prevail if group A had the same
distribution of characteristics as group B:
∆ρo = (ρB − ρC) + (ρC − ρA)




where FCA ∼ YA|DB = 1 and ρC = ρ(FCA ). The first term in the right hand side (∆
ρ
S) is
the component captures the effect changing in wage structure, from SB(.) to SA(.), while
keeping the distribution of observed and unobserved characteristics constant as in group B,
(X, ε)|DB = 1. The second term on the right hand side (∆ρX) corresponds to the effect
of changing the distribution of group characteristics from (X, ε)|DB = 1 to (X, ε)|DB = 0
under the wage structure of group A, SA(.).
The study of inequality measures11 often involves a quantile regression model to see how
the entire distribution of an outcome variable, Y , changes from the impact of an explanatory
variable, X. However, unlike the conditional means as in a linear model, the estimates from
simple quantile regression cannot be used to estimate the effect on corresponding quantile
11For example, the Gini coefficient, the coefficient of variation, the Theil index, or interquartile range.
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of Y when X changes, since the law of iterated expectations12 does not apply (Firpo et
al. 2009) and thus, the standard Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition – a decomposition of
mean differences – cannot be computed.
Among a number of alternative decomposition methods, the reweighting approach (Di-
Nardo et al. 1996) is proposed as a way to permit the decomposition of wage dispersion
at different quantiles of the wage distribution into the composition and the wage structure
effects using the counterfactual wage distribution. In this study, the overall sample is par-
titioned into two groups, before the financial crisis (2004-2006) and after the financial crisis
(2012-2014). Thus, the counterfactual distribution is what the wage distribution before the
financial crisis would be if characteristics of the workers before the crisis are reweighted
to mimic the workers’ characteristics after the financial crisis.13 Firpo and Pinto (2015)
show that the reweighting method is efficient when this procedure is used to decompose the
standard distributional inequality measures.
2.4.2.2 Reweighting method
As mentioned above, the law of iterated expectations in the linear model does not apply in
the decomposition with the exception of mean. For the decomposition of inequality measures,
this section introduces the reweighting method that is suggested by DFL.14
For instance, when τ th quantile of unconditional distribution of Y is qτ , this unconditional
quantile does not equal to the expected values of the conditional quantile.
qτ 6= E[qτ (X)] (2.18)
12The law of iterated expectations in a linear model holds, E[Y |X] = Xβ, and this implies
E[Y ] = E[X]β.
13In the original work of DFL (1996), the counterfactual density is what wage distribution would have
prevailed in 1988 (t = 1) if the characteristics of workers had remained as in 1979 (t = 0).
14In their original work, they use the wage density.
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Note that qτ is found by solving FY |X(qτ ) = τ .
When the marginal distribution of X is FX|Dg(x) for group g = A,B, the conditional




FYg |X,Dg(y|X = x)dFX|Dg(x) (2.19)
The counterfactual distribution, FY CA , can be expressed as:







where ω(x) = dFXB(x)/dFXA(x).
Therefore, the counterfactual distribution can be found by replacing the distribution of X
for group A, FXA(·), with one for group B, FXB(·), using reweighting factor. The reweighting
factor, ω(x), only depends on since it is a ratio of two marginal distributions and can be
estimated to logit or probit by simply applying Bayes’ rule15 such that:
dFxB(x) ≡ Prob(x|DB = 1)
=
Prob(DB = 1|X = x) · dF (x)∫
x
Prob(DB = 1|X = x) · dF (x)
=
Prob(DB = 1|X = x) · dF (x)
Prob(DB = 1)
(2.22)
dFxA(x) ≡ Prob(x|DB = 0)
=
Prob(DB = 0|X = x) · dF (x)∫
x
Prob(DB = 0|X = x) · dF (x)
=
Prob(DB = 0|X = x) · dF (x)
Prob(DB = 0)
(2.23)
In practice, the reweighting factor can be estimated using a predicted probability from a
15Bayes’ rule defines the conditional probabilities of event Bi given that A is





logit or probit model:
ω̃(x) =
P̂ rob(DB = 1|x)/P̂ rob(DB = 1)
P̂ rob(DB = 0|x)/P̂ rob(DB = 0)
(2.24)
In their paper, DFL(1996) estimate the probability density function with the weighted kernel























where K(·) is the kernel function.16
In this study, quantiles are used as the distributional statistic of interest for the decom-
position such that:
ρ = ρ(F ) = qτ (2.27)
where qτ = Qτ [Y ] is the population τ th quantile of unconditional distribution of outcome
variable.
The composition effect is given from these differences between the counterfactual distribution




and the distribution for group A at quantile (qτ ), qτ (yA)
∆qτX = qτ (y
C
A)− qτ (yA) (2.28)
The wage differentials between quantiles is the difference between the composition effects
at quantile (qτ )10th, 50th,or 90th. For example, the wage differentials between 90th and 10th






A)− q90(yA))− (q10(yCA)− q10(yA)) (2.29)
2.4.2.3 Finding the contribution of covariates to the decomposition analysis
However, we still cannot answer which factor is attributing most to the difference in the
wage distribution. A relatively new procedure of Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) can
help us to find the contribution of particular covariates by further dividing the explained
and unexplained components. Their proposed approach, the recentered influence function
(RIF) regressions, is a two-stage procedure based on the OB decomposition and can be
performed not only on the mean but also on any distributional measures. In the first stage,
the distributional statistic of interest (e.g., inter-quartile range, variance, or Gini coefficient)
is partitioned into an explained (composition effects) and an unexplained (wage structure
effects) part using a parametric or non-parametric estimated weight that is similar to the
reweighting method (DFL 1996). In the second stage, by adopting the OB decomposition,
these composition and wage structure effects are further decomposed into the contributions
of each covariate to the distributional statistic of interest. In practice, this procedure can
be done by replacing the dependent variable with the recentered influence function of the
distributional statistic.
Using RIF regressions, we can effectively examine the change in wage inequality among
male worker in the U.S. between before the financial crisis (2004-2006) and after the financial
crisis (2012-2014) by considering the decomposition of the changes at different wage quantiles,
even when the inequality growth at the top end of the wage distribution is not same as at
the bottom end of the distribution.
Let’s consider the case of quantile such as ρ = ρ(F ), and where the unconditional
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(marginal) distribution of outcome (Y ) is :
FY (y) =
∫
FY |X(y|X = x) · dFX(x) (2.30)
The definition of the influence function (IF ) is following Hampel (1974). He provides the
properties and interpretation of the influence function of a robust estimator when it is defined
as the first derivative of an estimator at some distribution. He also shows it can be used
to derive asymptotic variances and other local robustness properties. In its general abstract
from, the influence function of the estimator ρ at the underlying probability distribution F
is defined as:
IF (y; ρ) = IF (y; ρ, F ) = lim
ε→0
{ρ((1− ε)F + εγy)− ρ(F )} /ε, for 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 (2.31)




IF (y; ρ)dF (y) = 0 (2.32)
The specific forms of the IF are provided in previous studies (Chamberlain 1994; Monti
1991; Firpo et al.2007). For instance, the IF of the mean is:
IF (y, µ) = lim
ε→0
[(1− ε) · µ+ ε · y − µ]
ε
= y − µ (2.33)
Therefore, RIF (y;µ) = IF (y;µ) + µ = y.
Similarly, the IF of the median (δ) is given as:
IF (y; δ) =




Its RIF is RIF (y; δ) = δ + IF (y; δ).





z · dFY (z)
)2
− σ2 (2.35)





z · dFY (z)
)2
= (Y − µ)2 (2.36)
The well-known inequality measure, the Gini coefficient is defined as:
G(FY ) = 1− 2µ−1L(FY ) (2.37)
where L(FY ) =
∫ 1
0
GL(p;FY )dp and p(y) = FY (y). GL(p;FY ) denotes the generalized Lorenz





The IF of the Gini is given as:
IF (y; νGC) = 2µ−1L(FY ) + 2µ−2L(FY )y − 2µ−1 [y[1− FY (y)]] +GL(p;FY ) (2.39)
Therefore, the RIF of the Gini is given as:
IF (y; νGC) = 1 + 2µ−2L(FY )y − 2µ−1 [y[1− FY (y)]] +GL(p;FY ) (2.40)
17In this case, the generalized Lorenz ordinate implies the proportion of outcome that is belong to the pth
percentile of lowest earners in the distribution. See Monti (1991) for more details.
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FFL (2009) use this influence function as the dependent variable in a linear model that
determines the contribution of each covariate to the variation in the distributional statistic
ρ. Their recentered influence function (RIF ) is re-centering the influence function by adding
ρ(F ), such that:
RIF (y; ρ) = ρ(F ) + IF (y, ρ) (2.41)
so, the expected value of RIF reduces to the statistic of interest (ρ), Ey[RIF (.)] = ρ(F ).
For instance, in the case of τ th quantile of distribution F , qτ = Q(F, τ) = inf[y|F (y) ≥ τ ],
RIF is defined as:
RIF (y; qτ ) = qτ + IF (y; qτ ) = qτ +
τ − I(Y ≥ qτ )
fY (qτ )
= qτ +
I(Y ≥ qτ )− (1− τ)
fY (qτ )
(2.42)
where I(.) is an indicator function and fY (.) is the marginal density distribution of Y . The
value of the IF would be −(1−τ)/fY (qτ ) if the outcome is below the τ th quantile, and would
be τ/fY (qτ ) if the outcome is above the τ th quantile.
Its expected value is simply qτ since the expected value of the last term, E[I(Y ≥ qτ )−(1−τ)],
equals to zero.
Let’s consider the distributional statistic and its counterfactual:
ρg = ρ(Fg) for g = A,B (2.43)
ρc = ρ(FC) = ρ(F
C
A ) (2.44)
Its expectation will be expressed as:
ρg = E[RIF (yg; ρ)|g] for g = A,B (2.45)
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ρc = E[RIF (yA; ρ)|DB = 1] (2.46)
which is using the law of iterated expectations, and the distributional statistic is:
ρ = ρ(F ) =
∫
E[RIF (y; ρ)|X = x] · dFx(x) (2.47)
Denote RIF-regression as following:
θρg(x) = E[RIF (yg; ρg)|X = x, g] for g = A,B (2.48)
θρC(x) = E[RIF (yA; ρC)|X = x,DB = 1] (2.49)
Using these, the distribution statistics becomes
ρg = E[θ
ρ
g(x)|g] for g = A,B (2.50)
ρC = E[θ
ρ
C(x)|DB = 1] (2.51)
Therefore, the wage structure and the composition effects can be expressed as:
∆ρS = ρB − ρC = E[θ
ρ
B(x)|DB = 1]− E[θ
ρ
C(x)|DB = 1] (2.52)
∆ρX = ρC − ρA = E[θ
ρ
C(x)|DB = 1]− E[θ
ρ
A(x)|DB = 0] (2.53)
Under a linearity assumption that the conditional expectations, θρg(x) and θ
ρ
C(x), to be linear
in x, we can rewrite the wage structure and the composition effects using a linear projection,
θρl (x), as following:
θρg,l(x) = x
T · δρg (2.54)
θρC,l(x) = x
T · δρC (2.55)
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where δρg = (E[X ·XT |g])−1 · E[RIF (yg; ρg)X|g] for g = A,B and
δρC = (E[X ·XT |DB = 1])−1 · E[RIF (yA; ρC) ·X|DB = 1].
Since the expected approximation error equals zero,
E[θρg,l(x)|g] = E[θ
ρ
g(x)|g] for g = A,B (2.56)
E[θρC,l(x)|DB = 1] = E[θ
ρ
C(x)|DB = 1] (2.57)
Thus, the wage structure and the composition effects are reduced as:
∆ρS = E[X|DB = 1]
T · (δρB − δ
ρ
C) (2.58)
∆ρX = E[X|DB = 1]
T · δρC − E[X|DB = 0]
T · δρA (2.59)
The decomposition based on this RIF -regressions is generalizing the Oaxaca-Blinder type
decomposition to the distributional statistic using the linear specification.
2.5 Empirical results
In this section, having outlined the relevant methodologies and the basic trends of wages, I
now present the results in three stages. First, I report the estimated results of the percentile
shares of wages by the potential contributors to U.S. wage inequality during 2000-2014,
including gender, race, ethnicity, age, occupation, economic sector, location, difference in
the level of educational attainment, concentration of the top earners and other conditions
such as employment status and worker’s English language proficiency. Second, the analy-
sis of changes in the wage inequality by drawing a comparison between before (2000-2006)
and after the financial crisis (2010-2014) is discussed in the following section. Lastly, with
these estimates, I summarize the results by implementing two different decomposition meth-
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ods: the reweighting method that is suggested by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and
the unconditional quantile regression decomposition that is proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (2009).
2.5.1 Wage inequality in the U.S. (2000-2014)
2.5.1.1 Wage inequality by gender
Figure 2.7: The density of log wage by gender
Figure 2.7 shows the density of log wage for male and female workers in 2000-2014. The
density of the men is relatively rightly skewed compare to the women’s, and the mode of
the men is to the right of that of the women. The median of density for the men is higher
than the median of women’s, and the difference is about 0.5 log unit. Table D.13 reports
the wage shares of quintile groups during 2000-2014, as the percentage of total wages. The
first column of the table is for the entire sample and the second, and the third columns of
the table are the results for male and female workers, respectively. The percentile share of
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wages is the proportion of total wages that belongs to the particular group of people, which
is based on their relative ranks in the wages they received. The implication of the percentage
wage shares of quintile groups is that if the wages were equally distributed, then each group
would receive 20 percent of total wages.
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This point is evident in Figure 2.8, which depicts the percentage wage shares at each
decile within the gender group. The decile wage shares of the female group are slightly
higher than those of the male group, except for the best earners of each gender group at the
top decile. At a glance, we can observe a big difference across quintile groups: while the
top 20 percent of wage earners are receiving almost one-half of total wages, the lowest 20
percent of earners are making about 5 percent of total wages. The proportional wages of the
20 percent best wage earners among the male are higher (49.59%) than that of the female
(47.60%). Similarly, the portion of wages received by the lowest 20 percent earners is lower
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among the men (4.96%) than those among the women (5.49%). In that sense, the wages are
more unevenly distributed within the group of male than within the female group, which
indicates that the within-group wage inequality among the male is higher than the female.
Relatively speaking, the female workers hold slightly higher wage shares than male workers -
about a half percentage points – if they are at the same rank in the list of ordered wages paid
within each quintile group, except in the very top-end of the distribution. Thus, the overall
gender wage gaps across quintiles reflect mostly wage disparities between the best-earning
male and the best-earning female.
For the further understanding of the distributional wage differences by gender, the arith-
metic contrasts between distributions of wages among male and female workers are estimated.
Using the differences in the percentile wage shares densities by gender, we can evaluate which
differences between the distributions are significant. The percentile share densities are a nor-
malization of percentile shares with regard to the size of a certain subpopulation based on
their relative ranks on the distribution. Thus, it indicates how much people in that subpop-
ulation would be paid on average relative to the average total wages. Intuitively, if every
individual in that particular part of distribution receives wages, on average, equal to the
mean wage, the density has a value of one.
Figure 2.9 illustrates the gender wage gaps as decile wage share densities using the female
workers as the reference group. Thus, the results reflect the differences of wage distribution
would be if the worker is men since the densities display as the multiples of the average
outcome in the reference subpopulation.18 The male workers would be slightly worse off up
to the bottom 90 percent, which is about three representative cents.19 This implies that
wages are more unevenly distributed among male workers in relation to the among female
18 It implies that the relative group sizes are taken into account by normalizing percentile densities to the
total outcome of the reference subpopulation.
19 Intuitively, the percentile share densities with normalization shows who ends up with how much money
if 100 dollars are handed out among 100 people according to the observed distribution. If it is equally
distributed, each person would receive 1 dollar and so, there would be no inequality.
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workers who are in the same rank on wage distribution. However, the 10 percent best earning
men would be better off and they would receive 21 representative cents more than the 10
percent best earning women (in the third column of Table D.14).
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Note: the distributional difference of wages between male and female workers when the reference
group is the group of female.
Turning to the gender wage disparities in absolute level, the mean hourly wages at decile
and its differences are estimated and summarized in Table D.14. The decile mean hourly
wages of male workers lie between 4.48 dollars and 88.04 dollars per hour, whereas these
of female workers lie between 3.95 dollars and 64.55 dollars per hour. At every decile, the
male workers are paid more than female workers, and a number of gains tend to be more
at higher decile of distribution: the relative gains of men compared to women is 53 cents
per hour at bottom decile, but it is 23.49 dollars per hour at top decile, which is 44 times
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more. Figure C1 in the Appendix shows the mean hourly wage differences between male and
female workers.
These results re-emphasize three important trends in U.S. wage inequality. First, within-
group wage inequality of male is severe than one of within female group. Second, the male
workers are relatively paid more than female workers at every decile of the wage distribution.
Such phenomenon refers to ’sticky floors’: female workers receive lower wage gains compare
to male and consequently, remain stuck to the lower wage points with formal wage scales.
Notably, this explains the disadvantage and gender wage gaps at the bottom of wage dis-
tribution (Booth et al. 2003). Third, the overall gender wage dispersion reflects mostly the
pay gaps between the best earnings male and the best earning female. This significant pay
gaps at top-end suggest the existence of ‘glass ceiling’ for women, which implies invisible but
concrete barriers where the women in the top end of wage distribution have a much lower
pay than their male counterparts (Chi and Li 2008).
2.5.1.2 Wage inequality by race
What would be wage inequality within racial groups? To identify the similarities and
differences between racial groups, the percentile wage shares, and the Gini coefficient for five
racial group, such as White, Black, Asian, Other, and Two or more races, are estimated and
reported in Figure 2.10. The results are sorted by the subgroup Gini from highest value to
lowest value, and overall inequality is placed last.
Among the five racial groups, the wage inequality of the group of Asian is highest (0.448),
and that of the other races are lowest (0.408), according to the subgroup Gini.
The 10 percent best earners of the group of two or more races hold the largest wage
shares (34%), which is similar to the holding by the white top decile earners (33.6%). The
wage shares of the middle earners lie between 44.1 percent (other) and 46.5 percent (Asian).
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The largest wage shares of the bottom half percent are 23.5% (other). The group of Asian
shows the smallest wage shares of the 50 poorest earners (20.2%), which may lead to the
highest within-group inequality for Asian, although its middle earners have the biggest wage
shares. Similarly, the within-group inequality of the two or more races is greater than overall
inequality since their wage shares of the bottom half percent is small and these of top earners
is large. Across all subgroups, the wage shares held by the top half of the distribution is
more than 75 percent of total earnings. The more detailed results regarding the wage shares
and the Gini coefficient for the racial subgroups are reported in Table D.15.
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Note: the sub-population are defined by five-racial group (White, Black, Asian, Other, and Two or
more). The value of total represents the results across sub-populations. The results are reported from
the highest inequality to lowest inequality based on the Gini coefficient of the subgroups. The overall
inequality is placed last.
Turning to the wage disparities between white and non-white workers, the mean hourly
wages at quintile and its differences are estimated (Table D.16). The quintile mean hourly
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wages of white workers lie between 6.09 dollars and 57.46 dollars per hour, whereas those
of non-white workers lie between 5.23 dollars and 50.69 dollars per hour. At every quintile,
white workers are paid more than non-white workers, and their relative gains tend to increase
at the higher quintile of the wage distribution.
Figure 2.11: The difference in average wage between white
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Note: the difference in wages between White and non-White when the reference group is White
workers.
Figure 2.11 illustrates how much the hourly earnings would be paid more (less) on average
if the worker is not white at each quintile. The results show that the non-white workers are
worse off across all quintiles and their loss would be more if their ranks are relatively higher.
For the workers in the 50 percentile, they would be paid about 2.75 dollars less per hour if
they are non-white.
To stratify the results, the mean hourly wage gaps between white and non-white workers
by gender are considered. The mean hourly earnings of white and non-white men outpace
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those of women at every quintile (the second column of Table D.16). The quintile mean
hourly wages of white men lie between 6.69 dollars and 65.79 dollars per hour, whereas those
of white women lie between 5.64 dollars and 47.90 dollars per hour.
At every quintile, the wage gaps between white and non-white workers are much greater
among men than those among women. In fact, between white and non-white wage differen-
tials among women is surprisingly smaller than those among men: among women, the most
significant mean wage differences between white and non-white women is 1.67 dollars per
hour (the 60-80 quantile), which is less than one-tenth of those of men (the 80-100 quantile).
In sum, the worker would be relatively worse off if non-white at every quantile for men
and women. White men would be paid more than white women. The wage disparities
between white and non-white are mostly attributed to the pay gaps among men, which is up
to ten times more than the differences among women. The wage differentials tend to widen
at higher wage quintile of the wage distribution. These results suggest the existence of glass
ceiling for non-white workers that prevents minorities from achieving the best wages due to
the higher returns to characteristics in favor of white workers, in particular for the group of
male.
2.5.1.3 Wage inequality by ethnicity
To be sure, some of this wage inequality can be attributable to ethnicity. To identify
wage gaps due to ethnicity combined with race, the entire sample is partitioned into five sub-
groups: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic Asian, non-Hispanic other,
and Hispanic.
Figure 2.12 represents the percentage wage shares and the Gini coefficients of those five
groups. The five groups are ranked from highest to lowest values regarding within-group
inequality. Among five groups, the wage inequality of non-Hispanic Asian (0.448) and non-
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Hispanic other races (0.446) are greater than the Gini across all races and ethnicities (0.435).
Within each group, the wage shares held by the bottom half is less than quarter percent of
total wages, while those owned by the top half is almost four times as much. The wage
inequality among Hispanic is lowest (0.414), and this may be explained by the larger shares
held by the 50 percent poorest earner (23.1%) and the smaller shares for the top 10 percent
earners (32.7%). The top 50 percent of best earners hold more than 75 percent of total wage
shares across all groups. The more detailed results are reported in Table D.17.
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Note: the sub-population are defined by five-group (Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, Non-
Hispanic Asian, Non-Hispanic Other, and Hispanic). The value of total represents the results across
sub-populations. The results are reported from the highest inequality to lowest inequality based on
the Gini coefficient of the subgroups. The overall inequality is placed last.
To deepen our understanding of ethnic wage differentials, the level and density pay gaps
between Hispanic and non-Hispanic workers are estimated at each decile and reported in
Table D.18. The reference group is assigned to the group of Hispanic workers and thus,
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the differences represent the pay gaps would be if the worker is non-Hispanic. Figure 2.13
contrasts the distributional wage differences in decile wage shares between these groups.
Interestingly, the bottom half percent are relatively worse off if the worker is not Hispanic, but
the top half percent are relatively better off. The bottom 20 percent loose five representative
cents but the top 10 percent gain about ten representative cents, which is roughly twice
much of the loss in the bottom decile.
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Note: the distributional difference of wage between Hispanic and non-Hispanic when the reference
group is Hispanic.
This result shows an important feature in rising U.S. wage inequality: the relatively higher
gain in the top-end of the wage distribution combined with the relatively fewer gains (or more
loss) in the bottom-end help to explain the growth of U.S. wage inequality. It may be hardly
captured by studying inequality without considering the distributional wage differentials
since the pay gaps between the groups of Hispanic and non-Hispanic have become a secular
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trend and thus induces a monotonic increase in wage inequality between these groups.
The mean hourly wage gaps between Hispanic and non-Hispanic workers lie between 43
cents and 23.08 dollars per hour, and the results are displayed in Figure C2 in the Appendix.
Figure 2.14: The difference in decile wage shares between non-
Hispanic white and other
Note: the distributional difference of wage between non-Hispanic white and others when the reference
group is non-Hispanic white.
Turing attention to racial wage gaps, the differences in the decile wage shares and the
mean wages between the group of non-Hispanic white and others are considered. The esti-
mated distributional differences between non-Hispanic white and others show the pay gaps
would be if the worker is Hispanic or non-Hispanic all other races except white. As the
presentation in Figure 2.14, when the worker is not non-Hispanic white, the worker would
be better off in the bottom two quintiles or the top two quintiles but would be worse off in
the middle (the 20-70 percent). Their relative gains are four representative cents in the top
20 percent, and relative loss is two representative cents in the 30-70 percent. If Hispanic
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or non-Hispanic other races workers are in the third top decile (the 70-80), they would be
indifference. These results would be evidence for the presence of the U.S. labor market po-
larization, particularly for the group of workers of Hispanic or non-Hispanic other races. The
polarization is a non-monotonic job growth in the wage distribution when the job quality
as proxied by initial wages such as while the low-wage and high-wage jobs are rapidly grow-
ing, the middle-wage jobs are slowly growing or shrinking. Therefore, this tends to diverge
employment gains and widen wage inequality (Autor et al. 2006).
See Table D.19 for the estimated results of wage differences between non-Hispanic white
and others. Figure C3 (in the Appendix) pictures the decile mean hourly wage gaps between
non-Hispanic white workers and others.
2.5.1.4 Wage inequality by educational attainment
How much wage inequality is attributed to the returns to the different level of educational
attainment? In the U.S., the returns to education as measured by the relative wages of col-
lege graduates to the high school graduates slightly decreased from the middle of the 1960s to
the 1970s, but it has been increasing ever since (Acemoglu and Autor 2010). Many inequal-
ity studies find wage differentials by educational attainment are substantially attributed to
widening wage dispersion and increase within-group inequality (Juhn et al. 1993). Most
of the research in this branch explain the education premium, in the extension of skill pre-
mium, is due to the skill bias of technical change: the relative demand for skilled workers is
increased by skill-biased technology improvement and thus, the ratio of mean (or median)
log wage of college graduates and to the wage of high school graduate has been raised.20
But have been this a secular trend in a labor market expanding the wage gaps over the
past three decades? Autor et al. (2008) asset although there is still favoring the skilled
20 These studies identify skilled and unskilled groups as workers with college graduates and those with
high school graduates. Thus, the education premium can be viewed as the market’s returns of skills. See
Acemoglu (2002) and Katz and Autor (1999) for the excellent reviews for this literature, among many.
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labor in the 1990s, the pace became slower than it was before, except for the post-college
educated workers. Acemoglu and Autor (2010) also point out though the wage gap between
the college and high school graduates has monotonically increased, the changes in wages at
different parts of the wage distribution are non-monotone. However, as Juhn et al. (1993)
points out, the real wage gains are not equally spread across workers. They find that the
distributional divergence in earnings is prolonged across educational groups, which cannot
be reveal from looking at the median values of real wages.
To explore the recent trend of wage inequality due to the different schoolings and to
examine non-monotonic changes in the wage distribution, the distributional wage differentials
between the workers with the various level of educations are analyzed in this section.
Figure 2.15: The mean hourly wage difference between worker
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Note: the difference in mean hourly wage between worker who holds at least a bachelor’s degree
from 4-year college and who does not when the reference group is worker who does not have at least
a bachelor’s degree.
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Firstly, I consider two groups of workers with and without higher education to capture
the trend: one group are defined as the worker with at least a bachelor’s degree or more
education such as graduate schooling includes professional degrees, and another group is
those who have not completed the four-year college education.21 Figure 2.15 pictures the
earning gaps at each decile between workers with at least a four-year college degree and
those who have not finished college. At every decile, the workers are better off if they have
at least a four-year college degree and their relative gains from the college education tend to
be larger at the higher decile of the wage distribution. For instance, if the college educated
workers are in the tenth percentile of the wage distribution than their gains are 3.51 dollars
per hour. But, they would be paid 58.17 dollars more per hour in the ninetieth percentile of
the wage distribution, which is about 16 times more than those in the tenth percentile.
Secondly, turning to wage inequality due to the different returns to schooling, the wage
premium of graduate and college education are considered. The decile mean hourly wages
among workers those with: (1) post-college degree (graduate degree including professional
degree) and 4-year college degree, (2) 4-year college degree and high school diploma (who
completed up to the 12th grade of education including GED), and (3) high school gradu-
ates and high school dropouts (as those who has fewer than the 12 years of schooling) are
estimated and the results are reported in Table D.20.
The decile mean hourly wages of post-college educated lie between 9.08 dollars and 135.71
dollars per hour, while those for college-educated lie between 6.58 dollars and 97.17 dollars
per hour. For the high school graduates, the average hourly wage by decile varies from
3.87 dollars to 51.63 dollars per hour. At each decile, the ratio of the mean hourly wage of
post-college graduates to that of college graduates is lower than the mean hourly wage ratio
between college graduates and high school graduates. Thus, the college/high-school wage
21 The workers who have received up to the 12th grade of education, high school diploma or GED, some
college education (completed or not) or associate’s degree from the 2-year college.
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premium is greater than the post-college/college wage premium at all deciles.
However, their relative gains are not same across the wage distribution, even when the
trend of the wage premiums are monotonically upward. The pay gaps between post-college
and college educated lie between 2.50 dollars and 38.33 dollars per hour across deciles. These
show a significant within-educational group wage inequality: the relative wage gains of the
top decile earners are about 15 times more than those who are in the bottom decile. Similarly,
the earnings gap between college and high school educated lie between 2.71 dollars and 45.54
dollars per hour and the relative gains of the 10 percent best earners are roughly 17 times
more than these of the 10 percent poorest earners. The wage gaps between workers with
high school diploma compared to high school dropouts are only from 1.28 dollars to 8.50
dollars per hour.
Indeed, the wage premium from high school or college education contributes to wage
inequality across the educational groups with different level of schoolings. But, in addition
to this premium, the within-group wage inequality accounts for rising wage inequality with
different magnitude. For instance, the within-group wage dispersion as the ratio of top to
bottom decile among college-educated workers is higher than the ratio among post-college
or high school educated workers. These results reveal that the wage disparities due to
the different schoolings among workers are substantially attributable to the college wage
premium, and it tends to increase non-monotonically at higher decile of the wage distribution,
especially within the group of more educated workers. Therefore, the recent increase in U.S.
wage inequality is not only due to the higher returns to higher education but also due to
larger within-group wage dispersion among more educated workers as bigger relative gains
in the top-end compared to the lower-end of the wage distribution.
For robustness check, the decile wage differences between the workers with some college
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education and those without are reported in Table D.21 and Figure C4 (in the Appendix).22
The differences reflect the relative gains would be if the worker has at least one year of college
education. Although the magnitudes are somewhat smaller than the pay gaps between college
and high school educated workers, the results show that there are better off from some college
education across all deciles. The relative gains lie between 1.84 and 42.33 dollars per hour.
The changes before and after the financial crisis in wage differentials among workers with
different educational attainments will be discussed in Section 2.5.2.
2.5.1.5 Wage inequality by opportunity
Other contributors of wage inequality such as exogenously given conditions to workers
that are also known as “circumstances” are examined in this section. The outcome inequality
that is attributed to individual pre-determined circumstances beyond their level of efforts is
considered as inequality of opportunity (Roemer 2000). The inequality of opportunity (IOP)
is deemed to be closely related to the inequality of outcome very often, though it can be
barely observable. Intuitively, if the worker has to work while he is still in the school, he
might face a wage dispersion due to his working status. The primary concern for inequality
of opportunity (IOP) has started in the welfare economics literature. This literature, such
as in Roemer (2000), asserts that the inequality of outcome does not adequately represent
the level of inequality in society since the outcome difference is also related to the returns to
different levels of effort. Although it is still debatable to find a clear-cut of such measure, it
is worthwhile to consider how the exogenously given conditions of workers have shaped the
wage distribution for a comprehensive understanding of wage inequality. In this section, two
pre-determined conditions (or circumstances) are used to measure wage differentials among
workers such as the employment status and the worker’s English language proficiency, and
the average wage differences at each decile are estimated based on these partitions of the
22The workers with some college are defined as those with at least one year of college education.
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sample.
Figure 2.16: The mean hourly wage difference between
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Note: the reference group is the workers who have a part-time status.
The employment status of a worker indicates whether the person is still in the school
or not while employed. Using these full-time or part-time working status, the employees
are grouped into two, and the wage differentials between these groups are estimated. The
decile wage differences in Figure 2.16 reflect that the mean hourly wage gains would be if
the worker employed as a full-time. The relative benefits of the full-time workers tend to be
larger at the higher wage deciles: they would receive between 2.47 dollars and 28.51 dollars
per hour more compared to the part-time employees (Table D.22).
Does the worker’s English language proficiency cause the wage differentials? The sample
is partitioned into two groups: the workers who speak English fluently and who do not.23
23The group of workers are defined as those who speak English but not well or those who do not speak
English.
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Figure 2.17: The mean hourly wage difference between work-
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Note: the reference group is worker who speaks English well.
The results in Table D.23 and Figure 2.17 represent the wage gaps that are in contrast to
the group of workers who speak English well. The worker in the median would be paid about
7 dollars less per hour if they cannot speak English fluently (the first column of Table D.23).
For the comparison, the pay gaps between the workers who are native speakers of English and
those who are non-native speakers are estimated. The results are summarized in the second
column of Table D.23 and Figure C5 (in the Appendix). The worker in the median will be
paid about 3 dollars per hour less if the person is a non-native English speaker. Although
the wage gaps between native and non-native English speaker are smaller than the previous
results, between those who are proficient in English and who are not, the both results show
that the worker would be worse off if they do not possess English language proficiency.
To sum up, not only the core characters of workers but also the exogenous conditions
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given to the person can affect the wage differentials. These effects are usually considered as
unexplained wage gaps by observed characteristics. These unexplained wage gaps tend to
be larger at the higher end of the wage distribution. The relative gains (or loss) from the
working status of the employees or their proficiency in English would be up to 28.51 dollars
or 33.59 dollars per hour, respectively.
2.5.1.6 Wage inequality by location
While the U.S. wage inequality, when it is measured as Gini coefficient, has been increas-
ing monotonically since the 1980s, its trend in each state shows much difference of it. How
much of the U.S. wage inequality can be attributed to within- or between-state inequality?
In empirical studies, researchers often place a dummy variable to capture the location factor.
However, this regression type studies may not provide an accurate quantitative difference in
inequality between regions when the individual residential location from the survey data is
used for the proxy. The decomposition of inequality for the subgroup in the spatial context
is described as quantifying two components of total variation: a weighted average of re-
gional inequality (within-group component) and the inequality due to differences in average
outcome across regions (between-group component) (Shorrocks and Wan 2005). Particular
inequality measures, such as all member of the Generalized Entropy (GE) class, are ad-
ditively decomposable by subgroup into within and between terms. The Gini coefficient,
however, cannot suitably be expressed as the sum of within and between inequality terms
due to overlap between the groupwise (regional) income distributions (Shorrocks 1984).
The aim of this section is to propose a simple device in order to estimate an approximation
of within- and between-state contributions to the Gini coefficient. According to Shorrocks
and Wan (2005), the between-group inequality under the spatial subgroup is “the level of
inequality that would be observed if the income of each person is replaced by the mean
income of his or her respective region.” Therefore, we can estimate the approximation of
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between-state wage inequality by assuming there is no difference of earnings within that
location.
Let us suppose everybody in one state receives the same hourly wage, equal to the state’s
mean ȳj, with j = 1, . . . 51. Under this condition, within state wage inequality should be
removed since there are no wage differences between individuals who are within the same
state. Therefore, the dispersion with this assumption identifies the between state wage
inequality.
Turing to within state inequality, let ȳ be the national average of the hourly wage and
ȳj be state level of mean value, which is defined for each state, j = 1, . . . 51. Then we can
find a deflated wage for person i in state j using the mean ratio between the national mean





After multiplying the individual hourly wage by the mean ratio, the average of the de-
flated personal wage is equal to the national mean wage for all state (ȳdij = ȳ). Thus, by
using the mean wage ratio, this adjustment removes the between state difference, and thus,
the inequality is purely associated with the wage inequality within the state.
The estimated results from the above methods are reported in Table D.24. The first
column of the table is total wage inequality that is measured by the observed individual
earnings. The values in the second column of Table D.24 are Gini coefficient when personal
earings set to equal to the state mean hourly wage, and thus it represents the wage inequality
between states. In other words, it would be the level of wage inequality if there was no
difference in personal wages within each state. The third column of Table D.24 reports
the values when the individual hourly wages are deflated by the mean wage ratio, and thus
accounts for only within-state wage inequality. The mean wage ratio varies from 0.701 to
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1.307 across states. In the last column of Table D.24, the ratio of between states Gini and
the actual value of Gini indicates the proportion of the between state wage inequality among
total wage inequality that is measured by Gini coefficient. In general, the between state
wage disparities are much smaller than the within state wage differences. During 2004-2014,
the between state wage inequality accounts for only less than 17 percent of overall wage
inequality. The within state wage inequality accounts for the most of U.S. wage inequality,
which is more than 80 percent of the total.24 This is consistent with the previous findings in
this literature that the residual (within groups) wage inequality substantially accounts for
the rising wage dispersion since 1980s.25
Turning to the regional wage inequalities by Census Divisions, the percentile wage shares
and the Gini of the nine Census Divisions are estimated as in Figure 2.18. Among nine
divisions, the Gini coefficient of three divisions – Pacific, Middle Atlantic, and West South
Central – are higher than the overall Gini. The location with the lowest Gini is West North
Central Division and the one with the highest Gini is Pacific Division. Thus, the greatest
difference between the within group Gini is roughly 0.04. The largest wage percentile shares
held by the top decile earners is 34.3 percent of total earnings (Middle Atlantic and West
South Central Divisions), and their smallest shares are 32 percent (East and West North
Central Divisions). The wage shares owned by the middle-class lie between 44.4 percent and
45.3 percent of total wages and these values are similar across nine divisions. The percentile
wage shares occupied by the top-half are more than 78 percent of total wages except for
three divisions - East North Central, East South Central and West North Central Division.
The regional wage inequality is lower when the wage shares of the bottom half are relatively
large and of the top decile are fairly small. In fact, this relative size of the wage shares
held by the lower half seems to be mostly crucial for the regional wage inequality, while the
24The changes in regional wage inequality before and after the financial crisis will be discussed in Section
2.5.2.
25See Autor et al. (2008), Juhn et al. (1993), and Katz and Murphy (1992) among many.
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wage shares of the middle group are similar across the nine divisions. The regional wage
inequality by the four Census Regions are provided in Figure C6 (in the Appendix). The
wages are mostly unevenly distributed in West but well evenly distributed in Midwest with
the regional Gini as 0.442 and 0.414, respectively.
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Note: the sub-population are defined by the Census Division. The value of total represents the results
across sub-populations. The results are reported from the highest inequality to lowest inequality based
on the Gini coefficient of the subgroups. The overall inequality is placed last.
2.5.1.7 Wage inequality by concentration of the top earner
How much of wage is concentrated at top 1 percent? Figure 2.19 represents decile wage
density when the top 1 percent earners are treated as a separate group. The wage density of
the top 1 percent earners is a spike and clearly show the significant difference with others.
This way of plotting wage is somewhat similar Jan Pen’s description of income distribution
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in his book what is called Pen’s Parade of Dwarfs and a few Giants (Pen 1971).26 In his
book, the parade is expressed as everyone in the economy is lined up from shortest to tallest
when each person is represented by own height proportional to income. It would look like a
parade of dwarves and a few number of Giants at the very end.
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Table D.25 shows the wage shares of each decile and top 1 percent earners and their mean
hourly wages.27 The wage shares occupied by the 1 percent best earners are about 57 times
more than the person at the lowest decile would receive. The bottom 70 percent earners
would get less than 1 dollar, which means they receive less than average wages within that
bins. In an absolute level, the mean hourly wages for those who are in the bottom decile
26Only difference is that the usual plot uses the scale of the outcome variable, but in Figure 2.18, the
plotted values are an average value at each decile and normalized.
27 Table D.25 also summarizes the estimated results before the financial crisis (2000-2006) and after the
crisis (2010-2014), which will be discussed in section 2.5.2.
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are 4.19 dollars, while the top 1 percent workers would receive 237.58 dollars per hour. The
mean wage ratio of the first decile to top 1 percent is about 57, but that of the first decile
to the ninth decile is about 14. This difference in ratio indicates the wage dispersion are
substantially attributed to the prominent divergence at the top-end of the wage distribution.
The mean wage ratio of the ninth decile to the top 1 percent is roughly 4.
Figure 2.20: Percent shares of annual wages by top 10 percent
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As shown in Figure 2.20, the percentile shares of annual wage owned by top 10 percent
or top 1 percent earners are stable over time. During 2000-2014, the 10 percent best earners
preserve more than 32 percent of the total annual wages, whereas the 1 percent best earners
receive about 10 percent of the total wages each year. Interestingly, the wage shares of top
earners have slightly increased over time except 2003-2005. The total wage shares held by
top 1 percent and 10 percent earners are more than 45 percent of total annual earnings in
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2014.
Yet the exact reasons for this extreme of the top earners have not come to light, the studies
in this literature explain this extreme due to “winner take all” of talented one (Gabaix and
Landier 2008) or the incentive pay in the financial sector (Bell and Van Reenen 2010). When
we consider that fact that the top-coding of the micro-data, the real inequality at the very
top-end may be more severe than this estimated results.
2.5.1.8 Wage inequality by age
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Note: the sub-population are defined by six-age group (teens, twenties, thirties, forties, fifties and
sixties). The value of total represents the results across sub-populations. The results are reported from
the highest to lowest inequality based on the Gini coefficient of the subgroups. The overall inequality
is placed last.
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The wage disparities can be attributable to the difference in workers’ age because the
potential experience of the worker would be increased with the employee’s age. To take that
aspect implicitly into account, the sample is organized into six cohorts according to the age
of the worker. Figure 2.21 summarizes the wage percentile shares and the subgroups Gini
for each cohort.
The workers who are in their sixties and thus implicitly more experienced confront highest
within-group wage inequality regarding the subgroup Gini (0.474). The within-group wage
inequality for the teenager workers, who have little experience, is also relatively higher than
the Gini of other age groups. In fact, the within-age cohort wage inequalities tend to increase
with growing in age except for the teens who are the lack of experience. The wage shares
occupied by the top decile earners are considerably prominent for more experienced workers,
while the wage shares held by the 50 percent poorest earners are merely remarkable for those.
Table D.26 reports the mean hourly wage for each age cohort by quintile. The pay disparities
are higher in the 60-65 cohort than in any other cohorts. Interestingly, these different wage
dispersions between the age cohorts are substantially attributable to the divergence at the
top-end of the wage distribution. For instance, the ratio between the bottom to the 80
percentile is about 3.65 across all cohorts. However, the ratio of top to bottom quintile for
the 60-65 cohort is 10.50, whereas this ratio for the 20-29 cohort is 7.24. Thus, the wage
dispersion is substantially attributed to the within group difference, especially in the 60-65
cohort, that correspond to the significant deviation of earnings at the top quintile of the
wage distribution.
2.5.1.9 Wage inequality by occupation
How much wage inequalities would be differentiated by occupation? What would be
the pay gaps between the executives or the managerial occupations and others? It is well
known the compensation among executives at the very top-end of wage distribution sub-
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stantially contribute to the growth in wage inequality (Piketty and Saez 2003, Frydman
and Saks 2007). An appealing explanation of this relationship between wage inequality and
the occupation is due to the performance-pay: the performance-pay became a channel the
returns to skill to be translated into wage inequality (Lemieux et al. 2009).28 Nevertheless,
it is still hard to quantify the direct association between occupations and wage inequality
since the intra-occupational inequality is difficult to anticipate from usual labor force data
(Kim and Sakamoto 2008). In this section, I address this question by representing the re-
sults of within-group wage inequalities of each occupation. I then discuss the mean hourly
wages of occupation by quintile in light of the possible explanations of the presented within
occupational inequalities.
For the comparison, the sample is partitioned into seven broad occupational categories
implicit in the 1990 Census Bureau occupational classification scheme: executives and man-
agerial; professional specialty; technical and administrative; service; farming, production,
and repair; operators and laborers; sales. First, I report the wage shares and within-group
wage inequality by occupation as the subgroup Gini in Figure 2.22. The subgroup Gini
of sales occupation is predominantly high, which is 0.07 point higher than the next group.
Their top decile earners’ wage shares also are significantly larger than the rest of groups,
while their wage shares of the bottom half percent are much smaller than others. The within
occupational inequality of service and managerial somewhat similar as their Gini, 0.417and
0.411, respectively. The groups of operators and laborers show the lowest subgroup Gini as
of 0.364. The wage shares held by the top decile earners are considerably different across
occupational groups, which vary from 27.8 percent to 38.4 percent.
28 The performance-pay jobs are defined as “employment relationships in which part of the worker’s total
compensation includes a variable pay component at least once during the course of the relationship” (Lemieux
et al. 2009:17).
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Note: the sub-population are defined by seven occupations. The value of total represents the results across sub-
populations. The results are reported from the highest inequality to lowest inequality based on the Gini coefficient
of the subgroups. The overall inequality is placed last.
Next, turning attention to the pay gaps between occupations, I estimate the occupational
mean hourly wages in each quintile of the wage distribution (Table D.27). Note that, in Table
D.27, the seven occupations are ordered from the highest to lowest mean hourly wages across
all sample years. The mean hourly wages of managerial occupation are higher than those
of others at every quintile, and their relative gains are at least 2.83 dollars or up to 54.37
dollars per hour. The top quintile earners in service or operators and laborers occupations
are paid similar to those at the median in managerial occupation. The between-occupational
inequality as the ratio of best/poorest paid occupations at quintile is smaller than the within
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occupational inequality as the ratio of top/bottom quintile within the same occupation.
These results are consistent with the previous findings that within occupational inequality
grew faster than between occupational inequality in the U.S. (Kim and Sakamoto 2008).
Table D.28 represents how much the workers in the managerial occupation would be paid
more per hour than the rest of workers at each decile and top 1 percent of the distribution.
The estimated results are the differences as mean hourly wage at each decile (top 1 percent)
in managerial occupation relative to those in other occupations. The first column of Table
D.28 reports the average hourly wage for the workers in managerial occupation by decile.
The values lie between 8.32 dollars and 97.73 dollars per hour, but if the workers belong to
the top 1 percent paid in managerial occupation, their mean hourly wage is 359.49 dollars
per hour. They would be paid 149.37 dollars per hour more relative to the top 1 percent
earners in the rest of occupations. The relative gains of top 1 percent earners are at least
three times larger than those at the 90-99 within the same occupation.
The well-known study of Piketty and Saez (2003) report top-end inequality has been in-
creasing steadily in the 1980s from the evidence of comparable tax data for English-speaking
countries. They provide some possible explanations for the continuing growth in top-end
inequality with respect to the earnings of top-end executives: the implicit barriers to higher
salaries have been removed by changes in general pay-setting institutions (Piketty and Saez
2006). Lemieux (2007) points out the growth in performance-pay jobs account for a sizable
share of the rising inequality above the 80th percentile of the wage distribution.
2.5.1.10 Wage inequality by economic sector
Although top-end inequality can be substantially attributable to the earnings of exec-
utives, those are not the only contributors of rising top-end inequality. Kaplan and Rauh
(2007) draw attention to higher earners in Wall Street other than non-financial-firm top ex-
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ecutives such as investment bankers and hedge, private equity, and mutual fund investors.
They find those who are on Wall Street take a higher percentage of the top brackets than
top executives in nonfinancial firms. What is the relationship between the different returns
to economic sectors and the growth in wage inequality? The main virtue of this literature
explains the upward trend of U.S wage inequality since the 1980s by a rising demand for
unobserved skills accounts for increasing within-group wage inequality (Juhn at al. 1993).
To identify the wage differentials between different economic sectors, the sample of work-
ers are grouped into six based on the Census Bureau industrial classification scheme. Note
that, in census usage, the industries report the type of industry in which the individual
performed an occupation. These do not refer to manufacturing and production but refer to
work setting and economic sector, as opposed to the worker’s particular technical function.
Figure 2.23 shows the wage shares and the Gini coefficients of the six economic sectors.
Although the subgroup Gini of finance somewhat similar to the other services, the wage
shares held by the top decile earners in finance are more than 2 percent higher than those of
the services industry.29 In fact, the subgroup Gini of other services is slightly greater than
that of finance by 0.0035. However, when we separately consider the periods of before the
financial crisis from the one after, the Gini of the financial sector is higher than the Gini for
the other services (the second and third column of Table D.29). The slightly higher value of
subgroup Gini of other services than that of finance mostly reflect the increase in Gini after
the financial crisis.
Table D.30 compares the mean hourly wage of economic sectors by quintile. The average
hourly pay for the workers in the financial sector are highest in every quintile, while those for
the workers in trade are lowest. The hourly wage of the manufacturing and education and
health services are somewhat similar as in their mean values at quintiles. There is relatively
29Other services include all services except educational and health services such as business and repair,
personal, entertainment, other professional, transportation, communications, and sanitary services.
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Note: the sub-population are defined by six economic sectors. The value of total represents the results
across sub-populations. The results are reported from the highest inequality to lowest inequality based
on the Gini coefficient of the subgroups. The overall inequality is placed last.
large deviation at the top-end quintile across economic sectors, in particular, for the top
earners in finance.
Table D.31 reports the mean hourly wage in finance by decile and by the separated top
1 percent of the wage distribution. The average earnings for the worker who in financial
sector lie between 6.48 dollars and 94.80 dollars per hour but, in a case of the top 1 percent
earners, their wages jump to 343.30 dollars per hours (the first column of Table D.31). If
the workers are in the financial sector, they would be paid at least 2.38 dollars and up to
116.97 dollars per hour more relative to those in other sectors that depend on their relative
ranks on the wage distribution.
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2.5.2 Wage inequality before and after the financial crisis
How has the U.S. wage distribution been changed before and after the financial crisis?
Table D.32 presents the U.S. wage inequality as measured in the percentile ratios for the
distribution of personal wages and the Gini coefficient. The U.S. wage inequalities before
(2000-2006) and after the financial crisis (2010-2014) are in the second and third rows of
Table D.32. The wage inequality in the U.S. has increased after the financial crisis as the
higher Gini (0.440) in comparison with that of the before the crisis (0.429). The changes in
overall wage inequality summarized by the p90/p10 also have increased after the financial
crisis: it rose about 7.6%, which is from 6.31 before the financial crisis to 6.79 after.
The growing wage inequality after the crisis mostly attributed to increasing dispersion
in the upper tail of the wage distribution (p90/p50) rather than the small changes in the
median or the lower wage earners (p10/p50). During 2000-2014, wage inequality in the upper
half of wage distribution (the 90/50 wage gap) is much more than that in the lower half of
the distribution: the ratio of the p90/p10 percentile wage ratio is about 17 time as much
in comparison with the p10/p50 ratio and about 2.6 times as much for the p90/p50 ratio.
Before and after the financial crisis, the upper half of the wage distribution (p90/p50) as
percentile ratio has increased 4% and the lower half as the p10/p50 ratio has decreased about
2.6%. These results confirm the previous finding in Autor et al. (2008) that whereas wage
inequality in the upper tail has been growing persistently, inequality in the lower tail has
been reversed from rising since the 1980s.
While the previous table provides the measures of the shape of the wage distribution,
the results in Table D.33 rather imply that which part of the distribution is responsible for
the changes. Table D.33 shows the percentile wage shares for each decile, which is expressed
as a percentage of total earnings before the financial crisis (Panel A) and after (Panel B).
Intuitively, if the wages are evenly distributed, each decile group should have received 10
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percent of the total. Strikingly, only top three decile earners (the 70-80, the 80-90, and
the 90-100) receive more than 10 percent of wages both time periods. These larger wage
differentials tend to widen at higher wage deciles. Furthermore, the wage shares of these
top three decile groups have increased after the financial crisis up to half percentage points
(the 90-100). However, the wage shares of all other decile groups have reduced after the
financial crisis, especially the reduction in the 20-30 and the 30-40 decile groups are almost
two-tenth percentage points. The changes of the 60-70 decile groups are smallest, which
is only four-hundredth percentage points before and after the crisis. The results in Table
D.33 show that the top quintile best earners receive almost half percent of the wages in both
periods, while the lowest quintile earners receive only about 5 percent of the total in both
time periods.
Wage concentration by top one percent before and after the financial crisis is reported in
the second and third column of Panel A in Table D.25. After the financial crisis, the decile
wage shares as density has decreased in the bottom 70 percentile, but it has increased in top
30 percentile. The wage share held by the top one percent earners also has grown after the
financial crisis and their increased amount was the largest across all decile. Therefore, the
ratio between the bottom decile to the top 30 percent became larger after the financial crisis,
while the ratio between the bottom to middle (the 50-60) is reduced. This result implies
that the rising wage inequality is not only due to an increase in the extreme concentration
at the top tail but also the loss in the wage share at the lower tail of the distribution. The
bottom third and fourth decile (the 20-30 and the 30-40) show the biggest loss in terms of
the averaged values within each decile, which are 19 cents and 18 cents, respectively. The
decile hourly wages as mean values decrease after the financial crisis across all deciles (the
second and third column of Panel B in Table D.25). However, the magnitudes of decline
are more severe in the bottom half of the wage distribution. For instance, the percentage
decrease in the mean earnings varies from 5.8 to 9.7 percent in the lower half percentile, but
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those lie between 1.3 and 1.8 percent in top two deciles of the wage distribution. Therefore,
the results also confirm that the widening wage dispersion after the financial crisis is the
relatively substantial loss in the lower-end of wage distribution compared to the declined in
the top-end.
These estimated results indicate the polarization in the U.S. labor market has intensified
after the financial crisis. The literature describes this phenomenon as the upper tail inequal-
ity such as the difference between the median to the 90th percentile has been rising whereas
the lower tail inequality, which is the difference between the median to the 10 percent, has
been shrinking (Van Reenen 2011).
Turning attention to the within racial group inequality before and after the financial
crisis, Figure 2.24 and Figure 2.25 provide the graphical summaries for the wage shares as a
percentage of total earnings and the subgroup Gini coefficients based on five racial groups.30
The overall wage inequality and the subgroup Gini of White, Black, Asian, and two or more
races have increased after the financial crisis in compared with their Gini before the crisis
level. This result is consistent with the findings of Lemieux (2006b) such that an important
contributor to wage inequality in the both upper and lower tail is the wage dispersion within
narrowed defined demographic.
This point becomes clearer when to look at the percentage wage shares held by the
bottom half and the top half: the wage shares for the bottom half earners decrease after
the crisis, but those for top 50 percent earners increase in each racial group, except other
races.31 Interestingly, before the financial crisis, the wage shares held by the 10 percent best
earners of each group are very close to each other (32.9%-33.4%), but these diverge after the
crisis (32.3%-34.8%).
30 The exact numbers of estimated results are reported in Table D.34.
31 Among other races, the wage shares of top 50 percentiles before and after the financial crisis are 76.54%
and 76.48%, respectively. As a matter of fact, this is the only group show that lower within group inequality
after the financial crisis. See Table D.34 for more details.
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Figure 2.24: The comparison of wage shares and the Gini
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Figure 2.25: The comparison of wage shares and the Gini
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For instance, the wage shares of top decile earners in groups of White, Asian, and two or
more races increase up to about one-half percentage points, whereas those of groups of Black
and other races decline about the same amount. These divergences play a significant part in
widening between racial group inequality after the financial crisis. Indeed, the Gini of the
racial groups are diverged more after the crisis as the range of the subgroup Gini increase
from 0.29 to 0.49.
In all racial groups, while the wage shares of the middle 40 percent slightly increase after
the crisis, the within-group inequalities are somewhat closely associate with wage shares
owned by the bottom half percentile. If the wage shares of the bottom half decline then
their within-group inequality grows relatively, such as among Asian, but if wage shares of
the bottom half are stable or increase, as in other races, their within-group inequality tends
to be lowered even when their wage shares of top earners increases.
Figure 2.26 and Figure 2.27 represent the wage distribution as shares and the Gini co-
efficient by the five ethnic groups before and after the crisis. The group of non-Hispanic
others shows the highest degree of within-group wage inequality before the financial crisis
(0.444) but, after the crisis, within-group inequality of non-Hispanic Asian become greatest
(0.457). These changes are due to the relatively rapid growth of within-group inequality
in non-Hispanic Asian compared to non-Hispanic others. In fact, the subgroup Gini for all
ethnic groups increases after the crisis.
After the financial crisis, while the wage shares occupied by the bottom half earners have
reduced in all groups, the changes amounting to shares owned by the top decile earners are
various. The wage shares held by the top decile earners increase in non-Hispanic White and
non-Hispanic Asian but decrease in Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black. These amount for
non-Hispanic other races are similar before and after the crisis.
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Figure 2.26: The comparison of wage shares and the Gini
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Figure 2.27: The comparison of wage shares and the Gini
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Therefore, the primary factor contributes to the rising within-group inequality is not
same across the ethnic groups. For instance, the relative gains in wage shares held by the
middle 40 percentile substantially attributable to growing the within-group wage inequality
for Hispanic or non-Hispanic Black but the relative shares gains of the top decile contribute
significantly to within-group variation for the non-Hispanic White. Table D.35 summarizes
the estimated wage shares and the subgroup Gini by ethnicity before and after the crisis.
The main virtue of the study in this literature is to point out the different returns to
education as a key reason for the recent divergence of upper-tail and lower-tail wage inequality
(Acemoglu and Autor 2010; Katz and Autor 1999). Particularly, Autor et al. (2008) describe
the substantial change in the U.S. wage distribution after the 1980s as “polarization” of wage
structure – while persistently rising inequality in the upper tail of the wage distribution,
a slowing or reversing inequality trend in the lower tail of the distribution due to returns
to the skills. They find polarized earnings trends among workers with different levels of
education: a relative wage between post-college educated workers and non-college educated
workers show a continuous increase since 1970, but the relative wage between the college
graduate and to the rest of workers no longer increase after the 1980s.
To analyze the changes in pay gaps by education and the earnings trends before and
after the financial crisis, we begin by estimating the decile mean hourly wage by different
educational groups. Table D.36 reports the mean hourly wages of four groups – post college,
college, high school and high school dropouts – and their changes before and after the
financial crisis as level and as percentage changes. At every decile, the mean hourly wages
of all groups decrease after the crisis compared to the level of before, except the bottom
30 percentile of dropouts. The largest amount of dropped is 5.44 dollars per hour for the
top decile earners of post-college educated. However, the relative changes provide a different
upshot. The relative wage loss as the percent decrease in their mean wages is more substantial
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for the college or high school educated than those of post-college educated up to twice times
much. The largest percent loss of the post- college educated is about 7 percent, which is
similar to those for the middle range of college and high school educated. The percentage
decline is more significant those with high school diploma than those with a college degree.
These relative losses tend to increase at higher wage deciles within each educational group,
except for the dropouts. Their corresponding loss attenuates as moving to lower deciles, and
it becomes positive within the bottom 30 percent among dropouts.
These results show that workers have experienced real wage declines after the financial
crisis across the educational groups. It would be more severe if the worker is low-skilled and
in the lower-end of the distribution, except for the dropouts.
Lemieux (2006a) points out that the key factor of rising wage dispersion from 1973 to
2005 is accounted for by increased returns to postsecondary education. What would be the
pay premium of higher education after the financial crisis? Turing attention to the changes
in the wage premium before and after the financial crisis, the mean hourly wage differentials
between the educational groups are compared in Table D.37. Before the crisis, the pay gaps
between those with a college degree and high school educated is greater than the gains from
the post-college to college at every decile. Similarly, the wage gaps of college/high school
educated in relation to those with high school/dropouts are more at each decile.
Interestingly, the relative wage gains of post-college educated workers to those with col-
lege education increased after the crisis, but the relative wage gains of other groups - the
college/high school or the high school/dropouts – have reduced almost every decile. Their
decline in wage premium tends to be less in the upper percentile of the wage distribution.
For instance, before the financial crisis (2000-2006), the post-college educated group receives,
on average, between 2.30 dollars and 37.41 dollars per hour more than those with the college
education. After the financial crisis, these pay gaps have raised at least 25 cents (the 0-10)
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or up to 76 cents (the 80-90) per hour. The pay differences between college educated and
high school graduates become smaller in most deciles except for the top second and third
decile of the distribution (the 70-80 or the 80-90). Similarly, the wage gaps between high
school graduates and dropouts also decline except the top decile.
The changes in wage premium are more dramatic when we look at the changes as a
percentage. After the financial crisis, the post-college wage premium increase up to about
11 percent (the 0-10) but the premium from the high school graduates decrease roughly 40
percent. The loss of the college wage premium is between 0.18 percent and 11.14 percent,
which is in up to the bottom 70 percentile, but it becomes 2 percent gains in the upper tail
(the 70-90). Therefore, the rising wage inequality after the financial crisis is attributable to
two most primary aspects: widening wage dispersion within groups and increasing pay gaps
across groups with different levels of education.
These results are some support for the polarization in residual inequality and in earnings
trends among workers with different educational attainment, which is consistent with the
previous findings in the wage inequality literature such as Lemieux (2006a), Murphy and
Welch (2001) and Autor et al. (2008).
First, the within educational group wage inequality increases after the financial crisis,
not because of increase wages in absolute terms but because of a greater decrease in wages in
the lower tail of the distribution. The overall decline in wages across all educational groups
after the financial crisis are translated into a noticeable reduction in the mean earnings of
the bottom within each group but much less severe to the top earners. This perspective
is evident in the pay gaps changes after the crisis. Despite growing the wage gaps for
college/high school educated in the top tail, those for in the lower tail is flattening or even
decreasing after the crisis. These findings indicate the rising residual inequality, which is
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consistent with Lemieux (2006a).
Second, the post-college wage premium shows a monotonic increase after financial crisis
while the pay premium for the non-college workers shows a reversed trend. Likewise, after
the crisis, the relative wage gains of college/high school decrease in most of the distribution.
Autor et al. (2008) explain this phenomenon as the polarization in earnings trends among
workers with different levels of education. They find while the earnings of post-college
educated relative to the non-college educated have continuously increased since 1979, but
those of college-only relative to high school became plateaued after 1987.
Many studies document the recent pervasiveness of job polarization – the shrinking of
the middle class of the wage distribution while the bottom and the top rising or stabilizing
– across advanced economies.32 Van Reenen (2011) explains this polarization in the labor
market is due to the loss of the shares in the middle-quality occupations, whereas the high-
quality jobs, such as lawyers or bankers, as well as the low-quality jobs (e.g., restaurant
waiting or cleaners), have been growing. If there is polarization, the inequality measure
like the Gini coefficient would be lower in value, but it is not necessary means that now it
became more equally distributed. Are the changes after the recent financial crisis in U.S.
labor market resemble the job polarization?
To provide a snapshot of changes in within-group wage inequality before and after the
financial crisis, Table D.38 reports the subgroup Gini of the seven occupations. The within-
group inequalities have increased in all occupations, except the managerial. In fact, the
within-group wage inequality of managerial occupations decreases very slightly, which is
about 0.0002 in the Gini. While the subgroup Gini of professional specialty or farming,
production and repair occupations show relatively rapid growth, that of sales occupations
increases about one-fifth of those. Across all years, managerial and professional specialty
32 See Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006, 2008) for the United States, Goos and Manning (2007) for the
United Kingdom, and Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2014) for European countries.
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are the highest-paid occupations and service and operators and laborers are the lowest-
paid occupations. The middle-paid occupations are sales, technical and administrative, and
farming, production and repair occupations.
To see this more clearly, Table D.39 presents the mean hourly wages by occupations
and their changes before and after the financial crisis as an absolute level and as a percent.
Overall, the average earnings of all occupations decrease after the financial crisis, but their
magnitudes of reducing are various across the occupational groups. For instance, the mean
wages of the high-paid occupations decline about 2.5 percent, but those of the middle-paid
occupations substantially decrease, which are up to about 8 percent. The fall in mean
wages of the lowest-paid occupations is somewhat mild. Most reasonable suspect to explain
this polarization is shrinking the middle-quality jobs after the financial crisis. Goos and
Manning (2007) express this phenomenon as rising both “lovely and lousy jobs.” They rank
the occupations based on the average pay and use as an indicator of the quality of the
job, which is extended by Mieske (2009) through 2008. The results show that there was a
significant increase in the shares holdings by the top two deciles and the bottom deciles of
the occupational distribution.
To identify which part of the distribution is responsible for these changes, Table D.39
summarizes the quintile wage shares by occupational groups before and after the financial
crisis. While most of lower quintiles display a significant decrease in their wage shares, this
negative impact attenuates as moving towards the higher quintiles.33 The largest amount
of wage share loss is found in the first quintile of professional specialty. The changes in the
quintile wage shares of sales and service are subtle, and thus these are little accounted of
overall changes after the crisis.
How much the workers in the high-paid occupations would be received more and how
33 One exception is the top quintile of managerial occupations. Their wage shares slightly decreases after
the financial crisis.
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are those changed? Table D.40 represents the wage differentials between managerial and
other occupations before and after the financial crisis. The values are compared earners at
each decile and top 1 percent as separated. The relative gains of managerial occupations
increase after the financial crisis in most of the wage distribution, except the bottom two
decile and top decile. Their increasing relative gains are pronounced in the middle range
(the 40-80), and the amount is about 6 to 8 percent, which is about one dollar more per
hour. The relative gains of top 1 percent earners decrease after the crisis, which is about 17
percent and 30 dollars per hour. The poorest earners lose about 8 percent of their relative
gains after the financial crisis. Therefore, the rising wage dispersion between managerial and
others after the crisis are substantially attributable to the increase in the gains of middle
range of the wage distribution.
Goos et al. (2014) emphasize the importance of the technological changes in explaining
job polarization. They suggest that the recent technological change is biased toward replacing
the routine tasks forces to decrease the demand of middle-quality occupations relative to
high- and low-quality occupations. Consequentially, there is within-industry job polarization
due to shifting away from routine occupations within the economic sectors.
To understand the changes in economic sectors, first looking at the within-group wage
inequalities by six economic sectors (the second and third column of Table D.29). Before the
financial crisis, the subgroup Gini of the financial sector is highest (0.460), and that of the
manufacturing industry is lowest (0.393). But, after the crisis, the subgroup Gini of other
services is highest (0.468), and that of education and health sector is lowest (0.404) after
the crisis. In fact, after the crisis, within-group wage inequalities increase except one in the
financial sector, which slightly decreases. Manufacturing sector shows a significant growth
in within-group inequality as 0.017 in the Gini.
Turning attention to the level changes, the mean hourly wages of economic sectors before
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and after the financial crisis are summarized in Table D.41. The mean hourly wages of the
financial sector are highest in both time periods, while those of trade industry are lowest.
The wages in trade industry are dropped substantially after the financial crisis, which is
about 8 percent on average, but the changes in the mean values of the financial industry are
very subtle. Besides the financial and trade sectors, the changes in wages of other sectors lie
between 0.15 percent and 3.78 percent.
Goos at al. (2014) explain this phenomenon as between-industry shifts in the structure
of employment. Since particular industries are more intense in routine tasks and tend to
replace more their labor as routine-biased technology developing, which will occur the polar-
ization in employment shares within the sector. The results of the quintile wage shares by
economic sectors are some support for these concerning. The bottom quintile of primary or
manufacturing industries shows the substantial loss of their wage shares after the financial
crisis, which is up to about 7 percent, whereas the top decile shares within same industries
increase. However, this tendency is reversed in the financial sector. Their wage shares of
the middle decile but the bottom and top shares are raised after the crisis. Therefore, the
recent trend in U.S. labor market after the financial crisis can be viewed as emerging the
within-industry job polarization due to the between-occupation job polarization.
The changes in wage differentials between the financial industry and others are summa-
rized in Table D.42. The values represent the relative gains of the worker who is in the
financial sector compared to those in other industries at each decile and top percent of the
wage distribution. The mean wage gaps between the workers in the financial sector and
others increase after the financial crisis all decile except for the top 1 percent earners. The
percent increase in these relative gains of the workers in the financial sector is strongest in
the middle (the 40-50, the 50-60, and the 60-70) about 33 to 37 percent higher after the
crisis. The relative gains of the top 1 percent earners in finance decline after the financial
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crisis about 14 percent. These substantial decrease in the relative gains of the top-end in
finance may explain the reducing within-group wage inequality of financial sector after the
crisis.
When we consider the location, the between-state wage disparities account for overall
wage inequality more before and during the financial crisis than those of after the crisis (Table
D.24). During the entire period, the between-state variation accounts for 16.82 percent
of total wage inequality. The percentage ratios of between-state inequality to the overall
inequality are greater than 16.82 percent until 2010, then slowly decrease (the fourth column
of Table D.24). The between-state/total inequality ratio was highest in 2004 (17.73 percent)
and went down to 16.56 percent in 2007. But it went up again during the financial crisis
(2008-2009) until right after the crisis in 2010, which accounts for 16.88 percent of the total
inequality. The between-state inequality has been reducing since the financial crisis and thus
it showed the lowest value in 2014 as 16.48 percent of overall wage inequality.34
In general, the values of the total Gini and the within-state Gini are similar, which
implies the most of the wage inequality are attributed to the within-state variation during
2004-2014. The overall and the within-state inequality show its peak in 2014 as of 0.440 and
0.435, respectively. The overall Gini changes when the within-state Gini changes and the
changes in within-state influent directly to the U.S. wage inequality. However, the impact
of increasing in the between-state variation is weak and thus less likely cause a significant
increase in total wage inequality. For instance, the most recent increase in overall wage
inequality from 2012 to 2014 is mostly due to the rising the within-state inequality, while
the between-state inequality is reducing in the same period. These findings are in line with
34 For the robustness check, the ratio of between state inequality and total inequality that is estimated
with the Atkinson indices for the entire sample years (2000-2014), before and after the financial crisis. This
inequality measure is a member of the Entropy indices ad thus, it satisfies the property that overall inequality
can be additively decomposable by subgroup into within and between inequality. The percentage of the ratio
lies between about 3 to 7 percent and thus, it supports the results that only small portion of total inequality
accounts for between state inequality and most of inequality is explained by within state inequality.
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the studies by Autor at al. (2008).
2.5.3 Aggregate and detailed decomposition
Using the relevant methods that were outlined in section 2.4.2, now I present the quantile
decomposition results. In the decomposition, time period 0 indicates before the financial
crisis (2004-2006), and time period 1 is after the financial crisis (2012-2014). The time period
1 is used as reference group for the estimation. During the procedure, only observation
of male workers is used for comparison with the previous studies in the literature. The
number of observation before the financial crisis (2004-2006) is 1,602,078 and after the crisis
is 2,014,957. The aggregate decomposition results are presented in Table D.43. The results
compare the top-end of distribution (90-50 gap) to the low-end (50-10 gap), which is a
standard measure of wage inequality. The variance of log wage and the Gini coefficient are
also reported in the last two columns of Table D.43.
The base group used in estimation refers to a white male with an associate degree, 20 to 24
years of education who lives in the south when the years of potential experience is calculated
as age minus years of schooling minus five, which follows Mincer (1974). The interaction
terms between education and the potential experience are added to get richer specifications
when the probit models used to compute the reweighting factor. The six industry classes
(primary, manufacturing, education and health, other services, finance and Insurance, trade)
are considered, which is based on the industrial classification from the Census Bureau. The
six groups with different education are high school dropout, high school graduate or GED,
some college (at least one year of college education), Associate’s degree from 2-year college,
a 4-year college with a degree, and post-college or professional degree.
In Model 1, the explanatory variables include location (state level), six education classes
(Associate’s degree of college omitted), nine potential experience classes (21-25 years omit-
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ted) and its interaction terms for the comparison purpose. The consideration of races and
ethnicity is added in model 2. Model 3 adds an ability to speak English, and full- or part-
time working status on top of it. The six industry classes (primary omitted) is added in
Model 4. In Model 5, the four Census Regions (South omitted) is added as for the location
on top of those variables.
The results in Panel A (Table D.43) report the reweighting decomposition of changes in
male wage inequality. The counterfactual distribution of wage for before the financial crisis is
conducted by the kernel reweighting the characteristics of workers in before the crisis would
look like the workers’ characteristics in after the financial crisis while holding the conditional
distribution of wage is fixed as in before the crisis.
The first row of each model in Panel A (Table D.43) are the overall wage differentials
before and after the financial crisis in the wage distribution. The most of the changes in
rising wage dispersion (the 90-10) are attributed to widening wage gaps in the upper tail
of the distribution (the 90-50), while the variations in the lower tail (the 50-10) are small.
The results of the aggregate decomposition show that the wage structure effects are a more
important factor in increasing wage inequality at the top of the wage distribution, which
is measured by the 90-50 log wage differentials, but these are decreased in the bottom as
measured by the 50-10 log wage differentials. The composition effects are playing more
important role in reducing wage inequality for overall. Their magnitude of decreasing wage
inequality is strong in the bottom, such as in the 50-10 log wage differentials, but it is
relatively weak in the top tail (the 90-50) of the distribution. The composition effects in the
variance as the measure of inequality is weakest across all models.
In general, we find that wage differentials before and after the financial crisis are driven
primarily by the unexplained components with exceptionally strong effects at the top-end of
the wage distribution. The relatively small changes in the lower tail of the wage distribution
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may be reflective of weak wage structure effects in the bottom. The reduction in wage gaps
due to the explained component have been less significant at higher quantiles.
As Fortin et al. (2011) point out, the decomposition using the reweighting method is
not straightforward to extend to the detailed decomposition to measure influence from each
covariate. Thus, the unconditional quantile regression based on RIF that is suggested by FFL
used for performing detailed decompositions. Simply, the decomposition of any distributional
statistic can be done if the influence function can be computed.
The results of using RIF regressions without reweighting for the global measures of wage
inequality as in the variance of log wage and the Gini coefficient in 2004-2006 and 2012-2014
are reported in Panel B in Table D.43. Although the exact size of the changes somewhat
is not same to the those in Panel A, the results are qualitatively similar. Overall, the wage
gaps have been more persistent at higher quantiles and these are mostly due to unexplained
higher returns to the observed among the workers.
The results of model 5 in Table D.43 are extended as for the estimation of the detailed
decomposition of male wage inequality in Table D.44. The odd-numbered columns show the
decomposition results without reweighting and used the before the financial crisis (2004-2006)
as a reference. The even numbered columns are in before the financial crisis (2004-2006) is
reweighted to mimic after the financial crisis (2012-2014).
Composition effects linked to factors such as industry and education have shown as
increasing overall inequality (the 90-10). However, the impact of each covariate is different at
the different part of the distribution. For instance, location factor has a larger impact in the
top-end of the distribution (the 90-50) than in the lower-end (the 50-10), but education and
potential experience has more considerable influence in the lower-end. Indeed, composition
effect linked to location and experience are reducing the male wage inequality at the bottom
as measured by 50-10 wage differential, but the returns to these factors actually increased
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inequality at the top as measured by 90-50 wage differential. While composition effects linked
to the education is increasing inequality in the bottom half, but these are reducing inequality
in the upper half. In fact, regarding composition effects, the most significant contributor to
the male wage inequality are not same on the top and the bottom of the wage distribution:
the industry is mostly attributed to rising wage inequality as measured by the 90-50 log wage
differentials, but the education is more important when it is measured by the 50-10 log wage
differentials.
In terms of wage structure effects, experience and education are found to be a major
factor accounting for the male wage inequality. Wage structure effects linked to education
are contributed to increasing wage inequality in the upper tail, but these are attributed
to reducing wage inequality in the lower tail of the distribution. This result implies that
the returns to education are the prominent factor that is raised the wage inequality in the
top-end, which are consistent with the previous findings in the wage inequality literature.
Lemieux (2006a) finds a significant increase in the return to post-secondary education has
caused the convex wage distribution. Van Reenen (2011) argues that a substantial portion of
the within skilled group inequality is accounted to the residual wage inequality, which cannot
be attributed to the standard observation such as experience, education, and gender. Juhn et
al. (1993) also suggest that rising wage dispersion within a group is mostly due to the returns
to unobservable skills. Similarly, wage structure effects linked to industry are contributed to
wage inequality in the top and bottom of the distribution in an opposite way in the top- and
lower-end. While wage structure effects related to industry account for significant portion
of the decline in wage dispersion in the lower tail, those are attributed to widening the wage
gaps on the top-end. Wage structure effects linked to location are reducing the growth of
inequality at the lower-end modestly, but these are rising wage inequality at the top. Wage
structure effects linked to experience contributes to increasing inequality both in the top and
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the bottom end of the distribution.
Since the decomposition procedure that proposed by FFL only provides a first-order
approximation to the composition effect, this approximation error indicates an accuracy
of the linear specification for RIF-regression when it is small (Heywood and Parent 2012).
In fact, it is the difference between the composition effect with the reweighting estimate
and the latter term that is obtained using RIF-regression. The total reweighting error
represents the difference between the total explained with the OB type-decomposition for
unconditional quantile and one with reweighting-regression decomposition. The reweighting
error is reported in the last row of Table D.44, and it is subtle and does not exhibit a
systematic pattern. Thus, this implies that the reweighting procedure of the RIF-model
consistently estimated the compositions effects (Firpo et al. 2007).
2.6 Conclusions
The aim of this study is to untangle the sources of U.S. wage inequality that are closely
related to the recent rising income inequality. In this study, wage inequality is quantified
with Gini coefficient as well as with quantile shares. The advantage of the distributional
study of inequality is that it makes possible to provide detailed information underneath of
the inequality changes by considering the shape of the distribution, instead of focusing merely
on the level of a particular inequality measure. Furthermore, a comparison of the changes
before and after the financial crisis based on the relative ranks of an individual within each
subgroup can deepen our understanding of the causes of the widening wage disparities in the
U.S.
The U.S. wage inequality, during 2000-2014, is mostly due to the following features:
By gender
The wage is more unevenly distributed among men than that of among women, and
CHAPTER 2. 120
thus the within-group wage inequality of men is higher. The gender wage dispersion reflects
mostly the substantial pay gaps between the best-earning male and the best-earning female,
which suggests the existence of glass ceiling for women. The female workers receive lower
wage gains compare to the male workers and consequently, remain stuck to the lower wage
points with formal wage scales.
By race
When we consider the wage inequality of five racial groups, within-group wage inequality
among Asians is highest, while it is lowest among the Other Races category. Turning to the
wage disparities between White and non-White workers, at every quintile, White workers
are paid more than non-White workers, and their relative gains tend to increase at higher
quintile of the wage distribution. These wage gaps are much greater among men than those
among women. These results suggest the existence of sticky floors for non-White workers that
prevents them from achieving an equivalent wage due to the higher returns to characteristics
in favor to Whites, in particular for men.
By ethnicity
Among five ethnic groups, non-Hispanic Asian is ranked for the highest within-group
inequality and the Hispanic group is ranked as the lowest subgroup Gini. The distributional
wage differences between Hispanic and non-Hispanic groups show that if the worker is non-
Hispanic, the bottom half percent of wage distribution would be worse off but the top half
percent would be relatively better off.
The estimated wage gaps between non-Hispanic White and others – either Hispanics or
non-White non-Hispanics – is evidence of the presence of the U.S. labor market polarization.
The polarization is a non-monotonic job growth in the wage distribution when the job quality
as proxied by initial wages such as while the low-wage and high-wage jobs are rapidly growing,
the middle-wage jobs are slowly growing or shrinking. Therefore, this tends to diverge
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employment gains and widen wage inequality (Autor et al. 2006).
By educational attainment
At every decile, the workers are better off if they have a four-year college or more educa-
tion compared to those who have not completed the four-year college. These results confirm
the previous findings that the wage difference due to different education is substantially con-
tributed to widening wage inequality (Acemoglu and Autor 2010; Juhn et al. 1993; Autor
et al. 2008). Indeed, the wage disparities due to the different schoolings among workers
are significantly attributable to the college wage premium. More importantly, it tends to
increase non-monotonically at higher decile of the wage distribution within the group of
more educated workers. Thus, the recent increase in U.S. wage inequality is not only due to
the higher returns to higher education but also due to larger within-group wage dispersion
among more educated workers.
By opportunity
Other contributors of wage inequality such as pre-determined conditions to workers that
are also known as circumstance are examined in this study. The estimated results show that
the relative gains (or loss) from the working status of the employees or from their English
language proficiency would be up to 28.51 dollars or 33.59 dollars per hour, respectively.
Therefore, not only the core characters of workers but also the exogenous conditions given
to the person can affect the wage differentials. In the previous studies, these effects are
usually considered as unexplained wage gaps by observed characteristics and thus, remains
as a structure part of wage differentials. These unexplained wage gaps tend to be larger,
particularly at the top-end of the wage distribution.
By location
From a regional point of view, most of the wage dispersion in the U.S. is attributed to
the within-state wage inequality. The between-state inequality accounts only for less than 20
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percent during the sample period. The changes in within-state variation influence directly
to the U.S. wage inequality but the impacts of changes in between-state disparities are weak.
For instance, the most recent increase in wage inequality from 2012 to 2014 is mostly due to
rising within-state inequality while the between-state inequality is reducing. Turing attention
to the U.S. Census Divisions, the relative size of the wage shares held by the lower half of
wage distribution seems to be mostly crucial for the regional wage inequality, while the wage
shares of the middle group are similar across all nine divisions.
By concentration of the top earner
The wage shares held by top one or top ten percent highest earners are stable even
during the financial crisis. They preserve about ten percent and thirty two percent of total
annual wages, respectively. The wage density of the top 1 percent earners shows a significant
difference with the rest of others, which is about 57 times more than the person at the bottom
of the distribution would receive. The bottom 60 percent of workers would receive less than
average wages within that bins. When we consider the fact that the top-coding of the micro-
data, the real inequality at the very top-end may be more severe than the estimated results
in this paper.
By age
The wage disparities can be attributable to the difference in workers’ age because the
potential experience of the worker would be increased with the employee’s age. In fact,
the within-age cohort wage inequalities tend to increase with age except for the teens as
their potential experience increases. The wage dispersion is substantially attributed to the
within-age group difference, especially in the 60-65 cohort, that corresponds to the significant
deviation of earnings at the top quintile of the wage distribution.
By occupation
While the subgroup Gini of sales occupation and their top decile earners’ wage shares
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are predominantly high, the wage shares held by the top decile earners are considerably
varying across occupational groups. The between-occupation inequality as the mean wage
ratio of best/poorest paid occupations at each quintile is smaller than the within-occupation
inequality as the proportion of top/bottom quintile within the same profession. There exists
large relative gain of top one percent in managerial occupation relative to those in other
occupations, which is 149.37 dollars per hour.
By economic sector
Workers are in the financial sector are paid up to 116.97 dollars per hour more, depending
on their relative ranks in the wage distribution. The wage shares held by the top decile
earners in the financial sector are more than 2 percent higher than that of those in the
services industry. In fact, the average hourly pay for the workers in the financial sector is
highest in every quintile, while that of those in trade are lowest.
Changes in wage inequality before and after the crisis
The growing in wage inequality after the financial crisis mostly attributed to increasing
dispersion in the upper tail of the wage distribution rather than the small changes in the
median or the lower tail of the distribution. The wage shares held by the top three decile
earners have increased after the financial crisis. The wage shareholding by the top one
percent earners also has grown after the financial crisis and their increased amount was the
largest across all decile. the changes in decile mean hourly wages confirm that the widening
wage dispersion after the financial crisis is the relatively substantial loss in the lower-end of
wage distribution compared to the declined in the top-end.
Turning attention to the within racial group inequality, the subgroup Gini of White,
Black, Asian, and two or more races have increased after the financial crisis in compared
with their Gini before the crisis level. The subgroup Gini for all ethnic groups increases
after the crisis. The group of non-Hispanic others shows the highest level of within-group
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wage inequality before the financial crisis but, after the crisis, within-group inequality of
non-Hispanic Asian become highest. These changes are due to the relatively rapid growth
of within-group inequality in non-Hispanic Asian compared to non-Hispanic others.
The main virtue of the study in this literature is to point out the different returns
to education as a key reason for the recent divergence of upper-tail and lower-tail wage
inequality (Acemoglu and Autor 2010; Autor et al. 2008; Katz and Autor 1999). To analyze
the changes before and after the financial crisis in pay gaps by education and the earnings
trends, the decile mean hourly wages and the wage premium for different educational groups
are estimated. These results show that workers have experienced real wage declines after
the financial crisis across the educational groups. It would be more severe if the worker
is low-skilled and in the lower-end of the distribution, except for the dropouts. After the
crisis, while the relative wage gains of college/high school rose in the top tail, these pay gaps
became flatter in the lower tail of the wage distribution. The post-college wage premium
shows a monotonic increase after financial crisis while the pay premium for the non-college
workers shows a reversed trend. Therefore, the rising wage inequality after the financial crisis
is attributable to two most primary aspects: widening wage dispersion within groups and
increasing pay gaps across groups with different levels of education. These are compounding
the polarization in residual inequality and earnings trends among workers with different
educational attainment.
The within-group inequalities have increased in all occupations, except the managerial.
While the subgroup Gini of professional specialty or farming, production and repair occu-
pations show relatively rapid growth, that of sales occupations increases about one-fifth of
those. Overall, the average earnings of all occupations decrease after the financial crisis,
but their magnitudes of reducing are various across the occupational groups. The fall in
mean wages of the high-paid and the lowest-paid occupations are small, but those of the
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middle-paid occupations are substantial. Most reasonable suspect to explain this polariza-
tion is shrinking the middle-quality jobs after the financial crisis, which is expressed as rising
both “lovely and lousy jobs” (Goos and Manning 2007). When we compare the wage differ-
entials between managerial and other occupations before and after the financial crisis, the
rising wage dispersion between managerial and others are substantially attributable to the
increase in the gains of middle range in the wage distribution.
In the comparison inequality within economic sectors before and after the crisis, within-
group wage inequality in the financial sector slightly decreases, but the manufacturing sector
shows a significant growth in within-group inequality. These substantial reductions in the
relative gains of the top-end in finance may explain the reducing within-group wage inequality
of financial sector after the crisis since the relative gains of the top 1 percent earners in finance
decline after the financial crisis about 14 percent.
From the level changes, the wages in trade industry are dropped substantially after the
financial crisis while the mean hourly wages of the financial sector are highest in both time
periods. The bottom quintile of primary or manufacturing industries shows the substantial
loss of their wage shares after the financial crisis, whereas the top decile shares within same
industries increase. However, this tendency is reversed in the financial sector. Their wage
shares of the middle decile but the bottom and top shares are raised after the crisis. In sum,
the recent trend in U.S. labor market after the financial crisis can be viewed as emerging the
within-industry job polarization due to the between-occupation job polarization.
When I consider the location, the between-state wage disparities account for overall
wage inequality more before and during the financial crisis than those of after the crisis. The
between-state inequality has been reducing since the financial crisis and thus it showed the
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lowest values in 2014.
Decomposition
The most of the changes in rising wage dispersion (the 90-10) are attributed to widening
wage gap in the upper tail of the distribution (the 90-50), while the variations in the lower tail
(the 50-10) are subtle. the wage structure effects are a more important factor in increasing
wage inequality at the top of the wage distribution, which is measured by the 90-50 log
wage differentials, but these are decreased in the bottom as measured by the 50-10 log wage
differentials. The composition effects are playing more important role in reducing wage
inequality for overall and its magnitude of decreasing wage inequality is stronger in the
bottom of the wage distribution. In general, I find that wage differentials before and after
the financial crisis are driven primarily by the unexplained components with exceptionally
strong effects at the top-end of the wage distribution.
The detailed decomposition results of using RIF regressions show that the composition
effects linked to factors such as industry and education have shown as increasing overall
inequality (the 90-10). However, the impact of each covariate is different at the different
part of the distribution. In terms of wage structure effects, experience and education are
found to be a major factor accounting the male wage inequality. Wage structure effects linked
to education are contributed to increasing wage inequality in the upper tail, but these are
attributed to reducing wage inequality in the lower tail of the distribution. This result implies
that the returns to education are the prominent factor that is raised the wage inequality in
the top-end, which are consistent with the previous findings in the wage inequality literature
(Juhn et al. 1993; Lemieux 2006a; Van Reenen 2011).
This study examines the widening wage inequality in the U.S. during 2000-2014 and
compares the changes before and after the financial crisis from various perspectives. One
flaw of this paper may be the omission of the labor market institutional changes. More or
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less, there are already many studies that emphasize the relevance of institutional changes
and wage inequality. The long-term perspective of the influence of institutions on wage
inequality constitutes a topic for future research in this field.
Chapter 3





While researchers focus on the level of inequality in an outcome (e.g., income), the
outcome inequality does not adequately represent the level of inequality in society since
the outcome inequality is also related to the returns to different levels of effort. Thus, the
inequality of outcome can be neither all good nor all bad (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011). A
number of writers assert that inequality in the distribution of particular outcome would be
a poor yardstick of a fair society.1 As Peragine (2004, p.11) explains, “economic inequalities
due to factors beyond the individual responsibility are inequitable.”
The primary concern for inequality of opportunity (IOP) has started in the welfare eco-
nomics literature. This literature, such as in Roemer (2000), emphasizes the aspects of
pre-determined circumstances that are beyond an individual’s control: if a person faces in-
equality that is caused by one’s circumstance, then it should be compensated for equality
of opportunity. Many researchers argue the importance of IOP in the measurement of in-
equality. First, IOP is positively correlated with income inequality. For instance, if there
are larger income gaps between parents, it likely causes bigger income dispersion between
their children due to the differences in the quality of education or access to labor market
opportunities (Ferreira 2001). Second, IOP is negatively correlated with intergenerational
mobility, when the intergenerational earnings elasticity is used as the measure of intergen-
erational persistence (Hertz et al. 2007). Brunori et al. (2013) explain that “inequality of
opportunity is the missing link between the concepts of income inequality and social mo-
bility.” Therefore, it is worth to measure the inequality of opportunity and to investigate
the linkage between IOP and the inequality of outcome. What would be the opportunity
share of income inequality in the United States? How much has the portion that accounts
for income inequality changed after the most recent financial crisis? What would be the
1See Dworkin (1981) and Arneson (1989) among many authors.
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contribution of different circumstances to income inequality? Utilizing an ex-ante approach,
I distinguish the proportion due to circumstances, such as family background or individual
core characteristics, from the overall income inequality. In addition, the relative importance
of each circumstance is examined using the Shapley decomposition method.
The empirical study presented makes at least four further contributions. First, this
study reveals the shares of overall U.S. inequality that account for IOP. Second, this study
compares how much of total inequality is due to IOP within subpopulation by location, race
or ethnicity. Third, this study examines the trajectory of IOP over time with particular
reference to a comparison of the period before and after the financial crisis. Fourth, this
study measures the contribution of each circumstance on overall income inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 3.2 provides a brief literature
review of IOP. Section 3.3 outlines the methodology that this essay uses in the analysis of
IOP. Section 3.4 describes the data and key variables to be employed in this study. Section
3.5 reports the findings of the study, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Measuring Inequality of Opportunity
The fundamental idea of the measurement of IOP starts from sorting the determinants of
an outcome (e.g., income or educational attainment) into two exclusive classes: factors that
are beyond individual responsibility and factors that are under the control of the individual.
The former is called circumstances and latter is called efforts.
The study of equality of opportunity incorporates two principles: the compensation prin-
ciple and the reward (or responsibility) principle. According to the compensation principle
inequalities due to circumstances should be eliminated. The reward principle asserts that
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inequalities due to unequal effort should be considered acceptable (Fleurbaey and Peragine
2013). These principles can be traced into two different approaches, which are the ex-post
and the ex-ante approach. The ex-post approach pays attention to the variations in outcome
among individuals who have exerted the same efforts but are not under identical circum-
stances. Thus, inequality of opportunity is described as the difference among people at same
effort quantile (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011). The ex-ante approach is most concerned with
how to reward efforts among individuals who share the same circumstances and so is defining
the expected outcome if all people are under an identical circumstance. Therefore, inequality
of opportunity in the ex-ante approach is considered to be the difference between groups of
people who share the same circumstance (a.k.a., types).
On the one hand, the compensation principle is usually formulated in reducing the in-
equalities between individuals who perform the same level of effort but have a different
circumstance, which corresponds with the ex-post approach. On the other hand, the reward
principle is formulated to consider the group of people who is under the identical circum-
stances, which corresponds with the ex-ante approach. Empirically, the ex-ante approach is
easier to apply than the ex-post approach, since the ex-ante approach does not require an
estimate of effort while the ex-post approach does (Wendelspiess Chávez Juárez and Soloaga
2014).
To implement the ex-ante approach, once the set of circumstances that are observed in
data is defined, the population can be divided into subgroups (types) that share identical cir-
cumstances. The fundamental underlying assumption of the ex-ante measure of IOP is that
any differences between the average outcomes of different types is caused by circumstances
while the difference in outcomes within a given type is driven by efforts (Ferreira et al.
2012).2 Therefore, the difference in outcome that is associated with observed circumstances
2In this literature, the differences in average effort across groups is also caused by differences in circum-
stances and is treated as indirect effects of circumstances. See Ferreira et al. (2012).
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is considered to be IOP.
3.2.2 Defining Outcomes and Circumstances
The most difficult part in the empirical research of IOP is deciding which variables should
be treated as outcomes and which should be treated as circumstances in the model. In this
literature, a common outcome variable is a measure of economic wellbeing: household per
capita income or earnings (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011; Singh 2011), individual income or
earnings (Belhaj-Hassine 2012; Checchi et al. 2010; Piraino 2012; Pistolesi 2009) or per
capita consumption (Ferreira et al. 2011; Cogneau and Mesple-Somps 2008).
As for circumstance variables, the literature offers various ideas: parental education levels
(Ferreira et al. 2011; Piraino 2012), or both parental educational attainment and occupation
(Checchi et al. 2010; Cogneau and Mesple-Somps 2008; Ferreira and Gignoux 2011; Belhaj-
Hassine 2012; Pistolesi 2009; Singh 2011). These variables are used as indicators of family
background of adult offspring. Besides family background, commonly used circumstances are
gender, region of birth, race, ethnicity or geographical location. The circumstance factors
should be decided carefully according to the research question.
3.3 Method
This section outlines the techniques that are employed in this study, and proceeds in
two subsections. The first subsection formally defines the absolute and relative measure of
inequality of opportunity, which is following the work of Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). The
next subsection introduces the decomposition method to find the relative importance of each
circumstance using the Shapley value (Shapley 1953).
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3.3.1 The Point Estimate of Inequality of Opportunity
When y is the dependent variable of interest and C is a matrix of circumstance variables
that exogenously given to individual, the expected conditional outcome can be defined as:
ŷ = E(y|C) (3.1)
In this literature, it can be estimated in various ways depending on the characteristic of
outcome variable. For instance, Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) use the household per capita
income as their outcome variable, which is continuous with inherent scale, and estimate the
expected conditional outcome based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Checchi
and Peragine (2010) use individual earnings as the object of study and estimate IOP using
only nonparametric techniques.
According to the research question and the dependent variable, the measur of inequality,
I(·), is carefully selected. By applying this measure to ŷ, a measure of the absolute level
of inequality of opportunity can be computed, which implies all variations in the outcome
variable as being due to the circumstance:
θa = I(ŷ) (3.2)
We may define a relative measure of inequality of opportunity, if the inequality measure, I(·),





which is the absolute inequality measure divided by the inequality measure that is applied
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to the actual outcome y.3
This study follows the ex-ante measure of IOP suggested by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011),
since their method is particularly well suited for the continuous variables with inherent scale
such as income (Wendelspiess Chávez Juárez and Soloaga 2014). They adopt a weaker
criterion for the identification of equality of opportunity that uses mean outcomes to value a
type’s opportunity set (van de Gaer 1993). In this case, since the ex-ante approach refers to
IOP as inequality between types who share the same circumstances, equality of opportunity
would imply equality at the mean outcome of each type.
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) uniquely define an absolute measure of IOP and a relative
measure of IOP using a smoothed distribution that originates from the work of Foster and
Shneyerov (2000).4
Let N individuals be partitioned into K types, T1, . . . ., TK , with type k comprising
individual 1, . . . ., nk, and thus
∑K
k=1 nk = N . An inequality index is defined on the smoothed
distribution {µki }, k = 1, . . . , K:
{µki } = (µ11, . . . , µ1n1 ;µ
2
1, . . . , µ
2
n2
; . . . , µKnK ) such that µ
k
1 = · · · = µknk ≡ µ
k for all k. (3.4)
The smoothed distribution {µki } is obtained from a distribution of outcome (y) and from a




ydF k(y), where F k(y) denotes the cumulative distribution function of
outcomes in type k.
Then a scalar measure of IOP is defined as an index that is a mapping from a joint
distribution of the advantage and circumstances, {y, C} and from the associated partitioned
3This is known as an ex-ante measure of IOP in the types that is defined by Checchi and Peragine (2011).
4Foster and Shneyerov (2000) provide an inequality index defined on the corresponding smoothed distri-
bution, which is related to the earlier inequality decomposition literature such as Bourguignon (1979) and
Cowell (1980).
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type, Tk, to the non-negative real value:
θa = I({µki }) (3.5)





where I(·) can be any inequality index that satisfies the standard five properties5 and thus,
it follows that I(y) = I({µki }) +
∑
k wkI(yk) for the within type income vector, yk, and the
type-specific weights that sum up to be one,
∑
k wk = 1.
Foster and Shneyerov’s path-independent decomposability axiom implies that:
I({µki }) = I(y)− I({νki }) (3.7)




using the grand mean (µ). The generalized entropy class reduces to a single inequality
measure, the mean logarithmic deviation (E0), and thus, θa and θr are uniquely defined as:










and this term is the between-group component in the
standard decomposition of the mean logarithmic deviation by population subgroups (Ferreira
and Gignoux 2011).
5This is standard properties for the measurement of relative inequality in this literature. The five prop-
erties are Anonymity, Principle of Population, Independence of Income Scale, the Pigou-Dalton Transfer
Principle, and Decomposability. See Cowell (2011) for more details.
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3.3.2 The Decomposition of Inequality of Opportunity
To find out the sources of IOP and to discern the regional differences of IOP, a decom-
position method will be applied in this study. This decomposition method is decomposing
total IOP into the components attributed to each circumstance and, thus, estimates the rel-
ative importance of each circumstance using the idea of the Shapley value (Shorrocks 1982).6
The Shapley value is an allocation method that assigns the gains of a players’ coalition as a
function of what they contribute to the coalition in a cooperative transferable utility game
(Shapley 1953). The weights in Shapley are the probability for each possible coalition. The
Shapley rule assigns individually the average of all marginal contributions to all coalitions
to each player. These rules imply, in the application of the inequality decomposition, that
it considers the impact of eliminating each income source on overall inequality (Sastre and
Trannoy 2002). The definition of the Shapley value in the context of game theory is provided
in Appendix E.
3.4 Data and Key Variable
The microdata employed in this study come from the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS) from the American Community Survey (ACS), covering the period from
2000 to 2014. The ACS is an ongoing survey that is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau
and continues every year based on a randomly selected sample from every state, and the
District of Columbia.7 The ACS provides vital information on a yearly basis about jobs and
occupations, educational attainment, veterans, whether people own or rent their home, and
other topics that include individual’s core demographics. The exact number of observation
6Shorrocks (1982) suggests a decomposition method that assigns to each factor component its covariance
with total income.
7American Community Survey (ACS) is a weighted sample of population. From 2000 to 2004, ACS
provides 0.13 percent to 0.43 percent samples from every state, and from 2005 onward, the ACS contains
one percent samples.
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for each year are provided in Table F.1 in the Appendix. The entire sample period (2000-
2014) is partitioned into before the financial crisis (2000-2006) and after the financial crisis
(2010-2014) to capture any changes in the effect of IOP on income inequality.
The key variable of interest is real personal income that is defined as the sum of the
respondent’s pre-tax personal incomes or losses from all sources for the past 12 months.
This income measure is adjusted for inflation. In the empirical study, the most frequently
used proxy for the measure of advantage (y) is total income, which represents economic well-
being. Total income is a reasonable proxy for the economic well-being, even when it does not
include the accessibility to public goods, since it provides the level of command over private
goods (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011). An alternative measure might be household per capita
income, but this measure has its own problems. In such cases, unequal opportunities may be
transmitted not only by own earnings, but also by assortative mating, fertility decisions, or
non-labor income sources, which do not represent adult individual achievement. Thus, the
indicator of economic advantage should be measured at the individual level (Bourguignon et
al. 2007).
The unit of analysis are individuals aged 16 and above living with parents, who are
described as “own children” of the head of household in the ACS.8 The relationship between
the head of household and their offspring is defined as an individual’s relationship to the head
of household or householder excluding non-relatives (e.g., partner, friend, or roommates).
Regardless of age or marital status, natural-born, step-, and adopted children are considered
as own children in the IPUMS, but foster children are not. The head of household is the
reference person and is assumed to own the property among adult household members. The
head of household includes both male and female, rather than merely assigning the male
as the head of the household for all married couples, to capture the single parent’s house.
8The majority of offsprings in the data are aged between 16 and 29 years old. The observations that are
considered as "old" was not many and thus did not cause any significant different on results. See Table F.2
in the Appendix for the exact number of observation by each age group.
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There are about 5.8 million male heads of household and about 4.3 million female heads of
household, representing a total of 10,019,390 households. See Table F.3 in the Appendix for
the number of head of households and their own children.
The circumstances exogenously given from parents are considered in two dimensions:
family wealth and parents’ social standing. For the indicators of the wealth level of parents,
total family income, house value and property taxes are used. Total family income is the
total pre-tax money income earned by one’s family from all sources during the previous
year. House value is the self-reported value of the housing unit. Although the value of a
house may be not a perfect reflection of a household’s wealth, it is closely linked to the
median household net worth. For instance, during the financial crisis, Black and Hispanic
homeowners were hit strongest: Their net worth was mostly invested in their homes and
was wiped out during the Great Recession as property values fell but mortgage payments
rose (Bocian et al. 2011). Therefore, the variable for the house value is added in the model
to capture the variation in wealth of household. All values are adjusted for inflation and
expressed in 2010 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Annual property taxes are the
household’s total real estate tax costs (state, local, and other) for the previous year. It is
used as a categorical variable, which is ranked from 1 (none) to 69 ($10,000 or more) based
on a number of tax costs.
To capture the privilege from the parents, a composition measure of the parents’ social
standing and their education is included. The Nam-Powers-Boyd occupational status score
is a measure of occupational status based upon the median earnings and median educational
attainment associated with each category in the occupational scheme that is available in
the 1990 Census Bureau classification. The scores are based on the earnings and education
levels of the employed civilian labor force aged 16 and above, except who is not working
in the previous 12 months. The calculation of scores follows the methodology suggested by
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Nam and Boyd (2004). In their method, the occupational status score gives equal weights
to education and earnings and can be interpreted as the percentage of persons in the civilian
labor force who are in occupations having combined levels of education and earnings below
that the median level of the occupation.
In addition to the occupational status score, I also consider a dimension-specific occupa-
tional standing variable that represents the professional prestige. The occupational prestige
score is based on prestige assessments assigned by Nakao and Treas (1994) to each occu-
pation using the 1990 Census Bureau occupational classification scheme. The Nakao-Treas
prestige score is a weighted average of the ratings received by each occupation in data from
the 1989 General Social Survey. In that survey, the respondents described the social standing
of occupations with scores that ranged from "1" being the lowest social standing and to "9"
being the highest.9 While the entire range of the prestige scores is from 1 to 100, the score
lies between 1 and 86.1 in the sample.
For the circumstances belonging to the individual, several core characteristics are included
such as the gender, race, and ethnicity (Non-Hispanic or Hispanic). Futhermore, other
variables are individual English language proficiency (speaks only English, speaks very well,
speaks well, speaks but not well, or does not speak English),10 educational attainment,
birthplace, and a dummy for cognitive difficulty. All races are coded into five categories:
(1) White (2) Black (3) Asian or Pacific Islander (4) Other races and American Indian
or Alaska Native (5) Two or More mixed races. Other race is the residual category that
contains any race not listed on the data. All multiple-race responses are captured as two or
more races.11 Since the Census Bureau does not treat Hispanic or Latino as a race group,
9Nakao and Treas then converted these data into prestige score using the following formula:
Pj =
∑9
i=1(12.5)(i − 1)Xji,∀j, where Pj is the prestige score of the jth occupation, i is the rank of social
standing, and Xji is the proportion of ratings received by the jth occupation that fell on the ith rank of the
ladder.
10The exact sample sizes of each category are provided in Table F.4 in the Appendix. Among respondents,
86.94 percent report as speaking only English.
11See Table F.5 in the Appendix for the exact number of observation of each racial group.
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ethnicity is considered as a separate variable.12 The birthplace indicates the U.S. state, the
outlying U.S. area, or the foreign country where the person was born. Among respondents,
95.45 percent report as having no cognitive difficulty (Table F.7 in the Appendix). After
removing observation with missing values, the number of observation of "own children" with
information on parents is about 2.7 million (Table F3 in the Appendix). The location is
considered based on the Census Region for the comparison.
3.5 Empirical Results
In this section, having outlined the relevant methodologies in Section 3.3, I now present
the results in two stages. First, I discuss the analysis of IOP in the U.S. and each Census
Region by drawing a comparison between before (2000-2006) and after the financial crisis
(2010-2014). Especially, I analyze the contribution of the circumstances by means of a Shap-
ley decomposition. Second, the estimated results by racial and ethnic groups are reported
in the following section.
3.5.1 Inequality of Opportunity by Location
How equally is the opportunity of the economic advantage distributed in the U.S.? Are
there any changes in this distribution of opportunity before and after the most recent financial
crisis (2007-2009)? Table 3.1 presents the absolute and relative measures of inequality of
opportunity (IOP) for the U.S. and each Census Region. Its bootstrap standard errors are
reported below the point estimates. The first column of Panel A in Table 3.1 shows the
measured absolute and relative IOP for the entire sample period, which is 0.169 and 0.350,
respectively. The absolute IOP for total personal income ranges from 0.157 to 0.180 across
12See Table F.6 in the Appendix for the exact number of observation of Hispanic and non-Hispnic group.
Among respondents, 74.62 percent report as non-Hispanics.
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Census Regions during 2000-2014. The corresponding estimates for the shares of IOP (the
relative IOP) are about from 32 percent to 38 percent in total inequality. The relative
IOP tells us how much of all heterogeneity in total personal income is due to the observed
circumstances. Thus, this implies that about 35 percent of total U.S. income inequality
should not be considered due to the differences in individual efforts during 2000-2014. These
results can be compared with Pistolesi (2009) on U.S. data during 1968-2001. That author
concludes that between 20 percent and 43 percent of inequality of outcome is due to IOP.
Bourguignon et al. (2007) find around 25 percent of total earnings inequality in Brazil is
inherited while, in Egypt, around 30 percent of earnings inequality could be attributed to
IOP.
Among the four Census Regions, the Northeast shows highest (0.180) in the level of IOP
and the South is lowest (0.157). Regarding the relative measure of IOP, the share is higher in
the South (37 percent) and the West (38 percent), and lower in the Northeast (32.4 percent)
and the Midwest (32.6 percent). Across all Census Regions, more than 30 percent of U.S.
income inequality is attributed to the IOP.
Turning attention to the change before (2000-2006) and after (2010-2014) the financial
crisis, the absolute IOP is higher before the financial crisis (0.175) than after the financial
crisis (0.165). However, its share as in the relative IOP is higher after the financial crisis
(39 percent) than before the crisis (32 percent). Among four Census Regions, the Northeast
shows highest in the level of IOP for both before (0.184) and after the financial crisis (0.177).
The region with the lowest absolute IOP is the South both before and after the crisis (0.162
and 0.153, respectively). The absolute IOP dropped in every Census Region after the crisis;
especially, the level of IOP in the Midwest has dropped sharply. The corresponding shares of
IOP are largest in the West (38 percent) for the entire sample periods, and the main reason
is a sharp increase in the relative IOP after the financial crisis. The IOP as a share has been
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increased in all Census Region after the financial crisis and the largest increase occurs in the
West. Those increases in the relative IOP indicate that income inequality is substantially
more attributable to the observed circumstances after the financial crisis than before the
crisis, even though the absolute IOP has been reduced after the financial crisis.
Table 3.1: Absolute and Relative IOP for U.S. and for Census Regions
All (2000 -2014) Before(2000-2006) After(2010-2014)
Panel A: U.S.
US Abs. IOP 0.169∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.165∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Relt. IOP 0.350∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.394∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Panel B: Census Regions
Northeast Abs. IOP 0.180∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0013)
Relt. IOP 0.324∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.352∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0013)
Midwest Abs. IOP 0.170∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.163∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0013)
Relt. IOP 0.326∗∗ 0.307∗∗ 0.352∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0013)
South Abs. IOP 0.157∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.153∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0011)
Relt. IOP 0.374∗∗ 0.326∗∗ 0.437∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0011)
West Abs. IOP 0.168∗∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.165∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Relt. IOP 0.381∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.447∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: Sample is “own children” (aged 16 or older) of the head of household who is the reference person and owns
the property among adult household members both male and female. The levels of overall inequality are measured
by mean log deviations.
The next question is which among observed circumstances is relatively more important.
To answer this question, a Shapley decomposition is conducted to estimate the relative
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importance of each circumstance, once a point estimate of IOP is estimated. In practice,
because the Shapley decomposition is very computationally intensive it is necessary to group
the circumstances in order to reduce the number of computations. Thus, the circumstance
variables are sorted into two groups: the circumstances representing family background, and
the circumstances belonging to the individual. In fact, arranging the circumstances in the
same group would make perfect sense when the variables in the same group are directly
related to each other or when the variables in the same group are inseparable (Wendelspiess
Chávez Juárez and Soloaga 2014). For the comparison of the difference before and after the
financial crisis, the same estimation is performed on each subperiod.
Therefore, the decomposition of the estimated total IOP represents the proportion that is
attributed to each set of circumstances. More specifically, it shows how much of inequality of
opportunity is due to the family background and how much of it is due to the circumstances
belonging to the individual. The circumstance variables turn into two sets based on their
common factor. The one set of circumstances includes the variables represents the family
background such as the family wealth, the parents’ social standing and their education, and
the prestige from parents’ occupation. Another set contains the variables that belong to the
individual such as gender, race or ethnicity, etc. Table 3.2 provides the results the Shapley
decomposition of the estimated relative IOP for the U.S. (Panel A) and for the Census
Region (Panel B). The results imply how much of total inequality are attributed to each set
of circumstances and as the percentage of the relative IOP in parentheses.
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Table 3.2: Shapley Decomposition for U.S. and for Census Regions
All (2000-2014) Before(2000-2006) After(2010-2014)
Panel A: U.S.
Family 0.174 (49.63%) 0.168 (53.02%) 0.194 (49.09%)
Own 0.177 (50.37%) 0.149 (46.98%) 0.201 (50.91%)
Total 0.350 (100.00%) 0.316 (100.00%) 0.394 (100.00%)
Panel B: Census Regions
Northeast
Family 0.119 (36.67%) 0.134 (44.58%) 0.129 (36.61%)
Own 0.205 (63.33%) 0.167 (55.42%) 0.223 (63.39%)
Total 0.324 (100.00%) 0.301 (100.00%) 0.352 (100.00%)
Midwest
Family 0.164 (50.17%) 0.092 (29.89%) 0.172 (48.89%)
Own 0.163 (49.83%) 0.215 (70.11%) 0.180 (51.11%)
Total 0.326 (100.00%) 0.307 (100.00%) 0.352 (100.00%)
South
Family 0.154 (41.25%) 0.113 (34.62%) 0.215 (49.27%)
Own 0.220 (58.75%) 0.213 (65.38%) 0.222 (50.73%)
Total 0.374 (100.00%) 0.326 (100.00%) 0.437 (100.00%)
West
Family 0.175 (46.01%) 0.155 (47.01%) 0.209 (46.69%)
Own 0.206 (53.99%) 0.174 (52.99%) 0.238 (53.31%)
Total 0.381 (100.00%) 0.329 (100.00%) 0.447 (100.00%)
Note: The results represent the level of total (relative) inequality of opportunity and as a
percentage (in parentheses) that belong to each set of circumstances, family background and
owned by the individual.
As shown in Panel A in Table 3.2, during 2000-2014, the individual’s own circumstances
account for slightly more than half of total relative IOP (50.37 percent), while family back-
ground cirsumstances account for slightly less than half (49.63 percent). Interestingly, before
the financial crisis, family background accounts for substantially more of total IOP than the
circumstances belonging to the individual, but this reverses after the financial crisis. More
than half of IOP is attributable to the individual’s own circumstances after the crisis.
Panel B in Table 3.2 reports the decomposition results in each Census Region. During
2000-2014, except in the Midwest, total IOP is attributed more to the circumstances be-
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longing to the individual than to those of the family background. Own circumstances are
more important in the Northeast and the South (63.3 percent and 59.7 percent) than in the
Midwest and the West (49.8 percent and 53.9 percent). In the Midwest, the circumstances
related to family background are accountable for 50.1 percent of total IOP, highest across
all Census Regions.
The relative contributions of own circumstance have been increased after the financial
crisis in the Northeast and the West, while it diminished in the Midwest and the South.
Surprisingly, in the Midwest, before the financial crisis the set of own circumstances of the
individual accounts for significantly more of IOP than family background, but its share
dropped sharply after the crisis period. A similar pattern is shown in the South: the family
background accounts much less before the crisis but it contributed more to total relative
IOP after the crisis.
3.5.2 Inequality of Opportunity by Race and Ethnicity
Do people with different race or ethnicity face a difference in opportunity? For a further
understanding of the difference in IOP between the racial groups, the absolute and relative
IOP by five racial groups are estimated and reported in Panel A in Table 3.3.
During 2000-2014, the absolute IOP of Black was highest (0.180), while that of Asian
was lowest (0.159). The absolute IOP of Other and White was larger than that of Two or
more races. The absolute IOP increased for Black and Other races after the financial crisis
and decreased for White, Asian, and Two or more races. Regarding the relative measure,
the relative IOP of Other races was highest among five racial groups, which implied more
than 60 percent of total inequality was not due to the difference in individual effort levels.
Meanwhile, the relative IOP of White and Two or more races accounted for only about 33
percent of total inequality. Beside Other race, the share of IOP in the Black was large and
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close to 50 percent.
For all racial groups, the relaltive IOP increased after the financial crisis. In the compar-
ison before and after the crisis periods, the relative IOP of Black and Other races showed
dramatic changes, although its absolute IOP did not show considerable variations. The in-
creased shares of IOP indicated that after the financial crisis the larger proportion of total
inequality should not be considered due to the different efforts maintaining by individuals.
Panel B in Table 3.3 shows the point estimates of the absolute and relative IOP for non-
Hispanic and Hispanic groups. For the whole time period, the level of IOP for non-Hispanics
was higher, and mostly so before the financial crisis. For both groups, the absolute IOP
was greater before the crisis, while its corresponding shares was higher after the crisis. The
relative IOP of Hispanics rapidly increased after the crisis, which was somewhat similar to
the changes among Black and Other races.
In sum, the absolute IOP varied between 0.159 and 0.180 across the five racial groups
and between 0.166 and 0.171 for ethnic groups. Its corresponding shares as the relative IOP
ranged from 33 percent to 64 percent of total inequality based on their racial groups and
from 33 percent to 63 percent of observed inequality for different ethnicities.
Turning attention to the contributor of these differences in IOP between racial or ethnic
groups, the Shapley decomposition is conducted for each group. The results are reported
in Table 3.4. Which circumstance is most responsible for these differences in IOP? Are
these differences more attributable to family background or the individual’s observed own
circumstance?
Panel A in Table 3.4 shows the decomposition results for the five racial groups. While own
circumstance contributes more to total IOP in the group of White and Two or more races, the
family background was more responsible for total IOP in the group of Black, Asian and Other
races. During 2000-2014, the relative contribution of family background was about 72 percent
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Table 3.3: Absolute and Relative IOP by Race and Ethnicity
All (2000-2014) Before(2000-2006) After(2010-2014)
Panel A: Race
White Abs. IOP 0.170∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0007)
Relt. IOP 0.335∗∗ 0.309∗∗ 0.372∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0007)
Black Abs. IOP 0.180∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.183∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0023)
Relt. IOP 0.496∗∗ 0.408∗∗ 0.602∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0023)
Asian Abs. IOP 0.159∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.156∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0050) (0.0045)
Relt. IOP 0.390∗∗ 0.336∗∗ 0.450∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0050) (0.0045)
Other Abs. IOP 0.174∗∗ 0.174∗∗ 0.183∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0046)
Relt. IOP 0.644∗∗ 0.484∗∗ 0.926∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0046)
Two or More Abs. IOP 0.161∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.158∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0038)
Relt. IOP 0.333∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.363∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0038)
Panel B: Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic Abs. IOP 0.171∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Relt. IOP 0.333∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.368∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Hispanic Abs. IOP 0.166∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0019)
Relt. IOP 0.627∗∗ 0.481∗∗ 0.790∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0019)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: Sample is “own children” (aged 16 or older) of the head of household who is the reference person and owns
the property among adult household members both male and female. The levels of overall inequality are measured
by mean log deviations.
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Table 3.4: Shapley Decomposition by Race and Ethnicity
All (2000-2014) Before(2000-2006) After(2010-2014)
Panel A: Race
White
Family 0.159 (47.41%) 0.158 (51.23%) 0.170 (45.69%)
Own 0.176 (52.59%) 0.151 (48.77%) 0.202 (54.31%)
Total 0.335 (100.00%) 0.309 (100.00%) 0.372 (100.00%)
Black
Family 0.357 (72.03%) 0.309 (75.71%) 0.436 (72.48%)
Own 0.139 (27.97%) 0.099 (24.29%) 0.166 (27.52%)
Total 0.496 (100.00%) 0.408 (100.00%) 0.602 (88.78%)
Asian
Family 0.223 (57.19%) 0.193 (57.64%) 0.255 (56.58%)
Own 0.167 (42.81%) 0.142 (42.36%) 0.195 (43.42%)
Total 0.390 (100.00%) 0.336 (100.00%) 0.450 (100.00%)
Other
Family 0.405 (62.91%) 0.276 (57.03%) 0.668 (72.11%)
Own 0.239 (37.09%) 0.208 (42.97%) 0.258 (27.89%)
Total 0.644 (100.00%) 0.484 (100.00%) 0.926 (100.00%)
Two or More
Family 0.145 (43.63%) 0.118 (39.22%) 0.162 (44.02%)
Own 0.187 (56.37%) 0.183 (60.78%) 0.201 (54.74%)
Total 0.333 (100.00%) 0.301 (100.00%) 0.363 (100.00%)
Panel B: Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic
Family 0.155 (46.37%) 0.158 (51.44%) 0.165 (44.83%)
Own 0.179 (53.63%) 0.150 (48.56%) 0.203 (55.17%)
Total 0.333 (100.00%) 0.308 (100.00%) 0.368 (100.00%)
Hispanic
Family 0.315 (50.26%) 0.218 (45.38%) 0.416 (52.64%)
Own 0.312 (49.74%) 0.263 (54.62%) 0.374 (47.36%)
Total 0.627 (100.00%) 0.481 (100.00%) 0.790 (100.00%)
Note: The results represent the level of total (relative) inequality of opportunity and as a per-
centage (in parentheses) that belong to each set of circumstances, family background and owned
by the individual.
for Black and 63 percent for Other races. However, the contribution of the circumstances
from the family for these two racial groups was not same before and after the financial
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crisis. Among Blacks, the proportion of circumstance from family background reduced after
the financial crisis (72.48 percent), compared to its pre-crisis level (75.71 percent), whereas
the shares accounting for family background in the group of Other races increased after
the crisis. Therefore, after the crisis, the amount of total IOP that was attributed to the
circumstance from the family is still largest among Blacks but its portion became similar
to that of Other races. For Whites, the circumstance from family contributed more to the
total IOP before the financial crisis (51.23 percent), but after the crisis, own circumstance
became more important.
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the decomposition results for non-Hispanic and Hispanic
groups. During 2000-2014, the own circumstance accounted more than half of total shares of
IOP for non-Hispanics (53.63 percent); in contrast, the circumstance from family background
more important for Hispanics (50.26 percent). However, among non-Hispsnics before the
financial crisis, total IOP was due more to family backgroud (51.44 percent) than to own
circumstances in the group (48.56 percent). Similarly, among Hispanics, total IOP was due
more to the own circumstance (54.62 percent) than that of the family background (45.38
percent). Therefore, for non-Hispanics, the larger contribution of the own circumstance was
mostly due to its increased shares after the financial crisis. Meanwhile, for Hispanics, there
was increased relative importance of the circumstance from family background after the
financial crisis.
3.6 Conclusion
This study aims to identify the opportunity share of income inequality in the United
States and its changes after the financial crisis. During 2000-2014, about 35 percent of U.S.
inequality should not be considered due to the differences in the individual efforts but rather
as due to circumstances. This share of inequality that is considered as due to circumstances
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increases after the financial crisis while the absolute IOP declines after the crisis. From a
regional point of view, after the financial crisis, the relative IOP also increases in all the
Census Region.
The increased relative IOP of outcome inequality after the financial crisis may be in-
terpreted in three ways. First, the return to effort (i.e., labor supply decisions) may have
decreased relatively more than the return to circumstances nowadays. This may imply that
the effort characteristics, which are under the individual’s control, became less important
in the labor market after the financial crisis, than observed circumstance characteristics,
which are outside of the individual’s control. Alternatively, return to effort is lower after
the crisis than before, and its growth rate has reduced more for those workers. The most
reasonable suspect to explain this phenomenon is the shrinkage of the middle quality jobs in
the labor market after the financial crisis. This kind of structural change — the shrinking of
the middle class of the wage distribution while the bottom and the top are rising — is called
polarization (Autor et al. 2006). As Van Reenen (2011) explains, this polarization in the
labor market is due to the loss of the share of occupations of the middle class, whereas the
high-quality jobs, such as lawyers or bankers, as well as the low-quality jobs (e.g., restau-
rant waiting or cleaners), have been growing. If there is polarization, the measure of total
inequality would be lower in value but it does not necessary mean that now opportunity is
more equally distributed.
Second, instead, the return to unobservable circumstances, which is treated as effort, may
have decreased recently. It is possible that the lowered return to effort after the financial
crisis may be related to unobserved characteristics but considered as effort due to data
limitation. These kinds of consequences of omitted variables have been broadly discussed in
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the literature, and it would be interesting to explore this in greater detail in future work.13
Third, some intergenerational transition, both genetic and economic, may be more strongly
associated with adult offspring’s outcome nowadays than before. Equality of opportunity is
regarded as having somewhat close relevance to intergenerational association. Intergenera-
tional mobility is defined as the correlation between the socioeconomic well-being of parents
and that of their adult children (Torche 2014). Weak intergeneration mobility implies that
the opportunity to succeed is not determined by their social origins and thus, equality of
opportunity is promoted. However, if intergenerational persistence (i.e., genetic inheritance
or family socialization) becomes the primary determinant of success in the society, then the
intergenerational transmission is strong regardless of the level of equality of opportunity
(Jencks and Tach 2006). Among observed circumstances, the circumstances that belong to
the individual is relatively contributed more to total IOP than the circumstances from the
family background. This was mostly due to increased importance of the own circumstances
after the financial crisis.
Among five racial groups, the absolute IOP of Blacks is the highest, while that of Asians
is the lowest. After the financial crisis, the absolute IOP increased for Blacks and Other
Races but decreased for Whites, Asians, and Mixed-Race members of society. As for the
decomposition results, while own circumstance contributes more to total IOP in the group of
Whites and Mixed-Race individuals, family background was more responsible for total IOP
among of Blacks, Asians and members of the Other Races group.
Over time, the level of IOP of non-Hispanics is higher than that of Hispanics, and it
was due to the greater shares of IOP among non-Hispanics. The relative IOP of Hispanics
increased substantially after the crisis, while that of non-Hispanics did so only slightly. For
non-Hispanics, the larger contribution of the own circumstance was especially evident after
13See Pischke (1995), Poterba (1986) or O’Neil et al. (2007) for a discussion.
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the financial crisis. Meanwhile, for Hispanics, family background became increasingly more
important after the financial crisis.
From the perspective of a policy recommendation, although the results of this study
show a clear linkage between overall inequality and inequality of opportunity, the results





Mathematical Derivations for Chapter 1
A.1 Derivation of Equation (2)
This section provides that the Gini coefficient G is equal to G =
∑
k SkGkRk as stated
in equaltion (2).
Stuart (1954) develops the relationship between the absolute Gini and the covariance.




F (y)[1− F (y)]dy (A.1)
where A is the half of Gini’s expected means difference, y is income, a is the lowest value
of y, b is the highest value of y, and F (y) is the cumulative distribution of y. Applying
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]dF (A.3)
Since F (y) is uniformly distributed between [0, 1] and so its mean is 1/2, it can be rewritten
as:
A = 2cov[y, F (y)] (A.4)
Dividing by the mean of y, this yields the relative Gini, which is conventionally known as





where y is the mean of y.
Suppose y1, . . . ., yk represent K components of income and y represents total income such
that y =
∑K




cov[yk, F (y)] (A.6)
where cov(yk, F ) is the covariance of income from kth source with the cumulative distribution






















where µ and µk is mean income of y and yk, respectively. This is viewing each source’s
contribution to the Gini coefficient as the product of its correlation with the rank of total
income (Rk),1 the source’s own Gini (Gk), and its share of total income (Sk).
1Rk is a correlation coefficient between two variables yk and y. Schechtman and Yitzhaki (1985) show the
properties of the Gini correlation that are similar to the properties of Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation
coefficients. Such as:
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A.2 Derivation of Equation (3)
This section provides a partial derivative of the Gini of total income with respect to a
small percentage change, ek, in income from source k as in (2), holding income from all other






When there is a small percentage change,e, in income from source k, and by assuming that






where, for j 6= k
Sk(e) =
µk∑
k 6=j µk + (1 + e)µj
=
µk∑K
k=1 µk + eµj
(A.10)
while for source j
Sk(e) =
(1 + e)µk∑K
k=1 µk + eµj
(A.11)
Therefore, the difference between G(e) and G0 can be written as:










For j 6= k,
Sk(e)− Sk =
µk∑







(a) Pearson’s correlation coefficient If yk and y are normally distributed variables, then Rk = ρ.
(b) Spearman’s rank correlation −1 ≤ Rk ≤ 1. Rk is equal to zero if yk and y are independent, and equal
to I(−I) if yk is an increasing (decreasing) function of total income.
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By substituting equations (18) and (19) into the equation (17), we can find G such as:










































Therefore, the partial derivative of the Gini of total income is:
∂G0
∂ek
= Sk(GkRk −G0) (A.17)
A.3 The Presence of Non-Positive Incomes in the Sample
Not every standard measures of inequality are able to apply in the presence of negative
incomes in the sample (Cowell 2011). However, the Gini coefficient are well-defined for non-
positive values in two possible ways (Scott and Litchfield 1994). When the Gini coefficient
is defined as in (1), the values of Gini lies between zero and one in the absence of negative
incomes. First, if the mean income y is negative, then the Gini must have a negative value,
since the summation part of the equation (1) must be non-negative. Second, the Gini can
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|yi − yj| (A.18)
This can be happened if yj take some very large negative values and/or if the sample size
(n) is very small.
A.4 The Definition of Source Income Gini in the Presence
of Zero Incomes from the Source
This section provides the derivation of source income Gini in the presence of the obser-
vation with zero earnings from the particular source.









|yki − ykj | (A.19)
where yki is the income of individual i from source k.
Suppose nk1 individuals do not receive any income from this source (i.e., their yki = 0)
and nk2 individuals do receive such income (i.e., their yki 6= 0) among individuals i = 1, . . . , n
and n = nk1 + nk2




































































































































|yki − ykj | (A.22)
Appendix B
Tables for Chapter 1
Table B.1: Number of Observations and Mean of Incomes by Year
Year Obs. Total Wage Self-emp Social Welfare Interest Retirement SSI Other
2005 2,257,681 36,491.61 26,690.00 2,374.07 2,365.65 37.76 2,021.05 2,140.64 159.69 702.75
2006 2,352,619 35,779.47 26,074.22 2,323.26 2,371.90 41.40 2,041.81 2,080.68 166.40 679.63
2007 2,380,566 36,747.30 26,608.60 2,295.00 2,420.99 39.32 2,343.80 2,171.92 174.14 693.54
2008 2,393,491 36,552.08 26,550.74 2,111.64 2,438.42 39.32 2,408.61 2,173.63 146.09 683.64
2009 2,423,405 35,849.43 26,014.47 1,944.14 2,612.86 46.29 2,060.25 2,223.39 156.23 791.80
2010 2,453,657 34,338.98 24,726.67 1,767.33 2,704.39 54.24 1,810.49 2,197.60 235.54 842.72
2011 2,520,319 32,286.74 22,910.82 1,665.30 2,749.69 53.28 1,700.62 2,181.96 258.62 766.46
2012 2,523,940 32,927.25 23,446.43 1,690.32 2,780.97 50.25 1,747.91 2,237.07 256.95 717.35
2013 2,541,519 33,981.76 24,391.94 1,683.47 2,807.04 43.16 1,942.30 2,235.08 248.05 630.73
2014 2,550,887 34,181.89 24,417.14 1,702.50 2,905.07 37.94 1,972.73 2,290.56 256.81 599.14
Total 24,398,084 34,914.00 25,183.00 1,956.00 2,616.00 44.00 2,005.00 2,193.00 206.00 711.00
Table B.2: Number of Observation and Mean of Personal Income by Race and
Year (2005-2014)
White Black Asian Other Two or More
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
All years 19,289,097 37,162.47 2,448,226 23,288.47 1,126,100 37,882.52 1,099,288 20,788.16 435,373 26,053.86
2005 1,820,970 38,649.12 200,289 25,417.98 93,450 38,172.58 113,097 22,364.52 29,875 27,447.78
2006 1,870,747 38,126.16 224,516 24,152.63 98,946 38,222.52 124,812 22,025.04 33,598 26,711.50
2007 1,892,222 39,118.66 226,341 24,746.25 103,162 39,615.75 123,294 22,555.39 35,547 27,830.91
2008 1,916,628 38,760.68 232,720 24,679.62 105,842 39,469.59 99,170 21,999.03 39,131 27,973.81
2009 1,930,620 38,010.78 238,089 24,545.22 109,739 39,342.76 103,003 21,427.20 41,954 26,812.07
2010 1,941,890 36,465.43 247,374 23,520.87 116,211 37,495.56 101,551 20,133.23 46,631 26,244.99
2011 1,969,027 34,635.89 276,253 21,003.27 118,032 35,349.66 107,011 18,680.06 49,996 24,007.90
2012 1,971,493 35,278.68 270,877 21,519.49 121,988 36,169.59 107,566 19,063.94 52,016 24,275.32
2013 1,986,883 36,327.43 264,952 22,202.25 127,496 37,906.42 109,049 19,404.93 53,139 25,506.65
2014 1,988,617 36,553.54 266,815 22,416.42 131,234 37,745.87 110,735 19,812.48 53,486 25,700.86
160
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Table B.3: Number of Observation and Mean of Personal Income by Race and
Year (2005-2014)
White & Hisp Others & Hisp
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
All years 1,776,476 23,576.32 1,045,702 20,616.96
2005 123,225 24,881.70 105,729 22,092.38
2006 132,925 24,470.63 117,768 21,840.17
2007 142,208 25,003.47 115,856 22,394.13
2008 171,501 25,144.96 94,910 21,768.96
2009 177,938 24,370.51 99,974 21,042.68
2010 193,255 23,269.71 99,402 19,960.84
2011 202,991 21,817.84 101,390 18,453.13
2012 208,822 22,288.28 102,324 18,983.06
2013 209,259 22,914.78 103,472 19,369.25
2014 214,352 23,252.49 104,877 19,883.31
Table B.4: Mean of Personal Income by Year for Non-Hispanic (2005-2014)
White & Non-Hisp Black & Non-Hisp Asian & Non-Hisp Others & Non-Hisp
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
All years 17,512,621 38,540.65 2,394,957 23,336.27 1,112,025 37,995.68 556,303 25,470.97
2005 1,697,745 39,648.38 197,111 25,460.04 92,217 38,314.93 41,654 26,887.78
2006 1,737,822 39,170.67 220,968 24,188.60 97,625 38,317.36 45,511 26,221.10
2007 1,750,014 40,265.68 222,567 24,786.64 101,915 39,730.81 48,006 27,034.83
2008 1,745,127 40,098.76 227,579 24,737.36 104,282 39,581.24 50,092 27,426.77
2009 1,752,682 39,395.58 232,660 24,596.64 108,465 39,470.74 51,686 26,811.01
2010 1,748,635 37,923.79 241,574 23,559.16 114,804 37,613.70 55,987 25,909.51
2011 1,766,036 36,109.22 269,787 21,056.16 116,626 35,444.25 63,489 23,445.24
2012 1,762,671 36,817.64 263,987 21,566.34 120,390 36,278.95 65,746 23,597.58
2013 1,777,624 37,906.34 258,334 22,248.25 125,988 38,027.22 66,842 24,599.89
2014 1,774,265 38,160.46 260,390 22,444.35 129,713 37,849.98 67,290 24,727.76
APPENDIX B. 162
Table B.5: Census Region and Division
REGION I: NORTHEAST
Division I: New England Division 2: Middle Atlantic
Connecticut (09) New Jersey (34)
Maine (23) New York (36)





Division 3: East North Central Division 4: West North Central
Illinois (17) Iowa (19)
Indiana (18) Kansas (20)
Michigan (26) Minnesota (27)
Ohio (39) Missouri (29)




Division 5: South Atlantic Division 6: East South Central Division 7: West South Central
Delaware (10) Alabama (01) Arkansas (05)
District of Columbia (11) Kentucky (21) Louisiana (22)
Florida (12) Mississippi (28) Oklahoma (40)







Division 8: Mountain Division 9: Pacific
Arizona (04) Alaska (02)
Colorado (08) California (06)
Idaho (16) Hawaii (15)
Montana (30) Oregon (41)





Table B.6: Gini Coefficient by State (2005-2014)
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Alabama 0.562 0.564 0.568 0.559 0.568 0.572 0.611 0.575 0.582 0.575
Alaska 0.549 0.541 0.536 0.532 0.530 0.543 0.546 0.553 0.557 0.547
Arizona 0.554 0.565 0.564 0.567 0.566 0.575 0.591 0.591 0.594 0.589
Arkansas 0.532 0.549 0.550 0.551 0.548 0.550 0.555 0.558 0.565 0.569
California 0.592 0.597 0.600 0.605 0.604 0.611 0.625 0.624 0.628 0.627
Colorado 0.544 0.551 0.556 0.558 0.560 0.562 0.570 0.570 0.576 0.570
Connecticut 0.574 0.586 0.588 0.588 0.587 0.590 0.600 0.604 0.610 0.606
Delaware 0.528 0.536 0.535 0.549 0.534 0.542 0.550 0.554 0.556 0.551
DC 0.596 0.599 0.608 0.606 0.602 0.606 0.619 0.614 0.618 0.597
Florida 0.563 0.568 0.574 0.575 0.577 0.581 0.596 0.595 0.598 0.595
Georgia 0.564 0.573 0.576 0.578 0.583 0.585 0.599 0.601 0.606 0.601
Hawaii 0.530 0.535 0.531 0.534 0.531 0.536 0.550 0.549 0.550 0.553
Idaho 0.531 0.533 0.554 0.544 0.549 0.546 0.551 0.553 0.558 0.554
Illinois 0.559 0.567 0.573 0.571 0.574 0.574 0.582 0.582 0.592 0.583
Indiana 0.522 0.532 0.535 0.536 0.536 0.544 0.553 0.552 0.559 0.551
Iowa 0.487 0.502 0.503 0.501 0.498 0.501 0.515 0.517 0.522 0.519
Kansas 0.522 0.534 0.536 0.534 0.534 0.537 0.543 0.552 0.557 0.550
Kentucky 0.544 0.550 0.558 0.557 0.553 0.559 0.565 0.564 0.572 0.566
Louisiana 0.571 0.569 0.580 0.578 0.575 0.576 0.587 0.592 0.595 0.589
Maine 0.511 0.521 0.530 0.516 0.522 0.515 0.532 0.529 0.534 0.544
Maryland 0.540 0.547 0.555 0.552 0.563 0.561 0.573 0.572 0.577 0.572
Massashusetts 0.553 0.559 0.565 0.569 0.570 0.570 0.588 0.592 0.592 0.594
Michigan 0.540 0.550 0.557 0.557 0.555 0.554 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.557
Minnesota 0.520 0.521 0.530 0.529 0.529 0.530 0.537 0.529 0.542 0.535
Mississippi 0.554 0.568 0.576 0.574 0.576 0.574 0.582 0.589 0.585 0.585
Missouri 0.534 0.541 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.562 0.558 0.558 0.558
Montana 0.521 0.514 0.540 0.539 0.523 0.529 0.531 0.548 0.558 0.552
Nebraska 0.510 0.517 0.510 0.513 0.517 0.513 0.528 0.525 0.536 0.521
Nevada 0.534 0.540 0.549 0.544 0.550 0.559 0.567 0.568 0.567 0.558
New Hampshire 0.510 0.526 0.542 0.535 0.537 0.539 0.550 0.548 0.553 0.550
New Jersey 0.571 0.576 0.583 0.580 0.586 0.584 0.593 0.596 0.601 0.598
New Mexico 0.554 0.566 0.569 0.570 0.563 0.571 0.600 0.589 0.600 0.588
New York 0.582 0.593 0.599 0.596 0.598 0.599 0.609 0.605 0.610 0.610
North Carolina 0.547 0.554 0.563 0.560 0.562 0.564 0.578 0.576 0.583 0.579
North Dakota 0.524 0.512 0.516 0.515 0.538 0.506 0.536 0.561 0.547 0.556
Ohio 0.528 0.541 0.542 0.543 0.546 0.547 0.556 0.557 0.560 0.555
Oklahoma 0.550 0.559 0.562 0.555 0.556 0.558 0.572 0.571 0.576 0.572
Oregon 0.545 0.547 0.549 0.549 0.555 0.554 0.565 0.565 0.572 0.569
Pennsylvania 0.537 0.545 0.553 0.548 0.552 0.547 0.558 0.561 0.563 0.563
Rhode Island 0.523 0.535 0.541 0.545 0.549 0.554 0.564 0.564 0.571 0.572
South Carolina 0.548 0.559 0.559 0.563 0.560 0.561 0.577 0.577 0.574 0.575
South Dakota 0.513 0.522 0.503 0.524 0.520 0.527 0.521 0.520 0.528 0.532
Tennessee 0.555 0.563 0.570 0.570 0.564 0.565 0.580 0.579 0.586 0.582
Texas 0.585 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.594 0.593 0.607 0.607 0.608 0.608
Utah 0.560 0.563 0.564 0.568 0.570 0.578 0.586 0.579 0.593 0.589
Vermont 0.512 0.506 0.505 0.531 0.515 0.523 0.520 0.532 0.528 0.533
Virginia 0.551 0.562 0.566 0.567 0.571 0.575 0.588 0.591 0.590 0.586
Washington 0.548 0.554 0.553 0.553 0.555 0.555 0.571 0.573 0.573 0.571
West Virginia 0.541 0.546 0.547 0.544 0.552 0.547 0.562 0.563 0.558 0.556
Winsconsin 0.502 0.512 0.514 0.511 0.517 0.514 0.525 0.525 0.533 0.521
Wyoming 0.520 0.515 0.521 0.536 0.508 0.529 0.516 0.514 0.515 0.521
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Table B.7: Mean Income by Source and State (2005-2014)
State Total Wage Self-emp Social S Welfare Interest Retirement Supp Other
AL 29, 067.2420, 068.14 1, 420.95 2, 986.29 20.58 1, 268.94 2, 333.41 259.65 709.28
AK 36, 398.6526, 896.27 2, 646.88 1, 418.25 158.36 1, 751.00 2, 139.13 159.911, 228.86
AZ 32, 835.9323, 048.04 1, 557.69 2, 823.44 39.80 2, 018.13 2, 473.00 181.32 694.52
AR 26, 561.2517, 992.46 1, 473.28 3, 106.50 30.03 1, 207.65 1, 792.10 262.58 696.65
CA 38, 142.0927, 445.18 2, 715.31 2, 086.10 81.54 2, 636.39 2, 141.63 256.79 779.14
CO 38, 960.3728, 614.57 2, 378.62 2, 135.45 32.86 2, 548.94 2, 348.83 146.75 754.35
CT 47, 867.8935, 498.37 2, 673.19 2, 846.20 78.14 3, 351.91 2, 484.31 164.18 771.59
DE 37, 079.1926, 063.66 1, 542.25 3, 229.01 34.21 2, 041.56 3, 291.42 182.64 694.44
DC 53, 336.2941, 167.16 3, 074.24 1, 576.98 74.71 3, 115.50 3, 427.26 245.10 655.34
FL 33, 766.5022, 447.13 1, 571.14 3, 213.28 29.97 2, 957.76 2, 585.05 188.00 774.18
GA 32, 807.8924, 551.65 1, 533.31 2, 331.35 26.07 1, 451.95 2, 068.94 195.93 648.68
HI 35, 494.7924, 471.36 2, 154.78 2, 604.03 74.21 2, 505.62 2, 787.71 169.09 728.00
ID 28, 814.5519, 733.98 2, 061.71 2, 680.71 35.05 1, 545.60 1, 873.72 190.04 693.75
IL 36, 459.2927, 189.25 1, 752.94 2, 518.85 48.16 1, 931.38 2, 163.27 182.76 672.68
IN 30, 248.1422, 163.16 1, 405.36 2, 804.77 34.70 1, 317.30 1, 697.23 193.65 631.97
IA 31, 039.7821, 463.23 2, 238.36 2, 983.64 44.27 1, 867.91 1, 528.80 169.76 743.82
KS 32, 348.8023, 028.37 2, 191.99 2, 889.75 40.31 1, 762.92 1, 625.96 155.51 654.01
KY 29, 182.6520, 337.48 1, 460.62 2, 815.41 35.60 1, 388.42 2, 168.52 284.60 692.01
LA 29, 840.9121, 427.96 1, 664.81 2, 455.09 24.28 1, 477.89 1, 915.84 268.10 606.95
ME 29, 546.5919, 425.39 2, 180.71 2, 930.17 55.91 1, 793.93 2, 136.98 249.74 773.75
MD 45, 126.6334, 551.36 2, 069.83 2, 303.94 36.13 2, 239.10 3, 111.82 154.27 660.18
MA 42, 958.4632, 382.66 2, 399.06 2, 443.91 60.90 2, 596.25 2, 087.46 237.24 750.97
MI 31, 242.0621, 906.04 1, 301.12 3, 053.72 49.20 1, 422.37 2, 511.23 231.22 767.16
MN 35, 914.1625, 717.72 2, 847.34 2, 641.96 50.01 1, 973.38 1, 775.33 156.20 752.23
MS 25, 684.4617, 838.80 1, 391.73 2, 745.75 30.93 977.85 1, 810.11 313.04 576.25
MO 30, 307.2221, 449.47 1, 655.70 2, 850.35 34.05 1, 496.83 1, 971.56 214.64 634.62
MT 29, 903.6918, 902.40 3, 117.69 2, 868.44 34.48 2, 166.51 1, 919.98 184.14 710.04
NE 31, 601.0422, 060.40 2, 659.89 2, 793.71 30.63 1, 843.71 1, 335.10 146.94 730.66
NV 34, 718.0325, 019.34 1, 615.50 2, 472.14 44.94 2, 103.10 2, 511.77 155.44 795.80
NH 38, 789.1828, 277.17 2, 482.12 2, 725.74 38.86 2, 331.25 2, 124.14 165.46 644.44
NJ 45, 149.2434, 790.23 2, 029.14 2, 706.24 44.35 2, 346.87 2, 276.45 165.05 790.92
NM 29, 611.0520, 021.06 1, 638.71 2, 537.15 41.65 1, 779.51 2, 635.79 229.73 727.45
NY 38, 436.7628, 282.37 2, 028.37 2, 661.19 54.31 2, 136.19 2, 355.72 253.44 664.96
NC 31, 802.4822, 589.09 1, 553.27 2, 804.70 27.99 1, 720.61 2, 194.81 189.11 722.90
ND 33, 533.7321, 455.86 4, 740.58 2, 674.14 29.90 2, 592.36 1, 174.95 130.61 735.34
OH 31, 595.0522, 840.90 1, 382.29 2, 697.91 48.04 1, 438.63 2, 344.13 212.37 630.80
OK 28, 755.7319, 771.34 1, 857.87 2, 733.61 32.26 1, 576.85 1, 790.46 224.99 768.36
OR 32, 835.5122, 243.35 2, 085.82 2, 825.48 55.31 2, 177.66 2, 398.23 181.67 868.00
PA 32, 651.3523, 491.95 1, 647.86 3, 001.52 44.05 1, 569.23 2, 014.20 220.24 662.29
RI 36, 694.2326, 789.01 1, 757.73 2, 710.62 55.41 2, 063.96 2, 252.89 271.54 793.06
SC 30, 001.8320, 626.25 1, 383.26 2, 965.47 23.23 1, 715.61 2, 374.52 190.03 723.46
SD 29, 893.9719, 246.66 3, 876.50 2, 624.40 36.72 1, 891.03 1, 345.88 152.26 720.51
TN 30, 205.8421, 132.75 1, 912.30 2, 832.47 35.23 1, 478.49 1, 921.39 223.79 669.43
TX 33, 924.0225, 078.85 2, 167.39 2, 207.71 24.83 1, 825.78 1, 797.59 180.78 641.09
UT 32, 397.8524, 761.73 1, 527.66 1, 978.20 31.00 1, 527.03 1, 855.19 142.07 574.69
VT 33, 188.4922, 447.07 2, 630.76 2, 793.84 51.06 2, 584.10 1, 794.04 201.33 686.29
VA 41, 185.7931, 030.37 1, 786.18 2, 396.85 26.11 2, 022.75 3, 070.25 153.88 699.41
WA 37, 482.1827, 019.51 2, 030.74 2, 579.64 64.94 2, 388.89 2, 369.16 192.94 836.36
WV 26, 261.7917, 534.86 1, 064.83 3, 367.85 32.49 1, 072.03 2, 165.45 302.23 722.06
WI 32, 621.7823, 433.81 1, 930.30 2, 828.91 28.77 1, 634.39 1, 922.27 162.68 680.66
WY 34, 279.2924, 491.08 2, 385.97 2, 600.48 25.09 2, 021.22 1, 987.71 134.85 632.88
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Table B.8: Top and Bottom Mean Income States by Source
Top five mean income states by source
ST Total ST Wage ST Self-emp ST Social S ST Welfare ST Interest ST Retirement ST Supp ST Other
DC 53, 336.29 DC 41, 167.16 ND 4, 740.58 WV 3, 367.85 AK 158.36 CT 3,351.91 DC 3,427.26 MS 313.04 AK 1, 228.86
CT 47, 867.89 CT 35, 498.37 SD 3, 876.50 DE 3, 229.01 CA 81.54 DC 3,115.50 DE 3,291.42 WV 302.23 OR 868.00
NJ 45, 149.24 NJ 34, 790.23 MT 3, 117.69 FL 3, 213.28 CT 78.14 FL 2,957.76 MD 3,111.82 KY 284.60 WA 836.36
MD 45, 126.63 MD 34, 551.36 DC 3, 074.24 AR 3, 106.50 DC 74.71 CA 2,636.39 VA 3,070.25 RI 271.54 NV 795.80
MA 42, 958.46 MA 32, 382.66 MN 2, 847.34 MI 3, 053.72 HI 74.21 MA 2,596.25 HI 2,787.71 LA 268.10 RI 793.06
Bottom five mean income state by source
ST Total ST Wage ST Self-emp ST Social S ST Welfare ST Interest ST Retirement ST Supp ST Other
ID 28, 814.55 SD 19, 246.66 MS 1, 391.73 CO 2, 135.45 WY 25.09 IN 1, 317.30 KS 1,625.96 NE 146.94 IN 631.97
OK 28, 755.73 MT 18, 902.40 SC 1, 383.26 CA 2, 086.10 TX 24.83 AL 1, 268.94 IA 1,528.80 CO 146.75 OH 630.80
AR 26, 561.25 AR 17, 992.46 OH 1, 382.29 UT 1, 978.20 LA 24.28 AR 1, 207.65 SD 1,345.88 UT 142.07 LA 606.95
WV 26, 261.79 MS 17, 838.80 MI 1, 301.12 DC 1, 576.98 SC 23.23 WV 1, 072.03 NE 1,335.10 WY 134.85 MS 576.25
MS 25, 684.46 WV 17, 534.86 WV 1, 064.83 AK 1, 418.25 AL 20.58 MS 977.85 ND 1,174.95 ND 130.61 UT 574.69
Table B.9: Within Group and Between Group Inequality (2005-2014)
Year
Squared Coefficient of Variation
Gini Coefficient
Within Between Total Btw/Total(%)
2005 0.9521 0.0092 0.9612 0.9529 0.5609
2006 0.9931 0.0086 1.0017 0.8586 0.5682
2007 1.0345 0.0087 1.0431 0.8312 0.5725
2008 1.0316 0.0088 1.0404 0.8458 0.5726
2009 1.0048 0.0091 1.0139 0.9005 0.5741
2010 0.9741 0.0091 0.9832 0.9225 0.5762
2011 1.0436 0.0092 1.0528 0.8701 0.5880
2012 1.0432 0.0087 1.0519 0.8233 0.5879
2013 1.1018 0.0088 1.1106 0.7951 0.5921
2014 1.0788 0.0089 1.0877 0.8155 0.5890
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Table B.10: Gini Coefficient for Non-zero source income
Source
Before During After
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Wage 0.4927 0.4986 0.5017 0.5005 0.5023 0.5027 0.5122 0.5120 0.5175 0.5157
Self-Employment 0.6889 0.6875 0.6882 0.6932 0.6962 0.6950 0.6937 0.6923 0.7008 0.6929
Interest 0.8363 0.8295 0.8244 0.8275 0.8410 0.8391 0.8378 0.8371 0.8428 0.8339
Retirement 0.5048 0.5043 0.5101 0.5114 0.5086 0.5104 0.5166 0.5153 0.5199 0.5185
Other 0.6084 0.6086 0.6086 0.5989 0.5750 0.5570 0.5736 0.5874 0.5913 0.5974
Social Security 0.2830 0.2844 0.2849 0.2867 0.2864 0.2800 0.2811 0.2832 0.2873 0.2873
Supplemental 0.3099 0.3141 0.3192 0.3197 0.3225 0.2931 0.2872 0.2909 0.2920 0.2894
Welfare 0.5716 0.5947 0.5946 0.5941 0.5770 0.5769 0.5801 0.5779 0.5701 0.5680
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Note: decile difference in average wages between male and female workers when the reference group
is the group of female.
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Figure C.2: The difference in average wage between
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difference in wage 95% CI
Note: decile difference in average wages between Hispanic and non-Hispanic when the
reference group is Hispanic.
Figure C.3: The difference in average wage between
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difference in wage 95% CI
Note: decile difference in average wages between non-Hispanic White and others when
the reference group is non-Hispanic White.
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Figure C.4: The difference in average wage between
worker with at least one year of college education
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Note: decile difference in average wages between workers with at least some college
education and those without when the reference group is the worker who does not have
at least one year of college education.
Figure C.5: The difference in average wages between
worker between who is a native speaker of English
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difference in wage 95% CI
Note: decile difference in average wages between the worker who is a native speaker of
English and who is not when the reference group is worker who is a native speaker of
English.
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Figure C.6: The comparison of wage distribution and
the Gini coefficient by the Census Region
Note: the sub-populations are defined by the Census Region. The value of total rep-
resents the results across sub-populations. The results are reported from the highest
inequality to lowest inequality based on the Gini coefficient of the subgroups. The overall
inequality is placed last.
Figure C.7: Percent shares of hourly wage by top 10
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2000 289, 997 37, 115.75 74.39 6.12 5.72 0.11 6.60 5.18 0.39 1.50
2001 930, 119 36, 859.26 73.63 6.24 6.12 0.10 6.39 5.31 0.39 1.82
2002 840, 614 36, 920.60 73.71 6.19 6.30 0.10 5.82 5.49 0.40 1.99
2003 936, 372 36, 117.45 73.74 6.15 6.54 0.11 5.19 5.73 0.43 2.10
2004 935, 583 36, 673.90 73.32 6.41 6.49 0.10 5.42 5.83 0.41 2.01
2005 2, 257, 681 36, 491.61 73.14 6.51 6.48 0.10 5.54 5.87 0.44 1.93
2006 2, 352, 619 35, 779.47 72.87 6.49 6.63 0.12 5.71 5.82 0.47 1.90
2007 2, 380, 566 36, 747.30 72.41 6.25 6.59 0.11 6.38 5.91 0.47 1.89
2008 2, 393, 491 36, 552.08 72.64 5.78 6.67 0.11 6.59 5.95 0.40 1.87
2009 2, 423, 405 35, 849.43 72.57 5.42 7.29 0.13 5.75 6.20 0.44 2.21
2010 2, 453, 657 34, 338.98 72.01 5.15 7.88 0.16 5.27 6.40 0.69 2.45
2011 2, 520, 319 32, 286.74 70.96 5.16 8.52 0.17 5.27 6.76 0.80 2.37
2012 2, 523, 940 32, 927.25 71.21 5.13 8.45 0.15 5.31 6.79 0.78 2.18
2013 2, 541, 519 33, 981.76 71.78 4.95 8.26 0.13 5.72 6.58 0.73 1.86
2014 2, 550, 887 34, 181.89 71.43 4.98 8.50 0.11 5.77 6.70 0.75 1.75
Note: total personal income is defined as total pre-tax personal income or losses from all sources for the past 12 months. The
amounts are the sum of eight income components as follows: (1) wage and salary income, which includes cash bonuses, tips, and
other money income received from an employer but not including payments-in-kind or reimbursements for business expenses, (2)
self-employment income from a business, professional practice, or farm, (3) income from Social Security pensions, survivors benefits,
or permanent disability insurance, or U.S. government Railroad Retirement insurance payment, (4) income from various public as-
sistance programs or welfare except assistance from private charities, (5) income from an estate or trust, interest dividends, royalties,
and rent received, (6) retirement, survivor, and disability pension income, other than Social Security, (7) income from Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), and (8) additional income from sources such as Veterans’ payments, unemployment compensation, child
support, and alimony. All values are in 2010 dollars.
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Table D.2: Sample size and mean of personal hourly wage by state (2000-2014)
abb. State
All (2000-2014) Before (2000-2006) After (2010-2014)
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
1 AL Alabama 225, 342 19.44 69, 855 20.01 94, 819 19.06
2 AK Alaska 49, 971 24.29 25, 087 25.12 15, 762 23.16
4 AZ Arizona 293, 395 22.18 86, 817 22.57 127, 966 21.67
5 AR Arkansas 134, 551 18.03 41, 727 18.07 56, 872 18.02
6 CA California 1, 716, 413 26.29 510, 381 26.95 752, 626 25.65
8 CO Colorado 266, 543 24.28 80, 142 24.50 116, 477 23.98
9 CT Connecticut 192, 799 29.83 59, 804 30.58 82, 965 29.34
10 DE Delaware 59, 495 24.32 28, 411 24.95 19, 395 23.11
11 DC DC 45, 797 32.60 20, 796 32.51 16, 342 32.89
12 FL Florida 862, 489 21.73 260, 455 22.03 369, 124 21.07
13 GA Georgia 460, 651 21.86 138, 886 22.78 195, 831 21.04
15 HI Hawaii 78, 565 22.46 32, 014 22.58 29, 250 22.28
16 ID Idaho 83, 398 18.44 31, 147 18.22 32, 048 18.11
17 IL Illinois 677, 672 23.84 212, 682 24.52 285, 946 23.31
18 IN Indiana 352, 962 19.58 111, 687 20.45 148, 067 18.71
19 IA Iowa 185, 643 18.80 68, 479 19.38 72, 608 18.39
20 KS Kansas 162, 706 19.48 58, 848 19.20 64, 020 19.29
21 KY Kentucky 229, 545 19.33 81, 327 19.18 91, 470 19.28
22 LA Louisiana 219, 790 20.03 74, 743 19.64 90, 220 19.86
23 ME Maine 73, 059 19.19 28, 269 19.71 28, 039 18.61
24 MD Maryland 323, 007 27.47 102, 818 27.06 137, 452 27.43
25 MA Massachusetts 371, 167 27.47 113, 500 27.88 162, 663 26.90
26 MI Michigan 513, 042 21.44 171, 893 22.72 207, 882 20.16
27 MN Minnesota 299, 692 22.30 95, 791 22.96 127, 103 21.88
28 MS Mississippi 150, 987 18.25 59, 986 18.37 55, 370 18.01
29 MO Missouri 312, 818 19.95 98, 103 20.31 132, 607 19.51
30 MT Montana 57, 305 18.08 25, 113 17.46 20, 561 18.54
31 NE Nebraska 111, 744 18.44 43, 357 18.63 43, 165 18.37
32 NV Nevada 135, 238 22.45 41, 980 23.03 56, 886 21.62
33 NH New Hampshire 86, 530 23.72 34, 563 24.06 32, 511 23.24
34 NJ New Jersey 464, 438 29.59 144, 556 29.98 198, 049 28.76
35 NM New Mexico 93, 423 20.03 31, 815 19.89 37, 862 19.88
36 NY New York 970, 506 25.97 291, 338 26.91 424, 849 25.25
37 NC North Carolina 462, 161 20.81 137, 592 21.17 200, 502 20.37
38 ND North Dakota 51, 541 19.57 25, 817 18.31 16, 267 20.69
39 OH Ohio 628, 056 20.72 202, 171 21.58 261, 467 19.98
40 OK Oklahoma 175, 282 18.51 53, 102 18.64 75, 667 18.46
41 OR Oregon 190, 639 21.85 58, 350 22.18 82, 144 21.67
42 PA Pennsylvania 675, 189 21.47 210, 847 22.09 288, 576 21.03
44 RI Rhode Island 71, 661 23.53 31, 673 24.09 25, 053 22.86
45 SC South Carolina 222, 100 19.90 66, 693 20.50 96, 226 19.19
46 SD South Dakota 65, 790 17.46 36, 198 17.69 18, 583 17.01
47 TN Tennessee 313, 457 19.97 96, 985 20.28 133, 179 19.55
48 TX Texas 1, 155, 863 21.78 321, 673 22.06 524, 667 21.38
49 UT Utah 143, 572 20.69 45, 877 20.13 61, 357 20.64
50 VT Vermont 48, 315 20.45 24, 512 20.27 15, 062 20.69
51 VA Virginia 429, 323 25.38 130, 131 25.24 186, 887 25.45
53 WA Washington 345, 602 24.34 104, 650 24.41 150, 275 24.21
54 WV West Virginia 101, 351 18.20 41, 949 18.02 36, 679 18.24
55 WI Wisconsin 327, 994 20.40 105, 116 21.00 136, 940 19.82
56 WY Wyoming 45, 628 21.13 24, 116 21.75 13, 537 20.46
Total 15, 714, 207 21.91 4, 993, 822 22.19 6, 649, 875 21.53
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Table D.3: Mean annual working hour by decile
Percentile All Male Female Before After
0-10 1,129.24 1,223.35 1,052.86 1,113.44 1,129.24
10-20 1,472.50 1,614.57 1,381.93 1,495.34 1,472.50
20-30 1,655.92 1,833.94 1,528.12 1,678.18 1,655.92
30-40 1,794.40 1,945.69 1,655.16 1,805.72 1,794.40
40-50 1,871.28 2,027.43 1,726.06 1,889.55 1,871.28
50-60 1,935.28 2,076.71 1,795.84 1,946.57 1,935.28
60-70 1,969.07 2,089.45 1,839.33 1,978.62 1,969.07
70-80 1,980.32 2,094.15 1,849.55 1,980.00 1,980.32
80-90 1,971.03 2,080.05 1,823.21 1,948.58 1,971.03
90-100 1,863.54 2,002.15 1,637.20 1,786.58 1,863.54
Table D.4: Occupation categories, codes, and titles in ACS (1990 basis)
1. Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupations
Executive, Administrative, and Managerial Occupations 003-022
Management Related Occupations 023-037
2. Professional Specialty Occupations
Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors 043-063
Mathematical, Natural and Computer Scientists 064-083
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations 084-106
Education, Training, and Library Occupations 113-165
Life, law, and Social Science Occupations 166-179
Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes: 183-199
3. Technical and Administrative Support Occupations
Healthcare Support Occupations 203-208
Technologists and Technicians, Except Health 213-235
Administrative Support Occupations, Including Clerical 303-391
4. Service Occupations
Private Household Occupations 403-408
Protective Service Occupations 413-427
Service Occupations, Except Protective and Household 433-469
5. Farming, Forestry, and Fishing Occupations
Farm Operators and Managers 473-476
Other Agricultural and Related Occupations 477-499
6. Precision Production, Craft, and Repair Occupations
Mechanics and Repairers 503-549
Construction Trades 553-599
Extractive Occupations 613-617
Precision Production Occupations 628, 634-699
7. Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers
Operators, Fabricators, Assemblers, and Inspectors, Except Precision 703-799
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations 803-890
8. Sales Occupations 243, 253-290
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Table D.5: Industrial classification and codes in ACS (1990 basis)





- Food and kindred products: 100-130
- Textile mill products: 132-150
- Apparel and other finished textile products: 151-152
- Paper and allied products: 160-162
- Printing, publishing, and allied industries: 171-172
- Chemicals and allied products: 180-192
- Petroleum and coal products: 200-201
- Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products: 210-212
- Leather and leather products: 220-222
Durable Goods
- Lumber and wood products, except furniture: 230-242
- Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products: 250-262
- Metal industries: 270-301
- Machinery and computing equipment: 310-332
- Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies: 340-350
- Transportation equipment: 351-370
- Professional and photographic equipment, and watches: 371-392
5. Transportation, Communication and Other Public Utilities
Transportation: 400-432
Communications: 440-442




7. Retail Trade 580-691
8. Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 700-712
9. Business and Repair Services 721-760
10. Personal Services 761-791
11. Entertainment and Recreation Services 800-810
12. Health Care Services 812-840
13. Educational Services 842-860
14. Other Professional and Related Services 841, 861-893
15. Public Administration 900-932
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2000 144, 527 16, 488 7, 269 6, 811 2, 832 177, 927
2001 456, 207 48, 727 21, 727 23, 079 9, 779 559, 519
2002 406, 417 43, 446 20, 478 23, 071 8, 510 501, 922
2003 446, 877 47, 762 22, 981 24, 866 7, 705 550, 191
2004 444, 293 46, 038 23, 363 24, 923 7, 698 546, 315
2005 1, 041, 211 118, 873 56, 414 73, 093 18, 419 1, 308, 010
2006 1, 061, 016 129, 118 59, 975 79, 387 20, 442 1, 349, 938
2007 1, 069, 151 129, 179 61, 877 77, 984 21, 740 1, 359, 931
2008 1, 082, 617 132, 377 63, 945 61, 900 24, 137 1, 364, 976
2009 1, 064, 454 129, 130 64, 584 62, 695 24, 740 1, 345, 603
2010 1, 042, 183 128, 871 66, 425 59, 554 26, 550 1, 323, 583
2011 1, 027, 478 134, 032 65, 916 59, 625 27, 464 1, 314, 515
2012 1, 031, 278 133, 520 68, 543 60, 391 28, 718 1, 322, 450
2013 1, 047, 405 134, 008 72, 513 62, 008 30, 330 1, 346, 264
2014 1, 039, 051 135, 622 74, 574 63, 261 30, 555 1, 343, 063
Total 12, 404, 165 1, 507, 191 750, 584 762, 648 289, 619 15, 714, 207
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Table D.7: Census Region and Division
REGION I: NORTHEAST
Division I: New England Division 2: Middle Atlantic
Connecticut (09) New Jersey (34)
Maine (23) New York (36)





Division 3: East North Central Division 4: West North Central
Illinois (17) Iowa (19)
Indiana (18) Kansas (20)
Michigan (26) Minnesota (27)
Ohio (39) Missouri (29)




Division 5: South Atlantic Division 6: East South Central Division 7: West South Central
Delaware (10) Alabama (01) Arkansas (05)
District of Columbia (11) Kentucky (21) Louisiana (22)
Florida (12) Mississippi (28) Oklahoma (40)







Division 8: Mountain Division 9: Pacific
Arizona (04) Alaska (02)
Colorado (08) California (06)
Idaho (16) Hawaii (15)
Montana (30) Oregon (41)





Table D.8: Mean hourly real wage by age group (2000-2014)
Year 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-65
2000 9.61 16.32 23.70 26.72 28.96 29.67
2001 9.73 16.73 23.62 26.59 27.94 27.64
2002 9.70 16.26 24.18 26.93 28.65 28.63
2003 9.56 16.12 24.18 26.66 28.27 28.00
2004 9.39 15.86 24.63 27.13 28.28 28.44
2005 9.14 15.54 24.29 26.62 27.93 27.77
2006 8.91 15.24 24.00 26.35 27.43 28.67
2007 9.32 15.53 24.39 27.13 28.21 30.51
2008 9.24 14.75 23.32 25.97 27.22 28.88
2009 9.69 15.02 23.75 26.75 28.12 29.58
2010 9.75 14.72 23.22 26.51 27.42 28.85
2011 9.58 14.21 22.18 25.49 26.33 28.64
2012 9.46 13.93 22.28 25.66 26.58 28.53
2013 9.26 14.04 22.46 26.16 26.94 28.39
2014 9.39 13.87 22.28 26.18 27.02 28.95
Total 9.45 15.21 23.50 26.46 27.69 28.74
Table D.9: Men’s mean hourly wage by age group (2000-2014)
Year 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-65
2000 9.84 17.37 26.29 31.33 34.76 36.66
2001 9.95 18.14 26.39 31.35 33.23 33.45
2002 9.91 17.04 27.01 30.96 34.31 34.68
2003 9.85 16.73 26.69 30.89 33.46 33.49
2004 9.71 16.47 27.16 31.33 33.16 33.73
2005 9.43 16.13 26.63 30.79 32.72 33.42
2006 9.24 15.70 26.17 30.49 32.04 34.27
2007 9.62 16.11 26.62 31.18 32.71 37.39
2008 9.59 15.31 25.29 30.05 31.83 34.01
2009 9.89 15.58 25.89 30.67 32.83 35.58
2010 9.94 15.12 24.90 30.48 31.90 34.26
2011 9.69 14.41 23.74 28.93 30.30 33.00
2012 9.48 14.32 23.86 29.17 30.89 33.65
2013 9.59 14.64 24.15 29.69 31.39 33.31
2014 9.75 14.38 23.86 29.68 31.12 33.69
Total 9.70 15.83 25.64 30.47 32.44 34.31
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Table D.10: Women’s mean hourly wage by age group (2000-2014)
Year 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-65
2000 9.36 15.30 20.98 22.19 23.19 22.50
2001 9.49 15.32 20.74 21.97 22.70 21.63
2002 9.47 15.50 21.20 23.01 23.13 22.43
2003 9.24 15.50 21.55 22.52 23.31 22.39
2004 9.05 15.26 21.96 23.06 23.60 23.18
2005 8.83 14.94 21.80 22.52 23.36 22.17
2006 8.58 14.76 21.65 22.23 23.00 23.07
2007 9.00 14.95 21.99 23.09 23.88 23.73
2008 8.88 14.17 21.23 21.90 22.83 23.91
2009 9.50 14.46 21.49 22.84 23.64 23.73
2010 9.57 14.32 21.45 22.52 23.17 23.69
2011 9.47 14.02 20.51 22.01 22.56 24.51
2012 9.44 13.52 20.59 22.08 22.47 23.64
2013 8.93 13.42 20.64 22.52 22.65 23.66
2014 9.03 13.34 20.56 22.59 23.06 24.38
Total 9.19 14.58 21.22 22.47 23.10 23.24
Table D.11: Mean Hourly Wage by Census Region (2000-2014)
Year Northeast Midwest South West
2000 26.27 21.70 21.75 24.21
2001 26.18 21.84 21.37 24.46
2002 26.60 21.90 22.12 24.70
2003 26.07 21.78 22.30 24.37
2004 26.74 21.93 22.27 24.65
2005 26.12 21.54 21.86 24.74
2006 25.43 21.09 21.59 24.40
2007 26.06 21.63 22.32 25.15
2008 25.32 20.76 21.37 24.25
2009 26.25 21.37 22.21 24.65
2010 25.81 21.17 21.74 24.37
2011 24.73 20.14 20.87 23.68
2012 24.55 20.02 21.13 23.91
2013 25.06 20.52 21.29 23.67
2014 24.94 20.30 21.26 23.93
Total 25.74 21.18 21.70 24.34
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Table D.12: Mean Hourly Wage by Census Division (2000-2014)
Year

















2000 25.68 26.57 22.79 19.84 22.83 19.95 20.91 21.41 25.67
2001 25.28 26.68 22.62 20.68 22.65 19.08 20.49 22.10 25.78
2002 26.35 26.75 23.28 19.78 23.47 19.39 21.41 21.70 26.40
2003 25.58 26.34 22.92 20.03 23.83 19.48 21.26 21.29 26.12
2004 26.12 27.09 22.97 20.32 23.57 19.67 21.55 21.13 26.63
2005 26.96 25.81 22.13 20.16 22.99 19.56 21.11 21.86 26.05
2006 26.11 25.17 21.67 19.77 22.67 19.78 20.63 22.00 25.50
2007 26.64 25.85 22.24 20.22 23.53 19.99 21.43 22.68 26.28
2008 26.09 25.04 21.09 20.04 22.48 19.28 20.54 22.08 25.25
2009 27.25 25.88 21.79 20.45 23.20 19.57 21.89 22.30 25.72
2010 26.44 25.57 21.47 20.51 22.68 19.48 21.29 21.98 25.46
2011 25.56 24.41 20.38 19.60 21.95 19.03 19.97 21.07 24.86
2012 25.34 24.24 20.31 19.40 22.22 19.00 20.37 21.69 24.92
2013 26.30 24.59 20.85 19.79 22.25 19.39 20.62 21.52 24.64
2014 25.90 24.57 20.61 19.62 22.17 18.76 20.96 21.44 25.05
Total 26.11 25.64 21.81 20.01 22.83 19.43 20.96 21.75 25.62
Table D.13: The wage shares and mean hourly wage of quintile groups (in %)
by gender
Quintile All Male Female
0-20 5.14∗∗ 4.96∗∗ 5.49∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
20-40 9.88∗∗ 9.76∗∗ 10.30∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
40-60 14.58∗ 14.49∗ 14.97∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
60-80 21.32∗ 21.19∗ 21.64∗
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014)
80-100 49.08∗ 49.59∗ 47.60∗
(0.034) (0.047) (0.034)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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Male Female Difference Male Female Difference
0-10 0.17∗∗ 0.20∗∗ −0.02∗∗ 4.48∗∗ 3.95∗∗ 0.53∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
10-20 0.32∗∗ 0.35∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 8.24∗∗ 7.04∗∗ 1.20∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
20-30 0.43∗∗ 0.46∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 11.11∗∗ 9.25∗∗ 1.87∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
30-40 0.54∗∗ 0.57∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 13.95∗∗ 11.39∗∗ 2.56∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
40-50 0.66∗∗ 0.68∗∗ −0.02∗∗ 16.93∗∗ 13.69∗∗ 3.24∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
50-60 0.79∗∗ 0.81∗∗ −0.02∗∗ 20.28∗∗ 16.29∗∗ 3.99∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
60-70 0.95∗∗ 0.97∗∗ −0.02∗∗ 24.39∗∗ 19.50∗∗ 4.89∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
70-80 1.17∗∗ 1.19∗∗ −0.02∗∗ 30.03∗ 23.85∗∗ 6.17∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
80-90 1.53∗∗ 1.54∗∗ −0.01∗∗ 39.29∗ 30.82∗ 8.47∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019)
90-100 3.43∗∗ 3.22∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 88.04 64.55 23.49
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.236) (0.184) (0.299)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: the difference in wages between male and female when the reference group is female.
Table D.15: Decile wage shares (in %) and the Gini coefficient by race during
2000-2014
Percentile White Black Asian Other Two or more Total
0-50 21.84∗ 22.31∗ 20.22 23.55 21.06 21.64∗
(0.016) (0.037) (0.070) (0.129) (0.109) (0.015)
50-90 44.54∗ 45.09 46.45 44.11 44.93 44.63∗
(0.031) (0.071) (0.157) (0.239) (0.225) (0.029)
90-100 33.63∗ 32.61 33.33 32.35 34.01 33.73∗
(0.047) (0.106) (0.225) (0.367) (0.330) (0.043)
Gini 0.433 0.424 0.448 0.408 0.443 0.435
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table D.16: Mean hourly wage of White and non-White and the difference
by quintile
Quintile












0-20 6.09∗∗ 5.23∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 6.69∗∗ 5.44∗∗ 1.24∗∗ 5.64∗∗ 5.05∗∗ 0.59∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
20-40 11.73∗∗ 9.89∗∗ 1.85∗∗ 13.21∗∗ 10.42∗∗ 2.79∗∗ 10.59∗∗ 9.44∗∗ 1.15∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
40-60 17.25∗∗ 14.56∗∗ 2.69∗∗ 19.45∗∗ 15.44∗ 4.02∗ 15.32∗∗ 13.81∗∗ 1.51∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
60-80 25.06∗∗ 21.64∗ 3.42∗ 28.18∗ 23.07∗ 5.10∗ 22.02∗∗ 20.35∗ 1.67∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.020) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016)
80-100 57.46 50.69 6.77 65.79 54.58 11.21 47.9 46.83 1.07
(0.085) (0.171) (0.191) (0.135) (0.254) (0.288) (0.100) (0.231) (0.252)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: the difference in wages between White and Non-White worker when the reference group is White worker.
















0-50 23.09∗ 21.96∗ 22.32∗ 20.22∗ 21.08 21.64∗
(0.038) (0.017) (0.038) (0.026) (0.207) (0.015)
50-90 44.19 44.50∗ 45.09 46.47 44.30 44.63∗
(0.069) (0.033) (0.072) (0.050) (0.432) (0.029)
90-100 32.72 33.54∗ 32.58 33.31 34.63 33.73∗
(0.105) (0.049) (0.108) (0.075) (0.638) (0.043)
Gini 0.414 0.433 0.424 0.448 0.408 0.435
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table D.18: Hispanic and non-Hispanic difference in percentile wage shares
and in average wages, by decile
Decile Difference in percentilewage shares by decile
Difference in average
wages by decile
0-10 −0.04∗∗ (0.000) 0.43∗∗ (0.005)
10-20 −0.05∗∗ (0.001) 1.30∗∗ (0.005)
20-30 −0.03∗∗ (0.001) 2.31∗∗ (0.006)
30-40 −0.01∗∗ (0.001) 3.28∗∗ (0.006)
40-50 0.00∗∗ (0.001) 4.21∗∗ (0.008)
50-60 0.00∗∗ (0.001) 5.19∗∗ (0.009)
60-70 0.01∗∗ (0.002) 6.31∗ (0.012)
70-80 0.01∗∗ (0.002) 7.75∗ (0.015)
80-90 0.02∗∗ (0.003) 10.04∗ (0.023)
90-100 0.09∗ (0.011) 23.08 (0.317)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: decile difference between Hispanic and non-Hispanic when the reference group is Hispanic.
Table D.19: Non-Hispanic white and others difference in percentile wage
shares and average wages, by decile
Decile Difference in percentilewage shares by decile
Difference in average
wages by decile
0-10 0.01∗∗ (0.000) −0.64∗∗ (0.004)
10-20 0.00∗∗ (0.001) −1.38∗∗ (0.004)
20-30 −0.01∗∗ (0.001) −2.14∗∗ (0.005)
30-40 −0.02∗∗ (0.001) −2.82∗∗ (0.006)
40-50 −0.02∗∗ (0.001) −3.40∗∗ (0.007)
50-60 −0.02∗∗ (0.001) −3.98∗∗ (0.008)
60-70 −0.02∗∗ (0.001) −4.53∗ (0.010)
70-80 0.00∗∗ (0.002) −5.14∗ (0.013)
80-90 0.04∗∗ (0.002) −5.82∗ (0.020)
90-100 0.04∗ (0.010) −13.96 (0.324)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: decile difference between non-Hispanic White and others when the reference group is non-
Hispanic White.
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Table D.20: Mean hourly wage difference among workers with different
level of education by decile
Percentile
(1)Post-College (2)College (3)High School
Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference
0-10 9.08∗ 2.50∗ 6.58∗∗ 2.71∗∗ 3.87∗∗ 1.28∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
10-20 16.31∗ 4.61∗ 11.70∗∗ 4.85∗∗ 6.85∗∗ 2.20∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006)
20-30 20.85∗ 5.64∗ 15.21∗∗ 6.34∗∗ 8.87∗∗ 2.69∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006)
30-40 24.90∗ 6.52∗ 18.38∗∗ 7.63∗∗ 10.75∗∗ 3.27∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006)
40-50 29.15∗ 7.50∗ 21.65∗ 8.96∗ 12.68∗∗ 3.87∗∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007)
50-60 33.92∗ 8.56∗ 25.36∗ 10.56∗ 14.80∗∗ 4.48∗∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007)
60-70 39.59∗ 9.70∗ 29.88∗ 12.57∗ 17.31∗∗ 5.13∗
(0.022) (0.026) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.010)
70-80 47.07∗ 11.26∗ 35.81∗ 15.24∗ 20.57∗∗ 5.84∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.017) (0.018) (0.007) (0.013)
80-90 59.58∗ 14.74 44.84∗ 19.20∗ 25.64∗ 6.68∗
(0.046) (0.052) (0.023) (0.025) (0.010) (0.019)
90-100 135.71 38.55 97.17 45.54 51.63 8.50
(0.615) (0.772) (0.466) (0.499) (0.177) (0.532)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: mean hourly wage gap between workers with (1) post-college degree and 4-year college degree, (2) 4-year
college degree and high school diploma (completed the 12th grade), and (3) high school diploma and high school
dropouts
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Table D.21: The difference in percentile wage shares and average wages be-
tween workers with at least some college education and those without,
by decile
Decile Difference in percentilewage shares by decile
Difference in average
wages by decile
0-10 −0.02∗∗ (0.000) 1.84∗∗ (0.004)
10-20 −0.04∗∗ (0.001) 3.38∗∗ (0.005)
20-30 −0.04∗∗ (0.001) 4.75∗∗ (0.005)
30-40 −0.04∗∗ (0.001) 6.06∗∗ (0.006)
40-50 −0.03∗∗ (0.001) 7.42∗∗ (0.006)
50-60 −0.03∗∗ (0.001) 8.95∗∗ (0.008)
60-70 −0.03∗∗ (0.001) 10.86∗∗ (0.009)
70-80 −0.01∗∗ (0.002) 13.48∗ (0.011)
80-90 0.01∗∗ (0.002) 17.65∗ (0.016)
90-100 0.23∗∗ (0.009) 42.33∗ (0.289)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: decile difference between workers with at least some college education and those without when
the reference group is the worker who does not have at least one year of college education.
Table D.22: The difference in percentile wage shares and in average wages
between worker who is in the school and who is not
Decile Difference in percentilewage shares by decile
Difference in average
wages by decile
0-10 0.03∗∗ (0.000) 2.47∗∗ (0.003)
10-20 0.05∗∗ (0.001) 4.19∗∗ (0.004)
20-30 0.05∗∗ (0.001) 5.21∗∗ (0.005)
30-40 0.06∗∗ (0.001) 6.26∗∗ (0.006)
40-50 0.06∗∗ (0.002) 7.29∗∗ (0.007)
50-60 0.05∗∗ (0.002) 8.35∗∗ (0.008)
60-70 0.02∗∗ (0.002) 9.51∗ (0.011)
70-80 −0.01∗∗ (0.003) 11.00∗ (0.014)
80-90 −0.08∗∗ (0.004) 13.37∗ (0.021)
90-100 −0.23∗ (0.016) 28.51 (0.389)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: decile difference between workers with a full-time and a part-time working status when the
reference group is the worker with a part-time status.
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0-10 −0.35∗∗ (0.008) −0.15∗∗ (0.005)
10-20 −1.59∗∗ (0.007) −0.81∗∗ (0.005)
20-30 −2.94∗∗ (0.007) −1.54∗∗ (0.006)
30-40 −4.38∗∗ (0.008) −2.18∗∗ (0.007)
40-50 −5.90∗∗ (0.009) −2.65∗∗ (0.008)
50-60 −7.61∗ (0.010) −3.02∗ (0.010)
60-70 −9.64∗ (0.014) −3.22∗ (0.012)
70-80 −12.24∗ (0.018) −3.15∗ (0.017)
80-90 −16.13∗ (0.029) −2.46∗ (0.026)
90-100 −33.59 (0.344) −4.50 (0.395)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: the mean hourly wage difference between the group of workers who fluently speak
English (only) and who do not when the reference group is workers who speak English well
(only).
Table D.24: Wage inequality within and between state (2004-2014)
(1)Gini (2)Between Gini (3)Within Gini (2)/(1)(in%)
2004 0.4306 0.07634 0.4248 17.728
2005 0.4325 0.07284 0.4268 16.841
2006 0.4335 0.07279 0.4284 16.790
2007 0.4387 0.07263 0.4337 16.555
2008 0.4313 0.07271 0.4258 16.860
2009 0.4307 0.07268 0.4253 16.874
2010 0.4314 0.07281 0.4263 16.876
2011 0.4369 0.07275 0.4313 16.651
2012 0.4393 0.07268 0.4339 16.545
2013 0.4399 0.07257 0.4345 16.497
2014 0.4401 0.07254 0.4348 16.481
all years 0.4331 0.07284 0.4277 16.820
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Table D.25: Decile and top 1 percent wage shares and mean wages
Percentile
A. Wage shares B. Mean wage
All Before After All Before After
0-10 0.183∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 4.19∗∗ 4.42∗∗ 4.00∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
10-20 0.331∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.324∗∗ 7.56∗∗ 7.89∗∗ 7.27∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
20-30 0.440∗∗ 0.451∗∗ 0.432∗∗ 10.06∗∗ 10.47∗∗ 9.68∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
30-40 0.548∗∗ 0.558∗∗ 0.540∗∗ 12.52∗∗ 12.95∗∗ 12.09∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
40-50 0.663∗∗ 0.672∗∗ 0.656∗∗ 15.16∗∗ 15.60∗∗ 14.69∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
50-60 0.795∗∗ 0.800∗∗ 0.790∗∗ 18.18∗∗ 18.58∗∗ 17.71∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
60-70 0.956∗∗ 0.959∗∗ 0.955∗∗ 21.87∗∗ 22.26∗∗ 21.40∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
70-80 1.176∗∗ 1.170∗∗ 1.181∗∗ 26.89∗∗ 27.16∗ 26.46∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
80-90 1.535∗∗ 1.517∗∗ 1.551∗∗ 35.09∗∗ 35.23∗ 34.76∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015)
90-99 2.593∗∗ 2.577∗∗ 2.621∗∗ 59.29∗ 59.84 58.73∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.057) (0.048)
99-100 10.392 10.237 10.345 237.58 237.71 231.83
(0.056) (0.095) (0.093) (1.433) (2.456) (2.332)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table D.26: Mean hourly wages of age groups by quintile
Percentile 10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s
0-20 2.62∗∗ 4.63∗∗ 7.16∗∗ 7.69∗∗ 7.93∗∗ 7.29∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
20-40 4.78∗∗ 8.38∗∗ 12.96∗∗ 13.90∗∗ 14.17∗∗ 13.08∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
40-60 6.78∗∗ 11.76∗∗ 18.22∗∗ 19.84∗∗ 20.30∗∗ 19.07∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
60-80 9.50∗∗ 16.36∗∗ 25.46∗ 28.22∗ 28.95∗ 28.24∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.024)
80-100 23.57 33.53 53.23 62.37 65.95 76.50
(0.128) (0.122) (0.112) (0.153) (0.199) (0.487)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01


















0-20 11.33∗∗ 8.49∗∗ 4.70∗∗ 6.63∗∗ 6.27∗∗ 5.49∗∗ 4.10∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
20-40 19.86∗ 16.95∗∗ 8.87∗∗ 11.78∗∗ 11.73∗∗ 9.94∗∗ 7.48∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
40-60 27.51∗ 24.09∗ 13.54∗ 15.89∗∗ 16.67∗∗ 13.65∗∗ 10.48∗∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
60-80 38.41∗ 33.10∗ 20.96∗ 21.53∗∗ 22.85∗ 18.41∗∗ 14.89∗∗
(0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
80-100 88.58 69.73 56.45 44.98 43.01 36.08 34.22
(0.339) (0.197) (0.175) (0.154) (0.137) (0.094) (0.198)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: Seven occupations are ordered from the highest to lowest mean hourly wages across all sample years.
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Table D.28: Mean hourly wages by decile and wage differences between man-
agerial and other occupations
Percentile Mean wage Differences Std.Err.
0-10 8.32 4.34∗ (0.010)
10-20 14.33 7.17∗ (0.010)
20-30 18.12 8.65∗ (0.011)
30-40 21.61 9.90∗ (0.012)
40-50 25.34 11.23∗ (0.014)
50-60 29.67 12.83∗ (0.017)
60-70 34.94 14.78∗ (0.020)
70-80 41.89 17.23∗ (0.025)
80-90 53.26 21.35∗ (0.039)
90-99 97.73 45.46 (0.148)
99-100 359.49 149.37 (6.560)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Table D.29: The Gini coefficient of economic sectors
Sector All Before After
Primary 0.402 0.397 0.407
Manufacturing 0.403 0.394 0.411
Education & Health 0.400 0.395 0.404
Other Services 0.463 0.455 0.468
Finance 0.460 0.460 0.457
Trade 0.445 0.443 0.445
Total 0.435 0.429 0.440
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0-20 6.66∗∗ 7.72∗∗ 7.35∗∗ 5.16∗∗ 8.68∗ 4.29∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003)
20-40 12.57∗∗ 13.64∗∗ 13.70∗∗ 9.95∗∗ 14.95∗ 7.88∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
40-60 18.13∗∗ 19.00∗ 19.52∗∗ 14.97∗∗ 20.84∗ 11.33∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.005)
60-80 25.36∗ 26.90∗ 27.40∗ 22.90∗ 30.70∗ 16.55∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014) (0.030) (0.008)
80-100 53.65 59.34 57.97 56.63 82.84 40.92
(0.151) (0.251) (0.133) (0.199) (0.450) (0.141)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Table D.31: Mean hourly wages by decile and wage differences between fi-
nancial and other sectors
Percentile Mean wage Differences Std.Err.
0-10 6.48 2.38∗ (0.011)
10-20 10.88 3.47∗ (0.010)
20-30 13.64 3.79∗ (0.011)
30-40 16.25 3.96∗ (0.013)
40-50 19.11 4.21∗ (0.015)
50-60 22.57 4.67∗ (0.020)
60-70 27.24 5.70∗ (0.026)
70-80 34.16 7.70∗ (0.037)
80-90 46.02 11.59 (0.057)
90-99 94.80 37.76 (0.234)
99-100 343.30 116.97 (8.513)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
APPENDIX D. 190
Table D.32: Percentile ratios for distribution of total personal wage and
the Gini
p90/p10 p90/p50 p10/p50 Gini
2000-2014 6.51 2.50 0.38 0.435
2000-2006 6.31 2.45 0.39 0.429
2010-2014 6.79 2.55 0.38 0.440
Table D.33: Decile wage shares before and after the financial crisis (in %)
Percentile A. Before (2000-2006) B. After (2010-2014)
0-10 1.91∗∗ (0.003) 1.78∗∗ (0.002)
10-20 3.40∗∗ (0.004) 3.24∗∗ (0.004)
20-30 4.51∗∗ (0.005) 4.32∗∗ (0.005)
30-40 5.58∗∗ (0.006) 5.40∗∗ (0.006)
40-50 6.72∗∗ (0.008) 6.56∗∗ (0.007)
50-60 8.00∗∗ (0.009) 7.90∗∗ (0.009)
60-70 9.59∗ (0.011) 9.55∗ (0.010)
70-80 11.70∗ (0.013) 11.81∗ (0.013)
80-90 15.17∗ (0.017) 15.51∗ (0.017)
90-100 33.43 (0.074) 33.93 (0.071)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: the wage shares as percentage
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Table D.34: Decile wage shares (in %) and the Gini coefficient by race
A. White Before (2000-2006) After (2010-2014)
0-50 22.29∗ (0.026) 21.54∗ (0.026)
50-90 44.43 (0.050) 44.68 (0.052)
90-100 33.28 (0.075) 33.78 (0.077)
Gini 0.426 0.437
B. Black Before (2000-2006) After (2010-2014)
0-50 22.53 (0.072) 22.14 (0.050)
50-90 44.58 (0.135) 45.41 (0.094)
90-100 32.89 (0.203) 32.45 (0.141)
Gini 0.422 0.425
C. Asian Before (2000-2006) After (2010-2014)
0-50 20.90 (0.071) 19.58 (0.136)
50-90 45.82 (0.138) 46.61 (0.318)
90-100 33.28 (0.202) 33.81 (0.451)
Gini 0.448 0.457
D. Other Before (2000-2006) After (2010-2014)
0-50 23.46 (0.323) 23.52 (0.123)
50-90 43.60 (0.598) 44.21 (0.226)
90-100 32.94 (0.910) 32.27 (0.346)
Gini 0.412 0.408
E. Two or more Before (2000-2006) After (2010-2014)
0-50 21.89 (0.139) 20.40 (0.193)
50-90 44.72 (0.257) 44.76 (0.412)
90-100 33.39 (0.385) 34.85 (0.601)
Gini 0.431 0.455
F. Total Before (2000-2006) After (2010-2014)
0-50 22.11∗ (0.025) 21.30∗ (0.024)
50-90 44.46∗ (0.049) 44.77∗ (0.048)
90-100 33.43 (0.074) 33.93 (0.071)
Gini 0.429 0.440
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table D.35: Decile wage shares (in %) and the Gini coefficient by ethnicity
A. Hispanic Before (2000-06) After (2010-14)
0-50 23.16 (0.059) 22.94 (0.060)
50-90 43.86 (0.105) 44.22 (0.111)
90-100 32.97 (0.160) 32.84 (0.169)
Gini 0.414 0.417
B. Non-Hispanic White Before (2000-06) After (2010-14)
0-50 22.40∗ (0.028) 21.65∗ (0.028)
50-90 44.41 (0.052) 44.67 (0.055)
90-100 33.19 (0.079) 33.68 (0.082)
Gini 0.425 0.435
C. Non-Hispanic Black Before (2000-06) After (2010-14)
0-50 22.54 (0.073) 22.17 (0.051)
50-90 44.60 (0.137) 45.44 (0.096)
90-100 32.86 (0.206) 32.40 (0.143)
Gini 0.422 0.424
D. Non-Hispanic Asian Before (2000-06) After (2010-14)
0-50 20.92 (0.072) 19.57 (0.137)
50-90 45.85 (0.139) 46.62 (0.321)
90-100 33.24 (0.203) 33.80 (0.456)
Gini 0.440 0.457
E. Non-Hispanic Others Before (2000-06) After (2010-14)
0-50 21.49 (0.643) 20.60 (0.206)
50-90 43.47 (1.297) 44.36 (0.435)
90-100 35.04 (1.939) 35.05 (0.637)
Gini 0.444 0.454
F. Total Before (2000-06) After (2010-14)
0-50 22.11∗ (0.025) 21.30∗ (0.024)
50-90 44.46∗ (0.049) 44.77∗ (0.048)
90-100 33.43 (0.074) 33.93 (0.071)
Gini 0.429 0.440
Standard errors in parentheses.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table D.38: The Gini coefficient of occupations
Occupation All Before After
Managerial 0.4107 0.4099 0.4097
Professional Specialty 0.3988 0.3899 0.4049
Technical and Administrative 0.3759 0.3726 0.3807
Service 0.4170 0.4175 0.4190
Farming, Production and Repair 0.3659 0.3598 0.3708
Operators and Laborers 0.3640 0.3610 0.3669
Sales 0.4866 0.4832 0.4861
Total 0.4354 0.4288 0.4400
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Table D.39: Mean hourly wages and quintile wage shares by occupations be-
fore and after the financial crisis
Quintiles
Occupation Mean 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Managerial
Before 37.32 6.25∗ 10.74∗ 14.72∗ 20.47 47.83
(0.019) (0.031) (0.042) (0.057) (0.145)
After 36.53 5.98∗ 10.69∗ 14.93∗ 20.95 47.45
(0.019) (0.033) (0.046) (0.063) (0.159)
Level −0.79 −0.27 −0.05 0.21 0.48 −0.38
%change −2.12 −4.26 −0.44 1.43 2.34 −0.79
Professional Specialty
Before 30.84 5.78∗ 11.39∗ 16.00∗ 21.73∗ 45.10
(0.012) (0.021) (0.028) (0.037) (0.094)
After 29.99 5.43∗ 10.94∗ 15.67∗ 21.74∗ 46.23
(0.013) (0.024) (0.034) (0.047) (0.115)
Level −0.86 −0.36 −0.45 −0.33 0.00 1.14
%change −2.78 −6.15 −3.96 −2.08 0.01 2.52
Sales
Before 21.68 4.55∗ 8.56∗ 13.09∗ 20.11∗ 53.69
(0.013) (0.022) (0.032) (0.046) (0.107)
After 19.95 4.52∗ 8.53∗ 12.90∗ 20.01∗ 54.03
(0.013) (0.022) (0.033) (0.049) (0.113)
Level −1.73 −0.02 −0.03 −0.18 −0.10 0.34
%change −7.99 −0.47 −0.39 −1.39 −0.50 0.63
Technical and Administrative
Before 20.49 6.78∗ 11.79∗ 15.76 21.17 44.50
(0.024) (0.040) (0.053) (0.070) (0.185)
After 19.87 6.39∗ 11.53∗ 15.70∗ 21.45∗ 44.92
(0.015) (0.025) (0.034) (0.046) (0.118)
Level −0.62 −0.39 −0.26 −0.06 0.28 0.42
%change −3.02 −5.72 −2.21 −0.36 1.34 0.94
Farming, Production and Repair
Before 20.75 6.42∗ 11.88∗ 16.68∗ 22.65∗ 42.37
(0.015) (0.024) (0.033) (0.044) (0.111)
After 19.46 6.10∗ 11.49∗ 16.48∗ 22.78∗ 43.16
(0.015) (0.024) (0.034) (0.046) (0.114)
Level −1.29 −0.32 −0.39 −0.20 0.12 0.79
%change −6.23 −4.96 −3.28 −1.19 0.54 1.85
Operators and Laborers
Before 17.29 6.72∗ 11.98∗ 16.33∗ 21.93∗ 43.04
(0.014) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034) (0.089)
After 16.15 6.44∗ 11.81∗ 16.31∗ 22.14∗ 43.31
(0.016) (0.026) (0.035) (0.047) (0.120)
Level −1.14 −0.28 −0.17 −0.02 0.21 0.27
%change −6.59 −4.22 −1.41 −0.15 0.94 0.63
Service
Before 14.66 5.77∗ 10.47 14.72 20.94 48.11
(0.034) (0.061) (0.086) (0.122) (0.303)
After 13.97 5.75∗ 10.52 14.66 20.77 48.30
(0.028) (0.050) (0.069) (0.097) (0.242)
Level −0.69 −0.02 0.05 −0.06 −0.16 0.19
%change −4.68 −0.34 0.45 −0.39 −0.78 0.40
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: Seven occupations are ordered from the highest to lowest mean hourly wages across all sample years.
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Table D.40: Decile wage differences between managerial and other occupa-
tions before and after the financial crisis
Percentile Mean wage Before After Level %change
0-10 8.32 4.47 4.13 −0.35 −7.71
10-20 14.33 7.13 7.04 −0.08 −1.18
20-30 18.12 8.42 8.65 0.23 2.73
30-40 21.61 9.59 10.01 0.42 4.42
40-50 25.34 10.77 11.42 0.64 5.96
50-60 29.67 12.24 13.12 0.88 7.19
60-70 34.94 14.08 15.16 1.08 7.68
70-80 41.89 16.56 17.61 1.05 6.37
80-90 53.26 20.86 21.58 0.72 3.47
90-99 97.73 45.57 44.80 −0.77 −1.69
99-100 359.49 155.25 128.51 −26.74 −17.22
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Table D.41: Mean hourly wages and quintile wage shares by economic sectors
before and after the financial crisis
Quintiles
Economic Sector Mean 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Primary
Before 23.71 5.90∗ 10.99∗ 15.70∗ 21.64∗ 45.78
(0.013) (0.021) (0.029) (0.039) (0.097)
After 22.81 5.56∗ 10.62∗ 15.45∗ 21.92∗ 46.45
(0.013) (0.024) (0.034) (0.047) (0.114)
Level −0.90 −0.33 −0.38 −0.25 0.28 0.67
%change −3.78 −5.65 −3.42 −1.57 1.32 1.47
Manufacturing
Before 25.39 6.34∗ 11.01∗ 15.20∗ 21.33∗ 46.12
(0.016) (0.025) (0.034) (0.047) (0.119)
After 25.01 5.89∗ 10.58∗ 14.86 21.22 47.45
(0.024) (0.042) (0.059) (0.083) (0.206)
Level −0.38 −0.45 −0.43 −0.34 −0.11 1.33
%change −1.51 −7.14 −3.89 −2.24 −0.52 2.89
Education & Health
Before 25.54 6.02∗ 11.01∗ 15.55∗ 21.68 45.74
(0.015) (0.026) (0.036) (0.050) (0.125)
After 24.79 5.71∗ 10.76∗ 15.43∗ 21.79∗ 46.32
(0.010) (0.016) (0.023) (0.032) (0.078)
Level −0.74 −0.31 −0.25 −0.12 0.11 0.57
%change −2.92 −5.21 −2.23 −0.78 0.50 1.25
Other Services
Before 22.09 4.61∗ 8.93∗ 13.50∗ 20.89 52.06
(0.015) (0.028) (0.042) (0.065) (0.148)
After 21.59 4.88∗ 9.31∗ 13.88∗ 20.90∗ 51.03
(0.013) (0.022) (0.033) (0.048) (0.112)
Level −0.50 0.27 0.38 0.37 0.01 −1.03
%change −2.27 5.84 4.25 2.76 0.04 −1.98
Finance
Before 31.39 5.45∗ 9.50 13.32 19.74 52.01
(0.031) (0.052) (0.073) (0.107) (0.259)
After 31.38 5.59∗ 9.48∗ 13.10 19.16 52.68
(0.025) (0.041) (0.056) (0.080) (0.198)
Level −0.02 0.14 −0.02 −0.22 −0.58 0.67
%change −0.06 2.64 −0.22 −1.64 −2.93 1.30
Trade
Before 16.91 5.31∗ 9.74∗ 14.10 20.54 50.30
(0.021) (0.037) (0.053) (0.077) (0.187)
After 15.57 5.33∗ 9.80∗ 13.93∗ 20.35∗ 50.59
(0.013) (0.023) (0.032) (0.046) (0.111)
Level −1.34 0.01 0.06 −0.17 −0.19 0.29
%change −7.93 0.22 0.59 −1.21 −0.92 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Note: Six economic sectors are ordered from the highest to lowest mean hourly wages across all sample
years.
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Table D.42: Decile and wage differences between financial and other eco-
nomic sectors before and after the financial crisis
Percentile Mean Before After level %change
0-10 6.48 2.28 2.40 0.12 5.46
10-20 10.88 3.19 3.63 0.44 13.96
20-30 13.64 3.32 4.09 0.77 23.14
30-40 16.25 3.42 4.37 0.95 27.89
40-50 19.11 3.52 4.68 1.16 33.03
50-60 22.57 3.91 5.25 1.35 34.50
60-70 27.24 4.71 6.43 1.73 36.69
70-80 34.16 6.66 8.44 1.77 26.63
80-90 46.02 10.79 12.07 1.27 11.79
90-99 94.80 37.00 37.06 0.06 0.17
99-100 343.30 122.90 105.48 -17.42 -14.18
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Table D.43: Aggregate decomposition results using the reweighting method
and RIF regression
A. Decomposition used the reweighting method
Model 1 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0718 0.0594 0.0123 0.0379 0.0089
Composition effect -0.0209 -0.0046 -0.0163 -0.0059 -0.0024
Wage structure effect 0.0927 0.0641 0.0286 0.0438 0.0113
Model 2 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0718 0.0594 0.0123 0.0379 0.0089
Composition effect -0.0218 -0.0085 -0.0133 -0.0065 -0.0022
Wage structure effect 0.0936 0.0679 0.0257 0.0444 0.0111
Model 3 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0718 0.0594 0.0123 0.0379 0.0089
Composition effect -0.0222 -0.0080 -0.0141 -0.0069 -0.0023
Wage structure effect 0.0939 0.0674 0.0265 0.0448 0.0112
Model 4 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0718 0.0594 0.0123 0.0379 0.0089
Composition effect -0.0238 -0.0042 -0.0196 -0.0057 -0.0019
Wage structure effect 0.0955 0.0636 0.0319 0.0436 0.0108
Model 5 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0718 0.0594 0.0123 0.0379 0.0888
Composition effect -0.0196 -0.0065 -0.0131 -0.004 -0.0019
Wage structure effect 0.0913 0.0659 0.0254 0.0419 0.0907
B. Decomposition used RIF without reweighting
Model 1 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0741 0.0624 0.0117 0.0379 0.0089
Composition effect 0.0004 -0.0018 0.0022 0.0012 -0.0016
Wage structure effect 0.0737 0.0642 0.0094 0.0367 0.0105
Model 2 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0741 0.0624 0.0117 0.0379 0.0089
Composition effect -0.0025 0.0017 -0.0042 -0.0007 -0.0016
Wage structure effect 0.0766 0.0607 0.0159 0.0387 0.0104
Model 3 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0741 0.0624 0.0117 0.0379 0.0089
Composition effect -0.0034 0.0017 -0.0051 -0.0012 -0.0016
Wage structure effect 0.0775 0.0607 0.0167 0.0391 0.0105
Model 4 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0741 0.0624 0.0117 0.0379 0.0089
Composition effect 0.0004 0.0041 -0.0037 0.0003 -0.0012
Wage structure effect 0.0737 0.0583 0.0154 0.0376 0.0101
Model 5 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
Total change 0.0741 0.0624 0.0117 0.0379 0.0089
Composition effect 0.0051 0.0019 0.0032 0.0032 -0.0011
Wage structure effect 0.0690 0.0605 0.0085 0.0348 0.0100
Note: Model 1 includes location (state level), 6 education classes (Associate’s degree of college omitted), 9
potential experience classes (21-25 years omitted) and its interaction terms; Model 2 adds race and ethnicity;
Model 3 adds ability to speak English, and full- or part-time working status; Model 4 adds 6 industry classes
(primary, manufacturing, education and health, other services, finance and Insurance, trade; primary omitted);
Model 5 uses the 4 Census Regions (South omitted) as for the location instead of the U.S. state.
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Inequality measure 90-10 90-50 50-10
Unadjusted Change 0.0741 0.0741 0.0624 0.0624 0.0117 0.0117
Composition effects attributable to
Location 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0005
Industry 0.0031 0.0033 0.0014 0.0016 0.0017 0.0018
Education 0.0021 0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0018 0.0040 0.0041
Experience -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0020
Total composition 0.0051 0.0055 0.0019 0.0022 0.0032 0.0033
Wage structure effects attributable to
Location 0.0011 0.0049 0.0070 0.0092 -0.0059 -0.0043
Industry -0.0032 -0.0048 0.0131 0.0035 -0.0163 -0.0083
Education -0.0069 0.0077 -0.0003 0.0167 -0.0065 -0.0090
Experience -0.0052 0.0101 0.0024 0.0070 -0.0076 0.0030
Constant 0.0432 0.0358 0.0383 0.0321 0.0449 0.0437
Total structure 0.0690 0.0686 0.0605 0.0602 0.0085 0.0084
RW-error 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001
Inequality measure Variance Gini
Unadjusted Change 0.0379 0.0379 0.0089 0.0089
Composition effects attributable to
Location 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
Industry 0.0015 0.0016 0.0004 0.0005
Education 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0014
Experience 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0001
Total composition 0.0032 0.0034 -0.0011 -0.0011
Wage structure effects attributable to
Location 0.0018 0.0037 0.0005 0.0007
Industry 0.0023 0.0014 0.0010 0.0008
Education 0.0124 0.0201 0.0011 0.0022
Experience -0.0108 -0.0049 -0.0006 0.0002
Constant 0.0291 0.0217 0.0080 0.0069
Total structure 0.0347 0.0345 0.0100 0.0100
RW-error 0.0002 0.0000
Note: the explanatory variables include 4 Census Regions (South omitted), 6 education classes (Associate’s degree of college omitted),
9 potential experience classes (21-25 years omitted), and 6 industry classes (primary omitted). The odd number of column shows the
decomposition results without reweighting and used the before the financial crisis (2004-2006) as reference.
Appendix E
The Definition of the Shapley Value for
Chapter 3
This section provides a definition of the Shapley value in a cooperative transferable utility
game setting.
Suppose a set of agents is N = {1, . . . , i, . . . n} and a potential subset of agents is S ⊂ N ,
and the number of individuals in a coalition S is s. The worth of the coalition S is given
as the payoff v(S) ∈ R, where v is a characteristic function, ∀S and belong to the power
set 2S. Then, the marginal contribution of agent i to the coalition S\{i} is defined as
v(S) − v(S\{i}),∀i ∈ S. The agent i’s payoff is i’s expected marginal contribution to the
coalition when the coalition is randomly selected and all orderings of agents are held to
be equally likely. The probability that in a random ordering a given coalition S ⊂ N ,
i ∈ S can be calculated as the product of two probabilities: the probability that agent is in
the Sth place, which is 1
n
, and the probability that S\{i} occurs when s − 1 members are
randomly selected from the population N\{i} and that is (n−s)!(s−1)!
(n−1)! . The Shapley value,
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[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]
(E.1)
The total amount to be distributed among the agents, which is the sum of the Shapley
value payoffs over N , is equal to v(N). See Shorrocks (2013) for the application of the
Shapley value allocation method to the decomposition of inequality by factors components.
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Table F.2: Number of Observation by Age Group
Number of Obs. Percent (%) Cumulative %
teens 1,186,304 43.97 43.97
20s 1,108,872 41.10 85.07
30s 271,148 10.05 95.12
40s 65,291 2.42 97.54
50s 39,930 1.48 99.02
60s or older 26,440 0.98 100.00
Total 2,697,986 100.00
Table F.3: Relationship to the Head of Household
Male Female Total
Head of HH 5,753,733 4,265,657 10,019,390
Child 1,474,632 1,223,354 2,697,986
Total 7,228,365 5,489,011 12,717,376
Table F.4: Number of Observation by English Language Proficiency
Number of Obs. Percent (%) Cumulative %
Does not speak Eng 44,624 0.35 0.35
Speaks only Eng 11,056,015 86.94 87.29
Speaks very well 1,095,678 8.62 95.90
Speaks well 340,134 2.67 98.58
Speaks but not well 180,925 1.42 100.00
Total 12,717,376 100.00
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Table F.5: Number of Observation by Race
Number of Obs. Percent (%) Cumulative %
White 1,146,374 42.49 42.49
Black 590,050 21.87 64.36
Asian 345,072 12.79 77.15
Other 323,489 11.99 89.14
Two or More 293,001 10.86 100.00
Total 2,697,986 100.00
Table F.6: Number of Observation by Ethnicity
Number of Obs. Percent (%) Cumulative %
Non-Hispanic 2,013,237 74.62 74.62
Hispanic 684,749 25.38 100.00
Total 2,697,986 100.00
Table F.7: Number of Observation by Cognitive Difficulty
Number of Obs. Percent (%) Cumulative %
No cognitive difficulty 12,138,302 95.45 95.45
Has cognitive difficulty 579,074 4.55 100.00
Total 12,717,376 100.00
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. (2002). Technical change, inequality, and the labor market. Journal of eco-
nomic literature, 40(1):7–72.
Acemoglu, D. and Autor, D. (2011). Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Em-
ployment and Earnings*. Handbook of labor economics, 4, Part B:1043 – 1171.
Alvaredo, F. and Piketty, T. (2010). The Dynamics of Income Concentration over the
Twentieth Century. The Case of Advanced Economies. Brookings Institution Press, page
43 p.
Arrow, K. J., Bowles, S., and Durlauf, S. N. (2000). Meritocracy and economic inequality.
Princeton University Press.
Arulampalam, W., Booth, A. L., and Bryan, M. L. (2007). Is There a Glass Ceiling over
Europe? Exploring the Gender Pay Gap across the Wage Distribution. Industrial & Labor
Relations Review, 60(2):163–186.
Atkinson, A. B. and Morelli, S. (2010). Inequality and banking crises: A first look. In
European Labour Forum in Turin organised by the International Training centre of the
International Labour Organization (ILO).
Autor, D. (2011). The polarization of job opportunities in the U.S. labor market: implications
for employment and earnings. Community Investments, (Fall).
Autor, D., Katz, L. F., and Kearney, M. (2006). Measuring and interpreting trends in
economic inequality. In AEA Papers and Proceedings, volume 96, pages 189–194.
Autor, D. and others (2010). The polarization of job opportunities in the US labor mar-
ket: Implications for employment and earnings. Center for American Progress and The
Hamilton Project.
Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., and Kearney, M. S. (2008). Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality:
Revising the Revisionists. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2):300–323.
Baccaro, L. (2008). Labour, globalization and inequality: Are trade unions still redistribu-




Bell, B. and Reenen, J. V. (2010). Bankers’ Pay and Extreme Wage Inequality in the Uk.
Technical Report 28780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
Binder, D. A. and Kovacevic, M. S. (1995). Estimating some measures of income inequality
from survey data: an application of the estimating equations approach. Survey Methodol-
ogy, 21:137–146.
Blackorby, C., Donaldson, D., and Auersperg, M. (1981). A new procedure for the mea-
surement of inequality within and among population subgroups. The Canadian Journal
of Economics / Revue canadienne d’Economique, 14(4):665–685.
Bocian, D. G., Li, W., Reid, C., and Quercia, R. G. (2011). Lost Ground, 2011: Disparities
in mortgage lending and foreclosures. Center for Responsible Lending, 3.
Bound, J. and Johnson, G. (1992). Changes in the structure of wages in the 1980’s: an
evaluation of alternative explanations. The American economic review, 82(3):371–92.
Bourguignon, F. (1979). Decomposable income inequality measures. Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, pages 901–920.
Bourguignon, F., Ferreira, F. H., and Menendez, M. (2007). Inequality of opportunity in
Brazil. Review of income and Wealth, 53(4):585–618.
Brandolini, A. and Smeeding, T. M. (2009). Income inequality in richer and OECD countries.
The Oxford handbook of economic inequality, pages 71–100.
Card, D. (1996). The Effect of Unions on the Structure of Wages: A Longitudinal Analysis.
Econometrica, 64(4):957–979.
Chamberlain, G. (1994). Quantile regression, censoring, and the structure of wages. In
Advances in econometrics: sixth world congress, volume 2, pages 171–209.
Checchi, D. and Peragine, V. (2010). Inequality of opportunity in Italy. Journal of Economic
Inequality, 8(4):429–450.
Checchi, D., Peragine, V., and Serlenga, L. (2010a). Fair and unfair income inequalities in
Europe.
Checchi, D., Peragine, V., and Serlenga, L. (2010b). Fair and Unfair Income Inequalities in
Europe. Technical report, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Chi, W. and Li, B. (2008). Glass ceiling or sticky floor? Examining the gender earnings
differential across the earnings distribution in urban China, 1987–2004. Journal of Com-
parative Economics, 36(2):243–263.
Chávez-Juárez, F. and Soloaga, I. (2015). Scale vs. Translation Invariant Measures of In-
equality of Opportunity When the Outcome is Binary. SSRN Electronic Journal.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 209
Coudouel, A., Hentschel, J. S., and Wodon, Q. T. (2002). Poverty measurement and analysis.
A Sourcebook for poverty reduction strategies, 1:27–74.
Cowell, F. (2011). Measuring inequality. Oxford University Press.
Cowell, F. A. (1980). On the structure of additive inequality measures. The Review of
Economic Studies, 47(3):521–531.
Cowell, F. A. (1985). Measures of distributional change: An axiomatic approach. The review
of economic studies, 52(1):135–151.
Cowell, F. A. (1988). Inequality decomposition: three bad measures. Bulletin of Economic
Research, 40(4):309–312.
Cowell, F. A. (2000). Measurement of inequality. Handbook of income distribution, 1:87–166.
Cowell, F. A. and Kuga, K. (1981). Inequality measurement: an axiomatic approach. Euro-
pean Economic Review, 15(3):287–305.
Cox, N. J. (1999). gr42: Quantile plots, generalized. Stata Technical Bulletin, 51:16–18.
DiNardo, J., Fortin, N. M., and Lemieux, T. (1996). Labor Market Institutions and the Dis-
tribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach. Econometrica, 64(5):1001–
1044.
Ebert, U. and Moyes, P. (2000). An axiomatic characterization of Yitzhaki’s index of indi-
vidual deprivation. Economics Letters, 68(3):263–270.
Fei, J. C., Ranis, G., and Kuo, S. W. (1978). Growth and the family distribution of income
by factor components. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92(1):17–53.
Ferreira, F. H. (2001). Education for the masses? The interaction between wealth, educa-
tional and political inequalities. Economics of transition, 9(2):533–552.
Ferreira, F. H. and Gignoux, J. (2011). The measurement of inequality of opportunity:
Theory and an application to Latin America. Review of Income and Wealth, 57(4):622–
657.
Ferreira, F. H., Gignoux, J., and Aran, M. (2011). Measuring inequality of opportunity with
imperfect data: the case of Turkey. Journal of Economic Inequality, 9(4):651–680.
Ferreira, F. H. and Peragine, V. (2015). Equality of opportunity: Theory and evidence.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7217.
Firpo, S., Fortin, N., and Lemieux, T. (2007). Decomposing wage distributions using recen-
tered influence function regressions. University of British Columbia (June).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 210
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. M., and Lemieux, T. (2009). Unconditional quantile regressions. Econo-
metrica, 77(3):953–973.
Firpo, S. and Pinto, C. (2015). Identification and Estimation of Distributional Impacts of
Interventions Using Changes in Inequality Measures. Journal of Applied Econometrics.
Fleurbaey, M. and Peragine, V. (2013). Ex ante versus ex post equality of opportunity.
Economica, 80(317):118–130.
Fortin, N., Lemieux, T., and Firpo, S. (2011). Decomposition Methods in Economics. Hand-
book of labor economics, Volume 4, Part A:1–102.
Foster, J. E. and Shneyerov, A. A. (2000). Path independent inequality measures. Journal
of Economic Theory, 91(2):199–222.
Frank, R. H. (2000). Does growing inequality harm the middle class? Eastern Economic
Journal, 26(3):253–264.
Freeman, R. B. (1991). How Much Has De-Unionisation Contributed to the Rise in Male
Earnings Inequality? National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No.
3826.
Frydman, C. and Saks, R. E. (2010). Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-
Term Perspective, 1936-2005. Review of Financial Studies, 23(5):2099–2138.
Gabaix, X. and Landier, A. (2008). Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much? The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 123(1):49–100.
Gini, C. (1912). Variabilità e Mutabilità, contributo allo studio delle distribuzioni e realizioni
statiche. Studi Economico-Giuridici della R. Università di Cagliari, (3 Part 2).
Glyn, A. (2007). Capitalism unleashed: finance, globalization, and welfare. Oxford University
Press.
Glyn, A. (2009). Functional distribution and inequality. Oxford University Press.
Goldin, C. D. and Katz, L. F. (2009). The race between education and technology. Harvard
University Press.
Goos, M. and Manning, A. (2007). Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work
in Britain. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(1):118–133.
Goos, M., Manning, A., and Salomons, A. (2009). Job polarization in Europe. The American
Economic Review, 99(2):58–63.
Goos, M., Manning, A., and Salomons, A. (2014). Explaining job polarization: Routine-
biased technological change and offshoring. The American Economic Review, 104(8):2509–
2526.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211
Greenwood, J., Guner, N., Kocharkov, G., and Santos, C. (2014). Marry Your Like: As-
sortative Mating and Income Inequality. National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper Series, No. 19829:–undacao Getulio Vargas Praia de Botafogo, 190 Sala 1100 Rio
de Janeiro – RJ – Brazil E–Mail: cezar.santos@fgv.br.
Hertz, T., Jayasundera, T., Piraino, P., Selcuk, S., Smith, N., Verashchagina, A., and others
(2007). The inheritance of educational inequality: International comparisons and fifty-year
trends. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 7(2):1–46.
Heywood, J. S. and Parent, D. (2012). Performance Pay and the White-Black Wage Gap.
Journal of Labor Economics, 30(2):249–290.
Horn, G. A., Dröge, K., Sturn, S., van Treeck, T., and Zwiener, R. e. a. (2009). From the
financial crisis to the world economic crisis: The role of inequality. Technical report, IMK
Policy Brief.
Jacobson, L. S., LaLonde, R. J., and Sullivan, D. G. (1993). Earnings Losses of Displaced
Workers. The American Economic Review, 83(4):685–709.
Jencks, C. and Tach, L. (2006). Would equal opportunity mean more mobility? Mobility
and inequality: Frontiers of research from sociology and economics, pages 23–58.
Juhn, C., Murphy, K. M., and Pierce, B. (1993). Wage inequality and the rise in returns to
skill. Journal of political Economy, 101(3):410–442.
Juárez, F. W. C., Soloaga, I., and others (2014). iop: Estimating ex-ante inequality of
opportunity. The Stata Journal, 14(4):830–846.
Kaplan, S. N. and Rauh, J. (2010). Wall Street and Main Street: What contributes to the
rise in the highest incomes? Review of Financial Studies, 23(3):1004–1050.
Karoly, L. A. and Burtless, G. (1995). Demographic change, rising earnings inequality, and
the distribution of personal well-being, 1959–1989. Demography, 32(3):379–405.
Katz, L. F. and Autor, D. H. (1999). Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings Inequality.
Handbook of labor economics, Volume 3, Part A:1463–1555.
Katz, L. F. and Murphy, K. M. (1992). Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and
Demand Factors. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1):35–78.
Kee, H. J. (2006). Glass ceiling or sticky floor? Exploring the Australian gender pay gap.
Economic Record, 82(259):408–427.
Kim, C. and Sakamoto, A. (2008). The Rise of Intra-Occupational Wage Inequality in the
United States, 1983 to 2002. American Sociological Review, 73(1):129–157.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 212
Lee, D. S. (1999). Wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s: Rising dispersion
or falling minimum wage? Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 977–1023.
Lemieux, T. (2002). Decomposing changes in wage distributions: a unified approach. Cana-
dian J Econ, 35(4):646–688.
Lemieux, T. (2006a). Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition Effects, Noisy
Data, or Rising Demand for Skill? The American Economic Review, 96(3):461–498.
Lemieux, T. (2006b). Post-secondary education and increasing wage inequality. National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 12077.
Lemieux, T., MacLeod, W. B., and Parent, D. (2009). Performance pay and wage inequality.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(1):1–49.
Lerman, R. I. and Yitzhaki, S. (1985). Income inequality effects by income source: a new
approach and applications to the United States. The review of economics and statistics,
pages 151–156.
Litchfield, J. A. (1999). Inequality: methods and tools. World Bank’s Web Site.
McKay, A. (2002). Inequality Briefing. Briefing Paper, 1:1–6.
Melly, B. (2005). Decomposition of differences in distribution using quantile regression.
Labour economics, 12(4):577–590.
Michaels, G., Natraj, A., and Reenen, J. V. (2014). Has ICT Polarized Skill Demand? Evi-
dence from Eleven Countries over Twenty-Five Years. Review of Economics and Statistics,
96(1):60–77.
Mieske, N. (2009). Low-Skill Service Jobs and Technical Change, unpublished MSc disser-
tation. University College London.
Monti, A. C. (1991). The study of the Gini concentration ratio by means of the influence
function. Statistica, 51(4):561–580.
Murphy, K. M. and Welch, F. (1992). The structure of wages. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, pages 285–326.
Murphy, K. M. and Welch, F. (2001). Wage Differentials in the 1990s: Is the Glass Half-full
or Half-empty? The causes and consequences of increasing inequality, 2.
Nakao, K. and Treas, J. (1994). Updating occupational prestige and socioeconomic scores:
How the new measures measure up. Sociological methodology, pages 1–72.
Nam, C. B. and Boyd, M. (2004). Occupational status in 2000; over a century of census-based
measurement. Population Research and Policy Review, 23(4):327–358.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 213
OECD (2008). Growing unequal?: Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries.
Olinto, P., Lopez-Calva, L. F., Mulligan, M. A., Saavedra Chanduvi, J., and Ferreira, F.
H. G. (2012). Inequality in focus vol. 1 (no. 1). Inequality in focus, 1:1–12.
O’Neill, D., Sweetman, O., and Van de Gaer, D. (2007). The effects of measurement error and
omitted variables when using transition matrices to measure intergenerational mobility.
Journal of Economic Inequality, 5(2):159–178.
Park, B., Turlach, B., and others (1992). Practical performance of several data driven band-
width selectors. Technical report, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations
Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Parzen, E. (1962). On estimation of a probability density function and mode. The annals of
mathematical statistics, 33(3):1065–1076.
Pen, J. (1971). Income distribution: facts, theories, policies. New directions in management
and economics. Praeger, New York.
Peragine, V. (2004). Ranking income distributions according to equality of opportunity.
Journal of Economic Inequality, 2(1):11–30.
Piketty, T. . (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2003). Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):1–41.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2006). The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and Interna-
tional Perspective. American Economic Review, 96(2):200–205.
Piraino, P. (2012). Inequality of opportunity and intergenerational mobility in South Africa.
In 2nd World Bank Conference on Equity, pages 27–28.
Pischke, J.-S. (1995). Measurement error and earnings dynamics: Some estimates from the
PSID validation study. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 13(3):305–314.
Pistolesi, N. (2009). Inequality of opportunity in the land of opportunities, 1968–2001.
Journal of Economic Inequality, 7(4):411–433.
Poterba, J. M. and Summers, L. H. (1986). Reporting errors and labor market dynamics.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1319–1338.
Pyatt, G., Chen, C.-N., and Fei, J. (1980). The distribution of income by factor components.
The quarterly journal of economics, 95(3):451–473.
Rajan, R. G. (2011). Fault lines: How hidden fractures still threaten the world economy.
Princeton University Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 214
Ramos Morilla, X. and Gaer, D. V. d. (2012). Empirical approaches to inequality of oppor-
tunity. Institute for the Study of labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 6672.
Ray, D. (1998). Development economics. Princeton University Press.
Rosenblatt, M. (1956). Remarks on some nonparametric estimates of a density function.
The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 27(3):832–837.
Ruggles, S., Genadek, K., Goeken, R., Grover, J., and Sobek, M. (2015). Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota.
Runciman, W. G. (1966). Relative deprivation and social justice: a study of attitudes to
social inequality in twentieth-century England. University of California Press.
Sastre, M. and Trannoy, A. (2002). Shapley inequality decomposition by factor components:
some methodological issues. Journal of Economics, 77(1):51–89.
Schezhtman, E. and Yitzhaki, S. (1987). A Measure Of Association Based On Gin’s Mean
Difference. Communications in statistics-Theory and Methods, 16(1):207–231.
Scott, C. D. and Litchfield, J. A. (1994). Inequality, mobility and the determinants of
income among the rural poor in Chile, 1968-1986. Development Economics Research
Programme, Suntory-Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines,
London School of Economics.
Shapley, L. S. (1953). A Value for n-person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games,
II,(H. Kuhn and AW Tucker, eds). Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28.
Shorrocks, A. and Wan, G. (2005). Spatial decomposition of inequality. Journal of Economic
Geography, 5(1):59–81.
Shorrocks, A. F. (1982). Inequality decomposition by factor components. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 193–211.
Shorrocks, A. F. (1984). Inequality Decomposition by Population Subgroups. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, 52(6):1369–1385.
Shorrocks, A. F. (2013). Decomposition procedures for distributional analysis: a unified
framework based on the Shapley value. Journal of Economic Inequality, pages 1–28.
Singh, A. (2012). Inequality of opportunity in earnings and consumption expenditure: The
case of Indian men. Review of Income and Wealth, 58(1):79–106.
Stark, O., Taylor, J. E., and Yitzhaki, S. (1986). Remittances and inequality. The economic
journal, 96(383):722–740.
Stuart, A. (1954). The Correlation between Variate-Values and Ranks in Samples from a
Continuous Distribution. British Journal of Statistical Psychology, 7(1):37–44.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 215
Sullivan, D. and von Wachter, T. (2009). Job Displacement and Mortality: An Analysis
Using Administrative Data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3):1265–1306.
Taylor, J. E., Mora, J., Adams, R., and Lopez-Feldman, A. (2005). Remittances, Inequal-
ity and Poverty: Evidence from Rural Mexico. Department of Agricultural & Resource
Economics, UCD.
Teulings, C. N. (2003). The contribution of minimum wages to increasing wage inequality.
The Economic Journal, 113(490):801–833.
Torche, F. (2014). Intergenerational mobility and inequality: The Latin American case.
Annual Review of Sociology, 40:619–642.
Treeck, T. (2014). Did inequality cause the US financial crisis? Journal of Economic Surveys,
28(3):421–448.
Van Reenen, J. (2011a). Wage inequality, technology and trade: 21st century evidence.
European Association of Labour Economists, 3rd World Conference EALE/SOLE, London
UK, 17-19 June2010, 18(6):730–741.
Van Reenen, J. (2011b). Wage inequality, technology and trade: 21st century evidence.
Labour economics, 18(6):730–741.
Wisman, J. D. (2013). Wage stagnation, rising inequality and the financial crisis of 2008.
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37(4):921–945.
Wodon, Q. and Yitzhaki, S. (2002). Inequality and Social Welfare. Technical report, Uni-
versity Library of Munich, Germany.
Yitzhaki, S. (1979). Relative deprivation and the Gini coefficient. The quarterly journal of
economics, pages 321–324.
